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Abstract 
The Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period ended at the end of 2012. The literature discussing the 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in developing countries such as Malaysia is rare and 
limited. This is due to the fact that the Protocol only requires commitments from developed 
countries in order to reach its objective. The only relevant provisions to be discussed under the 
Protocol relevant to developing nations such as Malaysia are article 10 and 12, the former being 
the general obligations of Parties to the Protocol and the latter the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and analyze the Malaysian national 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and ‘green’ developments such as the CDM and the latest feed-in-tariff 
system implemented in Malaysia. Various national policies and laws such as the National 
Renewable Energy Policy and Action Plan 2009 and the Renewable Energy Act 2011 will be 
looked into to ascertain whether such policies and laws do support the spirit and purpose of the 
Convention. Analysis is also conducted on the current list of all relevant Malaysian CDM 
projects. With the findings, recommendations are made, especially on the legal perspective in 
order to make the Malaysian national implementation better so that the ultimate objective of the 
Convention can be achieved. 
Keywords: Environmental Law, Climate Change, Kyoto Protocol, National Law and Policy. 
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Introduction 
 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)'s Our Common 
Future (‘the Brundtland Report') defines sustainable development as development that 
meets the needs of the present, without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs. To achieve this, the report acknowledges the inseparability 
between the environment and development. It is an accepted wisdom that 
development will cause environmental degradation due to anthropogenic activities 
and thus the need to strike balance between the two agendas.  
 
In acknowledging the need for developing nations such as Malaysia to move forward, 
the application and implementation of the environmental international law principle 
‘common but differentiated responsibility’ is lauded. This principle enables a country 
to pursue sustainable development according to its own capacity. It is said that the 
main contributor of climate change is caused by development in particular industry. 
Industrialization as a phase of development is a necessary evil for a country to 
develop. With it greenhouse gases (GHG) are emitted into the globally common 
atmosphere thus causing climate change.  
 
To mitigate this problem, nations have banded together under the United Nations by 
establishing an international environmental treaty called the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) produced at the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which is 
informally known as the Earth Summit. The objective of UNFCCC is to achieve 
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”  
 
To achieve this objective the Kyoto Protocol was then adopted under the UNFCCC 
and was brought into force on the 16th February 2005. The Kyoto Protocol allows 
several flexible mechanisms to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gases emission. One 
of the mechanisms is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).  
 
Malaysia is a party to UNFCCC and also the Kyoto Protocol. As a developing nation 
and a country not under Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol, Malaysia have the privilege to 
actively tap into the CDM programme and the benefits that entails so that the nation’s 
quest for sustainability can be strived for if not achieved. 
 
Malaysia under the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Malaysia ratified and became member of the Kyoto Protocol on 4 September 2002. 
Malaysia as a developing nation is currently placed under the Non-Annex I group. 
This means that Malaysia is not subjected to any of the specific commitments under 
the Kyoto Protocol towards reducing GHG emissions other than the obligations 
mentioned in its Article 10. Since its ratification, the Malaysian government through 
its Natural Resources and Environment Ministry (MNRE) has actively implementing 
its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol, albeit being a country under the Non-Annex 
I group.  
 
To see such implementation, it is best to see first Malaysia’s obligation under the 
Protocol. Article 10 of the Protocol listed down various obligations of its Parties that 
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should be observed by the all parties to the Protocol, including Malaysia. In general a 
Party needs to do the following within its national perspective (see Table 1 below): 
 
Table 1: Obligations applicable to Developing Country Parties of the Kyoto 
Protocol based on National Perspective 
No. Obligations 
1 Formulate national programmes to improve the quality of local emission 
factors, which reflect the national socio-economic conditions. 
 
2 Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national programmes 
containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate 
adaptation to climate change. 
 
3 Strengthen development in scientific and technical research with regards to 
climate change. 
 
4 Promote capacity building and public awareness to climate change 
 
5 Provide information on programmes and activities undertaken in the National 
Communications. 
 
 
The Malaysian Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
 
Malaysia has actively embarked upon a voluntary effort in making reduction of its 
national GHG emissions. This voluntary commitment was put forward at COP-15 of 
the UNFCCC in Copenhagen. This voluntary reduction amounts to 40% less in the 
year 2020 compared to 2005. In general the Malaysian government’s effort in 
reducing GHG emissions is covered under three main programmes, which are energy 
efficiency, renewable energy and solid waste management. 
 
The National Policy on Climate Change 2009 
 
In order to fight against climate change the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment Malaysia (MNRE) has prepared the National Policy on Climate Change 
(NPCC). It has been approved by the Malaysian cabinet of Ministers on 20 November 
2009. 
 
The NPCC reiterate the country’s firm stand that climate change is one of the main 
issues facing the world today that are caused by both human activities and natural 
processes (NPCC 2009). Under the NPCC, it recognizes that climate change should 
be addressed through two approaches i.e. adaptation and mitigation. It states that 
“adaptation refers to actions taken to help communities and ecosystems cope with 
actual or expected impacts of climate change. Mitigation refers to actions taken to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which are one of the main causes of global 
warming, and enhance carbon sinks to lessen the impacts of climate change. In 
addressing climate change, particularly its impacts on humans, both adaptation and 
mitigation should be implemented in an integrated and balanced manner.” 
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The objectives of the NPCC are as follows: 
1. Mainstreaming climate change through wise management of resources and 
enhanced environmental conservation resulting in strengthened economic 
competitiveness and improved quality of life; 
2. Integration of responses into national policies, plans and programmes to 
strengthen the resilience of development from arising and potential impacts of 
climate change; and 
3. Strengthening of institutional and implementation capacity to better harness 
opportunities to reduce negative impacts of climate change. 
 
In responding to the challenges of climate change, the NPCC states that the Malaysian 
government undertakes to mainstream national responses that consolidate economic, 
social and environmental development goals based on five principles (see table 2 
below). 
 
Table 2: Principles under the NPCC 
No. Principle Explanation 
1 Development on a Sustainable 
Path 
Integrate climate change responses into 
national development plans to fulfil the 
country’s aspiration for sustainable 
development. 
2 Conservation of Environment 
and Natural 
Resources 
Strengthen implementation of climate 
change actions that contribute to 
environmental conservation and sustainable 
use of natural resources. 
3 Coordinated Implementation Incorporate climate change considerations 
into implementation of development 
programmes at all levels. 
4 Effective Participation Improve participation of stakeholders and 
major groups for effective implementation of 
climate change responses. 
5 Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities and 
Respective 
Capabilities 
International involvement on climate change 
will be based on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. 
Source: NPCC 
 
This policy is drafted in a way to highlight the efforts that need to be done by various 
Ministries and Agencies in fighting against climate change. From this policy it can be 
seen that the onus of implementing the country’s obligation under the Kyoto Protocol 
does not rest on the MNRE alone due to fact that in complying with those obligations, 
another ministry that is the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water 
(KeTTHA) participation is also required. 
 
The National Renewable Energy Policy and Action Plan 2009 (NREPAP) 
 
The NREPAP was drafted by the Ministry of Energy, Green Technology and Water 
(KeTTHA). In its executive summary, it states that under the context of electricity 
generation, efforts towards renewable energy must be made since the past “business-
as-usual” approach in energy generation is not sustainable, appropriate nor 
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productive. This is due to the fact that in Malaysia, the total GHG emissions for the 
year 2006 amounted to 169,829 GgCO2 and the power sector is identified as one of 
the major and largest contributors with 56,203 GgCO2 accounting for 33% of the 
emissions. Thus give rise to the need to revert to renewable energy in order to cut 
down on GHG emissions. 
 
The policy vision of the NREPAP is to enhance the utilisation of indigenous 
renewable energy resources to contribute towards national electricity supply security 
and sustainable socioeconomic development. It provides 5 objectives to be met, which 
are as follows: 
1. To increase Renewable Energy contribution in the national power generation 
mix; 
2. To facilitate the growth of the Renewable Energy industry; 
3. To ensure reasonable Renewable Energy generation costs; 
4. To conserve the environment for future generations; and 
5. To enhance awareness on the role and importance of Renewable Energy. 
 
The Malaysian government interest in Renewable Energy is not without basis. This is 
due to the fact that Malaysia is blessed with many indigenous renewable energy 
sources. The NREPAP 2009, has laid down several identified renewable energy 
sources that are relevant to be exploited in Malaysia, which includes, palm oil 
biomass wastes, mini-hydro, solar power, solid waste and land fill gas, wind energy 
and geothermal, and finally wastes and gases from agriculture-based and farming 
industries. 
 
Based on the NREPAP and its recommendations on strengthening the legislative 
aspect of the renewable energy in the country, the Malaysian parliament enacted a 
legislation to cover the area of renewable energy in Malaysia that is the Renewable 
Energy Act 2011. It is an Act to provide for the establishment and implementation of 
a special tariff system to catalyse the generation of renewable energy and to provide 
for related matters. 
 
Furthermore, on the aspect of strengthening national institutional framework with 
regards to renewable energy based on the NREPAP recommendations, the Sustainable 
Energy Development Authority Act 2011 was enacted. It is an Act to provide for the 
establishment of the Sustainable Energy Development Authority of Malaysia (SEDA) 
and to provide for its functions and powers and for related matters. The key role of 
SEDA is to administer and manage the implementation of the feed-in tariff 
mechanism (FiT) which is mandated under the Renewable Energy Act 2011. 
 
The NREPAP has also give rise to other related national policy that is the National 
Green Technology Policy 2009. 
 
National Green Technology Policy 2009 (NGTP) 
 
The NGTP was prepared by the Malaysian Ministry of Energy, Green Technology 
and Water (KeTTHA). Under the NGTP, it is stated as its policy statement that green 
technology shall be a driver to accelerate the national economy and promote 
sustainable development. It introduces the four pillars of the NGTP which are: 
1. Energy – seek to attain energy independence and promote efficient utilization; 
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2. Environment – conserve and minimize the impact on the environment; 
3. Economy – enhance the national economic development through the use of 
technology; and 
4. Social – improve the quality of life for all. 
 
The objectives of the NGTP centred heavily on the principle of sustainable 
development and they are as follows: 
1. To reduce the energy usage rate and at the same time increase economic 
growth; 
2. To facilitate the growth of the green technology industry and enhance its 
contribution to the national economy; 
3. To increase national capability and capacity for innovation in green 
technology development and enhance Malaysia’s competitiveness in green 
technology in the global arena; 
4. To ensure sustainable development and conserve the environment for future 
generations; and 
5. To enhance public education and awareness on green technology and 
encourage its widespread use. 
 
The NGTP has ignited a series of the Malaysian government initiatives in order to 
achieve its objectives. These initiatives revolve around the strategic thrusts a 
described by the NGTP as follows: 
1. Strengthen the institutional frameworks; 
2. Provide a conducive environment for green technology development; 
3. Intensify human capital development in green technology; 
4. Intensify green technology research and innovations; and 
5. Promotion and public awareness. 
 
In response to the five strategic thrusts, the Malaysian government initiated a series of 
initiatives to reflect them. In order to strengthened institutional framework of the 
NGTP, a National Green Technology Council (NGTC) was formed. The Council’s 
objective is to provide high level coordination among Ministries, Agencies, the 
private sector and all other stakeholders in the implementation of the NGTP. The 
NGTC will take a consolidated approach, providing a national strategic focus and 
plan to pave directions for the development and application of green technology in 
Malaysia. 
 
Another initiative in strengthening institutional framework is the restructuring of the 
National Energy Centre or Pusat Tenaga Malaysia (PTM) to become the Malaysian 
Green Technology Corporation (MGTC). This restructuring exercise was done in 
order to enhance the position of the MGTC to become a focal point for green 
technology development in Malaysia. 
 
In providing a facilitative environment for green technology and development, the 
Malaysian government introduced the Green Technology Financing Scheme (GTFS). 
Based on the announcement of the Malaysian Government Budget 2010 the GTFS is 
backed by RM1.5 billion fund to be distributed via soft loan system, where 2 percent 
of the loan interest is subsidised by the government. This soft-loan is intended for 
manufacturers and nationwide consumers of green technology. The GTFS starts 
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effective in January 2010 and all applications of the loan under the scheme are 
administered by MGTC. 
 
Financial incentive in the form of income tax exemption1 is also given to building 
owners who have been certified the Green building Index (GBI) from 24 October 
2009 to 31 December 2014. This goes the same to home buyers who had received 
GBI certificate from the developer property will be given duty stamp exemption on 
documents of transfer of the said property2. In order to acquire GBI certificate, one 
need to prove that the building owned is energy efficient, amongst others.  
 
Furthermore, there are several others government initiatives that involve KeTTHA as 
the originator of the NGTP to work together with other Ministries. Firstly, KeTTHA 
is working with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) to develop a mechanism for Green 
Procurement to be implemented in government agencies. Under this context of Green 
Procurement Mechanism, KeTTHA also works together with Standards and Industrial 
Research Institute of Malaysia (SIRIM) to develop standards, certifications and 
labelling mechanisms including Green Procurement manuals and procedure to enable 
government and private sector to embark on “green” procurement and purchasing. 
 
In order to evaluate the success of the NGTP and its initiatives a National Key 
Indicator shall be applied. Amongst others the reduction of the GHG emissions is one 
of the required indicators, followed by indicators that cover sustainable development 
and the improvement of living quality in Malaysia. These indicators seem to have 
most of the spirit of the Kyoto Protocol especially its ultimate objective that is GHG 
emissions reduction and the implementation of the principle of sustainable 
development. Thus it can be said that the NGTP and its initiatives is an 
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol article 10. Currently there are still no 
regulations and legislations in place for the NGTP to support its activities. 
 
Refer table 4 below to see the Malaysian government’s post ratification response 
towards obligations given by the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 
Table 4: Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in Malaysia. 
No. Obligations Implementation 
1 Formulate national programmes to 
improve the quality of local emission 
factors which reflect the national socio-
economic conditions. 
NPCC 
NREPAP 
NGTP 
 
2 Formulate, implement, publish and 
regularly update national programmes 
containing measures to mitigate climate 
change and measures to facilitate 
adaptation to climate change. 
NPCC 
NREPAP 
NGTP 
 
3 Strengthen development in scientific and 
technical research with regards to 
climate change. 
NGTP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tax exempted is equal to the amount of expenditure in obtaining the GBI certificate. 
2 KeTTHA, Incentives and Financial Support, 24 Oct 2011, 9 Dec 2011 
<http://www.kettha.gov.my/en/content/ incentives-and-financial-support> 
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4 Promote capacity building and public 
awareness to climate change 
NGTP 
5 Provide information on programmes and 
activities undertaken in the National 
Communications. 
Malaysia Initial National 
Communication to the UNFCCC 
Malaysia Second National 
Communication to the UNFCCC 
 
Renewable Energy Act 2011 (REA) 
 
The REA came into force in Malaysia on 2 June 2011. So far this is the only 
legislation that directly support the mitigation and adaptation approach of the 
UNFCCC, together with its complimentary Sustainable Energy and Development 
Authority Act 2011 (SEDA) that provides the administrative aspect of administration 
of renewable energy in Malaysia. Still in its infancy, renewable energy generation in 
Malaysia is confined to the feed-in tariff system of small renewable energy power 
producers. Coming in force in 2011, it also covers and acknowledges the renewable 
energy projects that already been registered and running under the CDM scheme. One 
criticism that can be directed to this law is that it provides a limit of energy generation 
by renewable energy rather than allowing the market forces to act upon this matter. 
This can be viewed as a protectionist policy implemented by the government in order 
to protect non-renewable energy power producers. 
 
Implementation of CDM in Malaysia 
 
Currently, in Malaysia 204 projects are given LOA by the DNA. From that number, 
only 103 projects have been registered under the UNFCCC CDM Registry while 2 
projects are requesting for registration (Refer Appendix C for full list of CDM 
projects in Malaysia)3. The remaining 99 projects are either rejected from being 
registered, have withdrawn their request for registration or have their validation 
terminated. From this data it can be seen that currently only 50.4% of the whole CDM 
bound projects are registered.  
 
 
In 2007, the numbers of CDM projects implemented in Malaysia is very small 
compared to the recent development4. By 2007 only 31 projects were given LOA, 16 
projects registered with the CDM and only 2 projects accredited with CER issuance. 
(See table for comparison) 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 UNEP Riso Centre, CDM Pipeline, 15 Dec 2011 < http://cdmpipeline.org/> 
4	  Azhar	  bin	  Noraini,	  “Climate	  Change	  ans	  CDM	  in	  Malaysia”,	  Seminar	  on	  CDM	  Potential	  in	  TNB,	  (Bangi,	  
27	  July	  2007)	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Chart 1: Comparison of the number of CDM Projects in Malaysia in 2007 and 
2011 
 
 
From the table above we can see that there is a huge increase in the numbers of CDM 
projects implemented in Malaysia. It seems that after 4 years, the numbers have 
increased more than 6 times. This shows that Malaysia is very serious in 
implementing the CDM. In 2010 Malaysia ranked 5th in the world, behind CDM 
giants China and India, for registered CDM projects5. 
 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
On Kyoto Protocol 
The implementation of Kyoto Protocol and CDM in Malaysia can be viewed under 
two perspectives, which are the implementation made by the government through its 
ministries and agencies for the former and the participation by the private sector for 
the latter. As a party to the Kyoto Protocol, the Malaysian government has the duty to 
observe its provisions, which are relevant, albeit the fact that Malaysia as a Non-
Annex I country is not imposed by the specific commitments of the Protocol. This 
means that even though most of the obligations are not applicable to Malaysia, 
commitment must still be given to fulfil the ultimate objective of the Protocol and in 
the same time the general obligations provided under article 10. On this aspect 
Malaysia has proven itself to go beyond its obligations. Though not required under 
the Protocol to reduce GHG emission, the Malaysian government voluntarily gave 
commitment to reduce its GHG emission in quite a large number. 
 
Since the ratification of the UNFCCC and later the Kyoto Protocol, the Malaysian 
government had initiated various national policies and programmes which serve both 
the Convention and the Protocol ultimate objective. These national policies are further 
strengthened with adequate institutional frameworks that oversee the implementation 
of the policies. However, it must be noted that even though Malaysia had formulated 
several national policies relevant to the Convention and Protocol, it lacks the 
legislation that would help enforce the effort of reducing national GHG emissions. 
The current legislations that deal with emissions in Malaysia are not adequate since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Bernama, Malaysia Tempat Kelima Dunia Untuk Projek-Projek CDM, Bernama.com, 7 June 2010, 20 
August 2011  <http://web6.bernama.com/bernama//v3/news_lite.php?id=504046>. 
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they are more focus on vehicle emissions rather than industrial emissions that form 
the other huge part of GHG emissions production6. 
 
It is submitted that in order for Malaysia to actually achieve its voluntary commitment 
of GHG reduction target, new laws or regulations must be passed so that it is possible 
for emissions reduction to be enforced. However, one may argue that such 
enforcement would mean that the industry sector will be burdened and bound with 
heavy obligations, and may cause negative growth on part of the industrial sector. In 
the light of such argument, I submit that such new laws should keep in mind and 
observe the principle of sustainable development. This will require a juggling act 
between enforcing GHG emissions reduction and protecting the interest of those tied 
to the industry. 
 
Thus the new legislation on enforcement of GHG reduction should include the 
following: 
1. It must identify the major GHG emitters; 
2. The major GHG emitters must be required to submit yearly GHG emissions 
report so that its amount can be observed. Failure to submit such report shall 
constitute as an offence; and 
3. Major GHG emitters must comply with a national emissions standard. Non-
compliance shall constitute an offence. 
 
This legislation by itself will look quite harsh to the industries. Thus in order to 
protect their interest and in the same time observing the principle of sustainable 
development, government-backed initiatives can be implemented. These initiatives 
can be in the form of tax cuts to reward compliance, and encouragement for industries 
to adopt green or more efficient technology. In simple terms, the new law must be 
strict enough to enforce compliance and the initiatives must be attractive enough to 
encourage compliance. 
 
On CDM 
In the context of CDM implementation in Malaysia, the focus is more onto the private 
sector that builds and manages the project rather than the government. However it 
must be noted that the government still need to provide a good institutional 
framework including sound rules and regulations to facilitate CDM projects 
implementation. In Malaysia, the government has established the MGTC, or 
previously known as PTM to oversee CDM projects while in the same time making 
the agency as a focal point for implementation of green technology. This combined 
purpose of the MGTC is like killing two birds with one stone. It is a one stop centre 
that is supposed to making things easier for CDM and green technology projects. This 
will of course benefit the country and any participating party. 
 
On the ground perspective, CDM implementation in Malaysia has not cause any 
adverse impact on any aspect except for certain minor issues, as has been discussed 
above. This is unlike the situation in other countries such as India and Thailand where 
implementation of CDM projects has cause great misfortune to those who dwell near 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Environmental Quality (Control of Emission from Petrol Engines) Regulations 1996; Environmental 
Quality (Control of Emission from Diesel Engines) Regulations 1996; Environmental Quality (Control of 
Emission from Motorcycles) Regulations 2003. 
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the vicinity of the projects7. Stories of residents being evicted from their land by 
CDM projects existed in India8. While in Thailand, a lot of people who live near a 
CDM project plant suffer skin diseases believed to be caused by the burning of paddy 
husks for the purpose of generating Biomass electricity9. 
 
It is submitted that these problems existed is not due to the fault of the CDM regime, 
but it is caused by the weakness of the CDM project country host parties including 
their Annex I country partners in facilitating such project so as to ensure that no 
adverse impact will occur to the environment. In order to stop such bad things from 
happening, the host country party must have sound law, regulations and rules to 
ensure compliance with enforcement and in the same time protects those who are 
affected, at least directly, from the CDM project. 
 
I further submit that a national legislation with regard to CDM projects should include 
the following: 
1. Every application for CDM registration should be provided with an extensive 
environmental impact assessment (EIA); 
2. All application should be made public so that the CDM project can be 
commented upon by relevant NGOs and stakeholders; and 
3. Liability and Redress for environmental harm. By following the Polluter Pays 
Principle this is to provide that if a person or an entity is responsible for 
causing damage to the environment, they are liable to pay for the damage or 
compensate for it. The person may also be required to repair the damage they 
have caused. For this purpose the liability and redress mechanism as provided 
under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety including the Malaysian Biosafety 
Act 200710 should be referred to. 
 
Furthermore, since all CDM project application for registration at the CDM Registry 
starts from the host country party i.e. national level, it is at this level that each 
application must be scrutinized and be dealt with according to the findings. Not only 
that, all running CDM projects should be monitored from time to time. This will of 
course require active participation between the government and its agencies including 
with relevant NGOs and stakeholders. Such combined effort I believe will be able to 
weed out any rotten CDM projects. 
 
All in all it can be said that Malaysia, in its status as a Non-Annex I party, has 
voluntarily complied and successfully implemented the Kyoto Protocol and CDM. 
However, there can always be room for improvement. With relevant new national 
laws and regulations regarding GHG emissions, the 2020 target of 40% GHG 
emissions reduction compared to 2005 can be achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Gilbertson, Tamra and Reyes, Oscar, Carbon trading How it works and why it fails, (Uppsala: Dan 
Hammarskjold Foundation) 2009. 66-79 
8 ibid 
9 ibid 
10 Biosafety Act 2007 (Act 678) 
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Abstract 
 
To be competitive in today’s increasingly complex and rapidly changing environment, 
organizations must retain personnel and promote the well-being of employees. This paper 
aims at empirically investigating work life balance on job performance of the sailors in Rapid 
Action Boat Squadron (RABS) in Sri Lanka Navy. Data were collected from 219 sailors 
using structured questionnaire originally developed by Opatha, (2010) was used for 
measuring work life balance and the structured questionnaire developed by Udayakumar, 
(2003) was used for measuring job performance. Pearson Correlation Coefficient and Curve 
Fit Analysis were employed for the analysis of data. The study substantiated that there is a 
weak positive relationship between work life balance and job performance of the sailors. The 
results suggest that the work life balance aspect on its own does necessarily lead to improved 
individual performance and assumedly organizational effectiveness. Therefore, it needs to 
implement work life balance-performance model effectively through specific practices. The 
paper empirically investigated work life balance-performance model in RABS of Sri Lanka 
Naval context and offers practical implications for top level administration of the Squadron 
seeking effective implementation of the work life balance-performance model. 
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Introduction  
Organizations function in increasingly complex and changing environments. 
Globalization, competition, advancements in information technology, increased work 
demands, decreasing resources, a changing workforce, and transformations in the 
expectations and capabilities of employees are realities that human resource 
professionals must be prepared to effectively manage (Agarwala, 2003; Gephart Jr., 
2002; Hempel, 2004; Norris,2004). As one of the elite forces of Sri Lanka Navy, 
RABS personnel are trained to a high standard with sufficient level of physical and 
mental fitness and the capacity to develop their skills. However, there is a problem of 
attrition and dissatisfaction rate at early stage in sailors’ career. In addition to this 
problem, first it lowers the return on investment in training personnel. Second, high 
attrition both at the early stage of their naval career has implications for operational 
effectiveness which reduces the training effectiveness of the Squadron. In 
combination, these problems will continue to have an impact on retention in the Sri 
Lanka Navy. Among other factors which could influence on the job performance, 
work life balance Gajendran and Harrison, (2007) and Halpern, (2005) may be major 
root to determine the degree of sailor’s effort for the Sri Lanka Navy. Current awful 
nature of human utilization in organizational context may be the basis of sailors’ 
performance as a major factor or as a minor factor. Therefore, the authors try to find 
out the impact of work life balance on determining the job performance of the sailors 
in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy. 
 
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Job performance has been distinguished as a single most all-encompassing outcome 
variable in the micro organizational behaviour research (Staw, 1984). The job 
performance for any one in any milieu is determined by many and different factors. In 
the Porter – Lawler extension of expectancy theory, the effort (the factors of values of 
reward, perceived effort rewarded probability), abilities and traits and role perception 
determine the performance (Moorhead and Griffen, 1999). The equity theory for 
employee performance determines people from perception of equity or inequity by 
comparing what they give to the organization relative to what they get back and how 
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this ratio compares with those of others (Moorhead and Griffen, 1999). Vroom 
(1964), Porter and Lawler (1964), Hellriegel, Slocum and Woodman, (1992), and 
DeCenzo and Robbins (1993), pointed out that the performance is determined by the 
level and interaction between ability and motivation. 
Gellerman (1963) said that conscious goal setting is an important determinant of 
levels of performance. Latham and Yukl in 1975 indicated that goal – setting 
programs improve performance at managerial and non - managerial levels over an 
expanded period of time in a variety of organization (Gordon, 1993). Locke, 
Frederick, Buckner, and Bobko based on their research, has suggested that 
performance was a function of employees’ ability, acceptance of goals, level of the 
goals and the interaction of the goal with their ability (Gordon, 1993). 
Employees who have formed intentions to quit their jobs often mentally distance 
themselves from their work environment and are less focused on their work, less 
likely to work to their full potential, and less effective than their counterparts who 
have not formed such intentions (Beehr & Gupta, 1978; Keaveney & Nelson, 1993). 
As a result of this decrease in effectiveness, employees with intentions to leave their 
current places of work can be very costly to organizations (Cascio, 1991; Gerhart, 
1990; Sager, 1990). Moreover, turnover intentions are often the best predictor of 
turnover rates in organizations ( Armitage & Conner, 2001; Keaveney & Nelson, 
1993; Kim & Hunter, 1983; Locke & Latham, 1990; Mobley, 1977; Steel & Orvalle, 
1984; Williams & Hazer, 1986). Using archival records, Huffman et al. (2005) found 
that turnover intentions closely correspond to the actual turnover of military 
personnel. 
Human resources practices play an important role in the work-life balance and 
turnover intentions of military personnel through support provided to personnel and 
job quality. Although the military may not always have the flexibility to change 
organizational standards and job specifications if they want to remain competitive and 
functional, they do have a significant amount of control over how they manage 
personnel and how they structure specific aspects of jobs or military occupations. 
That is job descriptions may not be changed easily in a military context, but aspects of 
how the job is performed may be improved. For example, job satisfaction is improved 
by supportive practices such as increasing supervisory support and helping personnel 
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to balance their work and family responsibilities. Similarly, ensuring that job 
descriptions are clear (both “on paper” and in practice) may decrease the amount of 
ambiguity for personnel, and developing and maintaining interesting jobs may keep 
employees stimulated by, and engaged in, their work. Organizations looking to sustain 
the physical and psychological factors of current employees and improve retention 
should focus first on factors within their realm of control rather than the extraneous 
factors (e.g., market stability) or relatively stable individual factors (e.g., employee 
personality) that may affect employee work-life balance and retention. Specifically, 
hypothesize that organizational factors involving the supportive management of 
personnel (i.e., supervisory support, organizational support, and work life balance) 
and characteristics pertaining to job quality (i.e., work stimulation and job clarity) will 
be related to work life balance and turnover intentions among military personnel. 
However, these effects are mediated by job satisfaction, given the consistently strong 
relationships between these practices and job satisfaction (e.g., Berg, 1999), and given 
the strong relationships between job satisfaction and both work life balance and 
turnover intentions in previous research (Kathryne, Arla, 2007) 
Recently, researchers have explored the impact of “work - family culture” defined as 
the “shared assumptions, beliefs, and values regarding the extent to which an 
organization supports and values the integration of employees’ work and family lives” 
On employees’ use of work family benefits, reports of work - family conflict, and 
general job attitudes (Behson, 2002; Allen, 2001). Attention to work - family culture 
has grown in response to reports that few employees actually make use of 
organizations’ family - friendly benefits (Bond et al., 1997). Despite the availability 
of programmes designed to facilitate employees’ work family balance, an 
organization’s unsupportive values and norms may undermine the effectiveness of 
such programmes, (Behson, 2002; Allen, 2001). 
 
Most of the research conducted in different countries shows that there is a positive 
relationship between personal life and employee performance. For instance Frone et 
al. (1997) examined the impact of work - life conflict on performance and reported a 
momentous relationship, he used a self reported scale to measure job performance. 
Aryee (1998) reported that performance is related to job - parent conflict but not to 
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job - spouse conflict in his study.  Jackson and Schuler (1983) have found that 
organizational commitment is negatively related to family life of the persons which 
leads to low performance and hence high work - life conflict. Jackson and Schuler 
(1983) and Allen, (2000) wrote that the job affects personal life of employees and vise 
versa. It was said that in terms of commitment that work - life conflict affects it and 
ultimately the performance of employee is reduced. 
Work to family conflict has negative impact on performance of people according to 
Liao, Arvey, and Butler, (2001) when work affects the family the performance 
decreases but it is a good indicator of measuring dedication one has for his job. Work 
family conflict is drastically associated with organizational commitment, and if an 
employee loses commitment then ultimately the performance is reduced. Allen, 
(2001), in his study on customer service employees, customers and supervisors, found 
direct and indirect effects between work family conflict and employee performance 
where the performances are rated by supervisor. Bond, Galinsky, Swanberg, (1997) 
found that there exists a conflict between life and job performance of employees.  
According to Gajendran and Harrison in 2007, Halpern, 2005; there is a positive 
relationship between work life balance practice and job performance of the employee. 
Based on the above evidences, it is hypothesized that the work life balance of the 
sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy has a positive relationship with their job 
performance. Figure 1 shows the schematic diagram of the theoretical framework. 
Hypothesis:  
H1: There is a significant relationship between work life balance practice and job 
performance of the sailors in Rapid Action Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy. 
H0: There is no significant relationship between work life balance practice and job 
performance of the sailors in Rapid Action Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy. 
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Figure: 1 Schematic Diagram of Research Framework 
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Method 
The survey was carried out among the sample of 219 sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka 
Navy which represented 43 present of the population. The unit of analysis was at 
individual level (sailor). The selection of sample was carried out on a random 
sampling method. To collect the primary data required for the study a set of 
questionnaires were distributed among them. These questionnaires consisted of 36 
question statements. All question statements were designed with 5-point Likert scale 
to measure the variables and dimensions in the research model. The secondary data 
were collected from the sources such as reports, records, and other publications. Data 
collected from primary (questionnaire) source were collected and analyzed using the 
computer based statistical data analysis package, SPSS version 16.0. The data analysis 
included the univariate (descriptive) and bivariate analyses. Research conclusions 
were made based on the results there of. The reliability of the two instruments used to 
collect data was examined by using Cornbach’s Alpha coefficient. The Cornbach’s 
Alpha coefficient of job performance was 0.866 and work life balance was 0.847. 
Hence the coefficients of the Cornbach’s Alpha indicate that each of the instruments 
which were used to measure the two variables under the study had sufficient internal 
reliability. 
Univariate Analysis 
Under the univariate analysis frequency distribution analysis was carried out of 
respondents by their personal characteristics. The age of the respondents grouped into 
four levels ranging from 20 to 40 years. The majority 49.3% of the respondents was 
within the age group of 20-25 and 33.3% of the respondents were within the age 
group of 26-30 and 16.9% of the respondents were within the age group between 31-
Age 
Marital 
Status 
Education 
Experience	  
Work Life 
Balance  
Job Performance 
Of the Sailors 
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35 years. Just 0.5% of the respondents represented the age group 36-40. The majority 
of the respondents (56.2%) were unmarried. The level of education of the majority of 
the sample (93.2%) was GCE O/L. This is because GCE O/L is a prerequisite for 
recruiting the Sri Lanka Navy. The experience levels ranged from 01 to 20 years of 
the sample. The results show that 45% of the respondents were 01-05 years’ 
experience in Navy and just 5% marked over 16 years’ experience in their service 
period. 
The frequency distribution analysis was made individually for the variables of job 
performance and work life balance. Frequency distribution analysis results have been 
interpreted mainly considering the Mean and Compare Mean values. The mean value 
of the distribution of job performance is 4.4027. Then the job performance of the 
respondents is good. The mean value of the distribution of work life balance is 
1.5309. Then the respondents are not balanced with their work and life domains.      
Bivariate Analysis 
Bivariate analysis includes the correlation analysis and curve fit analyses which were 
used to investigate any relationship between independent variable (work life balance) 
and job performance (dependent variable). The correlation analysis was made to 
investigate any relationship between work life balance and job performance. Person 
Correlation between these two variables is 0.368 which is positive. The statistical 
evidence claimed that work life balance and job performance are positively correlated 
to each other. Regression equation of work life balance is; 
Job Performance = 3.673 + 0.477 (Work Life Balance) 
The b value of equation, the gradient of regression, is 0.477, which is significant at 
1% (0.000). When considered the adjusted R2, 13.2 % of the variance of job 
performance is explained by work life balance with the standardized beta 0.367. The 
ANOVA of the model for Job Performance and work life balance showed the F value 
that is 34.090, which is significant at 1% (0.000) suggesting that job performance has 
significantly explained 13.2% of the variance of job performance. Curve fit for job 
performance and work life balance further confirms the positive linear relationship 
between job performance and work life balance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka 
Navy. 
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According to the results of the tests, the hypothesis is accepted since r>0, and b>0. 
Hence the data support the hypothesis that there is a relationship between work life 
balance and job performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy. Further, data 
claimed positive relationship. 
Discussion 
It was found that there is a positive relationship between work life balances and job 
performance the sailors in Rapid Action Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy. The 
correlation between these variables was 0.367, which is significant at 1% (0.000) 
level. This correlation was found to be weak as it is not more than the lower bound of 
strong correlation (0.5), but closet to marginal level. 
According to the results of simple regression analysis, work life balance was found to 
have a positive impact on job performance with the strength of b value of 0.477. The 
multiple regression analysis also revealed that work life balance had weak effect on 
job performance [the beta value of 0.212 significant at 1% (0.000)] and the results of 
the stepwise multiple regression analysis when considered the adjusted R2, 13.2 % of 
the variance of job performance is explained by work life balance indicated that work 
life balance is contributing to the less explanatory power of the research model. 
Hence, work life balance was also found to be a less predictor of job performance.  
Discussing the level of work life balance of the respondents in the sample, it was 
found that they have not balanced of a favorable level of work and life spheres with 
the mean value of 1.5309 and standard deviation of 0.32671. Accordingly, it was 
found that the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy were not balanced with their work 
and personal life. 
As indicated by the empirical data, the job performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri 
Lanka Navy is not strongly depended on the work life balance. The job performance 
of the sailors in Rapid Action Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy was high. But their 
work life balance and the correlation between these two variables is not so high.  
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According to behavior of these two variables, the job knowledge, cooperation, 
dependability, interpersonal skills, communication skills, planning work, organizing 
work, quality of work, punctuality, attendance, speed, achievement, and completion of 
work of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy were quite enhanced by the flexi-
time, annualized hours, staggered hours, job sharing, term-time hours, compressed 
hours and part-time working. 
 Therefore, the sailors’ practices due to utilization of the workforce in the organization 
to the organizational direction are not highly depended on their work life balance 
practice in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy.  
Conclusion  
The problem of the research was that to what extent work life balance affects job 
performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy. Based on the theoretical 
information, conceptual framework was developed to test the relationship of job 
performance with work life balance. According to the findings, it is substantiated that 
work life balance was less predictor of the job performance of the sailors in RABS of 
Sri Lanka Navy.  
It illustrated that work life balance is less significant factor that determines the job 
performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy.  This is because; RABS is 
one of the elite forces of Sri Lanka Navy, which established for the purpose of 
countering the LTTE military strategies. This voluntarily joint special force was 
trained in highly tough and structured war oriented background. In the sense, the 
characteristics such as mental and physical capacity, high determination power and 
enthusiasm keep sailors’ leads to high level of job performance. Basically as they are 
work oriented rather than family, the balance between work and family spheres are 
not in favorable level. The findings of this research study shall be important on the 
theoretical as well as practical scenario. As this research model proves to be an 
explanatory model of job performance, the findings of the study are important to 
improve job performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy. 
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 Limitations and Future Research 
The study was limited to investigate the influence of the job satisfaction, work life 
balance and occupational stress on job performance of the sailors in Rapid Action 
Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy. These are not only the factors for determining the 
job performance of the sailors.  
The researcher believes the important independent variables that may account for the 
unexplained variable in the job performance of the sailors may be the other variables 
such as mental and physical ability, person energy level, personality dimensions 
(dependability, self – confidence), (Gordon, 1993), group norms, organizational 
culture, career commitment, job involvement, task environment, turnover intentions, 
living environment, welfare measures, career development, job specification, personal 
knowledge and so on.  
Further research studies are suggested to carry out to find the effects of these factors 
on job performance of the sailors in RABS of Sri Lanka Navy. However, in the 
context of researching the effort of these variables on the job performance, essentially 
future researchers may have to encounter serious difficulties in measuring the 
variables, as there is no measurement instruments correctly developed.  
Another important limitation is that this analysis was cross-section in nature. 
Additional research is suggested to carry out longitudinally in order to evaluate the 
impact of the variables over the time. Longitudinal studies using quantitative and 
qualitative techniques are required in order to understand the changes in the three 
variables over the time. 
The study was conducted among a sample of sailors in Rapid Action Boat Squadron 
as a whole, which does not include types of different rates is another limitation. The 
work life balance of different rates may depend on the job performance of the sailors 
in Rapid Action Boat Squadron of Sri Lanka Navy. Therefore, work life balance and 
job performance relationship of different rates of sailors is to be investigated.  
This study has narrowed down with single branch of Sri Lanka Navy. However, it is 
also useful to extend the research to other branches of Sri Lanka Navy, which face 
similar situation to a lesser extent to improve overall situation in Sri Lanka Navy. 
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Abstract 
 
Europe Union has always been a good model for Asia to form integration among East South 
Asian countries. While, occurrence of financial crisis in 2008 showed Europe Union also 
faced fundamental problems, which even most scholars, daresay this horrific economic shock 
is able to make it difficult for the convergence of countries in Europe zone. Then it can be a 
good lesson for Asia. In spite of emphasizing on market by economic liberalism, most 
experts believe that market failure cause the deepest global crisis after Great Depression 
(1929) to happen. They credit, that the governments have an undeniable role to finance 
globalization. Although we cannot ignore the importance of the role of attendance of 
government in the economy, we believe that sometimes governments are the reasons for the 
problems in economic situation of country. As a result, the aim of this paper is to investigate 
the role of the government to worsen the crisis, which leads to bankruptcy of some countries 
of Euro zone between 2000 and 2012. Factors that will be looked at include the lack of 
political integration among European government and cooperation of national government, 
the absence of mighty government to make decision and policy and undisciplined financial 
plans, as well as, loss of proper rules and low. These are occasions of bad government. They 
could not solve the imposed crisis from financial markets from USA but also intensified the 
conditions of these communications where some Europe countries move to bankruptcy. 
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1) Introduction  
Maybe nobody believed that occurrence of price bubble in housing market in the United 
States, before 2007, and bursting them, in July 2007, is the origin of the most harmful 
recession in the world economy after the Great Depression of 1929. The global crisis, which 
was started from financial market in 2007, was enlarged to real economy, affected the 
production process, and finally involved the goods and services, labor, and capital markets in 
the last quarter of 2008. Recent financial crisis caused the world to face a harsh and rapid 
down fall in production of industries, reduction of international trade, lack of mobility and 
attract of foreign investment, and debt crisis.  
Asian countries especially South East Asia always desired to constitute a union with closed 
and unlimited economic, social, and political relationship among countries of this region like 
Europe Union by common currency such as Euro. The bad experience of financial crisis in 
Europe Union caused to scruple to form and organize a new union in Asia regardless of 
having the required potentials. East Asia has passed terrible crisis in the nineties which 
economists enumerate several reasons to happen in this part of the world. Lack of productive 
investments of savings, currency value appreciation in the last decade, which undermined 
export competitiveness, dependence on flight capital for economic growth coupled with lack 
of proper financial infrastructure to manage huge capital inflow effectively, and the inherent 
weaknesses of corporate strategies of large and dominant local financial institutions, are 
causes to occur the crisis in East Asia. (Mohamad and Nassir, 2000)  Some economic experts 
focus on this issue financial crisis of East Asia was transmitted among these countries. They 
have explained which high powered trade relationship among East Asian countries caused 
each non-significant and inconsiderable shocks which happens in these countries is 
transmitted easily with connections of economic channels among countries of this area.(Gong 
et al., 2004) This kind of thinking, with the occurrences of serious financial crisis in Europe 
have prevented the effort to constitute the Asian Union to organize a new union like 
European Union with common currency like Euro among themselves.     
The recent crisis of European Union is the most horrific crisis that has happened since 1957 
when this union was formed. Most experts believe that recent financial crisis has made 
difficult the convergence of European countries. The indebted countries of union like Greece, 
Italy, Spain, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal have to refund their debts by economic austerity 
plans otherwise; we will encounter dark and hopeless perspective for European governments. 
Among the results of the financial crisis in Europe was the risk of collapse of Euro unit, 
instability in the whole of European financial system as well as the decline in economic 
growth by 4%. At the same time the debts of European government have tripled from 2008 
up to now, resulting in the enhancement of European government’s deficit in the end of 2009, 
this deficit was about 9 billion Euros. The labor market has also suffered with the increase of 
unemployment from 7.5% in 2008 to 9.9% in 2009 and 11.5% in 2011. In addition, the 
region has experience decrease of interest rate from 4.25% in 2008 to 1percentage in the last 
of 2009, reduction of exports, downturn of housing value and bankruptcy of most European 
banks.  
Financial indiscipline of members, the lack of regulatory mechanism on operation of 
European banks and existence of competitive and non-competitive economic together are the 
most significant reasons which the weak countries of Euro area suffered severe deficit during 
several years. Then they borrowed continuously and finally they could not repay them. 
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In addition, financial crisis has caused a political gap among member countries. In one hand, 
weak countries of southern Europe believe that hegemonic policy in Germany is the most 
substantial reason to create the gap among these countries. According to this view, 
commercial imbalance between members who have trade surplus like Germany and members 
who are in trade deficit situation such as Greece has created trade deficit among members of 
Euro zone. Moreover, economic critics explain that Germany has forced members who are 
debtor to do economic austerity plans as preconditions to borrow and these plans are 
limitations to achieve the economic growth. On the other hand, Germany claims financial 
crisis of Europe is a result of prodigality and financial indiscipline of members of European 
Union and their non-competitive economic, because the governments dominated their 
economies. 
In actuality, financial crisis has eventuated to the defeat for all the members of Euro zone. 
The feeble members will experience the collapse of value of national money, ungovernable 
inflation and enhanced foreign debt, which eventually lead to a complete economic 
bankruptcy. On the other side, the powerful countries, which mainly include western 
European countries, the crisis will cause them to lose their sales markets and will decline 
demand for their productions. As a result, they will face impressive unemployment and will 
lose their economic position in the world. 
However, transmission of recent crisis to Europe Union also showed that although the 
economic interconnectedness has more profits, in economic inappropriate situation, the crisis 
could have the harmful effects. Chiefly when the smaller economy is dependent on large 
economies and economic unstable of developed countries could worsen the conditions of 
economies, which have the lower rate of economic growth and even cause the bankruptcy of 
the economy. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus are examples, which can 
support our statement.  
The significant point that we should bring up, here, is that governments can have 
considerable effects to reduce the negative effect of economic crises. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to remind that sometimes governments, themselves, cause to create fluctuations in 
crisis. This problem reduces the level of standard of living of residents and lessens the 
satisfaction of people. The experience of countries of Euro zone is a documentary reason, 
which displays the incompetence, and inefficiency of their governments, which has caused 
the deteriorating the situation. As result, most experts believe that the resent economic crisis 
has been the crisis of government. Then we can strongly argue that bad government not only 
able to manage the economic shocks and fluctuations but also they sometimes act as a 
catalyzer to worsen an economic process.  
Consequently, in Part two we will review the background of what happen in the financial 
crisis in Europe and the role the government played in this crisis. Part 3 will offer our finding 
about the role of bad government in the occurrence the financial crisis in Euro Zone, and 
eventually in part four we will conclude our discussion of crisis and bad government.  
2) Background literature of recent financial crisis 
Since after the Great Depression, people said, “we have to make sure this never happens 
again”. Then they had done anything, what was intransitive, to avoid this similar bad 
economic situation, but the world experienced one in 2007 that created similar situation for 
people of the world. Ahamed (2009) in his book points to harsh great depression in 1929. The 
important hint, which is explained by Ahmad, is the mistake of four original bankers’ 
decisions of the world. He shows that presidents of England, France, and Germany’s central 
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banks also Federal Reserve president the four people responsible to cause the Great 
Depression. After World War I, the central banks insistence to use the “Gold Standard 
System” has caused the monetary irregularity and the great crisis of the twentieth century. 
Some crises happen in stock markets (1929) and some of them occur in credit markets 
(2007). Moreover, sometimes we are witness that exchange market and even goods markets 
experience different crises. These crises can affect one country or a group of countries and 
maybe the whole of the world. The first crisis started by collapse in stock market and second 
happened with falling in credit market. (Herring and Wachter, 2003) show that most financial 
crises happen since we face bubbles in real estate markets,    and the appearance of the 
bubbles can have different reasons. 
Allen et al (2009) argues that there was a bubble in real property prices in the U.S and 
European countries   and the most important reason for this phenomenon was the loose 
monetary policy by the Federal Reserve and global imbalances.  
Occurrence the crisis in financial markets of USA is being referred to the early twenty first 
century.1In addition, China could conquer the most goods markets of USA. China could, for 
the first time, decline American demand for internal production. In other word, the 
consumption of United States from goods, which were produced in USA, had decreased 
while its import had gone up. This problem caused bad situation for growth process. 
Moreover, 11 September happened in 2001. Which damaged economic power of USA and 
had negative effects on financial markets? This caused capital flight for the greatest economy 
of the world. Morck et al. (2011) believe “the United States is experiencing sub-prime 
mortgage crisis which is creating a deep economic winter.  
By studying the case of European countries that are member of EU, it seems that the most 
important problems of this zone during the financial crisis and after that even up to now, has 
been the lack of political integration between the West and East Europe countries. It is clear 
that Euro zone crisis in 2007 has boosted the significance of presence the powerful 
government to create collaboration between the West and East Europe. Unfortunately, the 
manifest problem that the Europe Union suffers from it, according to theory of Benink and 
Schmidt (2004), is the absence of political integration.  
Most economists claim that Euros is the origin root of the financial crisis in Europe. In their 
view, this problem started when the plan of money union was done without financial merger. 
It means, it was necessary that with money union established an organization which 
proctored on providing budget system tile all the members of union were dedicating a 
constant ratio of domestic gross production to their budget.(Hall, 2012) 
Moreover, incident of financial crisis changed the market failure to one of the hottest topics 
in economies. Páramo (2009) shows that, information asymmetries as type of market failure, 
has raised inefficiency of securitization markets and behavior of investors, rating agencies, 
intermediaries, and originators, which has had direct effect on financial markets to face crisis. 
Here, we face so many questions, which we have to find appropriate answer to prevent global 
economy from future crisis, like what are the lessons learned from the current crisis. What are 
the important reasons to start the crisis and how can we confront future problems? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	   Between	   1995	   and	   2000,	   industrial	   countries’	   stock	   indexes	   raised	   rapidly.	   This	   improvement	   owed	   the	  
growth	  of	   internet	   and	   information	   technology	   sector.	   In	   this	   time,	   so	  many	   firms	  had	  been	   established	  by	  
prefix	  e-­‐	  or	  suffix	  .com,	  which	  faced	  bankruptcy	  very	  soon.	  (	  dot	  com	  bubble	  crisis)	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Alternatively, is there a need for government to control market failure, which it seems, is one 
of the roots of occurrence of financial crisis?  
Hoshi and Kashyap (2008) simulated the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) model of 
the United State for Japanese financial crisis and illustrated that government must navigate 
the financial markets during the crisis via equity injection. In addition, Bebchuk emphasizes 
that fluctuation situation  can lead the financial markets into crisis, we have to consider a 
government funded asset purchase program.(Bebchuk and Spamann, 2009)  
This global financial crisis corroborated that accretion and affiliation of the economy are two 
points, which are needed for a regulative system and constant international financial 
framework. Ozkan (2011) proves that global governance can be useful to the recovery of the 
economy after the recent crisis. He describes an effective, defined, and legitimate global 
governance of G-20 to improve the worse economic situation of the world. Chua emphasize 
that to recover the global crisis in 2007, we have to reign diplomacy efforts, (Chua and Pang, 
2012).  Benink and Schmidt (2004) describes what can play effective role in critical 
economic conditions in new world, which the global economy is integrated, is political 
integration. To this end, the best option is still national governments. In addition, to create 
accretion among the members of Euro Union, the tool which we need, is diplomacy (Hiebert, 
2005). Now, we believe when a successful diplomacy happen among these countries, initially 
all of them are able to organize a successful political and economic communication with each 
other.  
As result, with studying the literature of government support in crisis, we will show that 
government assistance will guarantee the reform of financial market when they face crisis. In 
addition, even government can hold up outbreak of financial crisis, but government should 
have special character, which we will refer to them in future. Otherwise, government can be 
the reason to create fluctuation; in so fare, some economists believe the recent financial crisis 
is the government crisis. It can be said that bad government lead to bad situation in societies.   
3) Finding  
Expanse of number of countries encounter risk of bankruptcy in Europe Union, and 
enhancement of famine and hungry in Africa and some part of Asia confirm, after four years, 
world economic situation still feel the danger of harmful effect of recent crisis. Moreover, 
countries have not been able to reform completely their situation. Even according to the 
annual report of UN and DESA in 2012, the world has experienced the weakened economic 
situation.(2013) 
Debt crisis, bankruptcy of some Europe countries and high rate of unemployment are some 
problems, which the developed countries face them. Weakening the power of Euro and, lack 
of financial discipline of European government are two factors, which help financial crisis to 
be changed debt crisis and the high risk of bankruptcy for some governments, while the rate 
of unemployment also shows in Europe the number of people who are losing their jobs will 
raise. (Table 3.1) 
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 Table 3.1 Unemployment Rates of Europe, 2004-2014 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
European 
Union 
9.2 9.0 8.3 7.2 7.0 9.0 9.6 9.6 10.4 10.9 10.6 
Euro 
area 
9.2 9.2 8.5 7.6 7.6 9.6 10.1 10.1 11.3 11.8 11.6 
Source: World Economic Situation and prospects 2013, 2013 
Debt crisis has entailed the rate of economic growth was been negligible and Europe 
governments have so many problems to solve them and improve their situation after 
recession. The interesting point is the imperfect condition to form the Europe Union has been 
transmitting the crisis among countries, which are member of Euro area. The member of 
Europe Union whose their process is done by currency, not Euro, are less vulnerable that 
Euro zone. This acknowledges Euro is one of the variables to make economic fluctuations. 
Over four years of financial crisis, which started from USA and gradually changed into the 
global crisis, the world has not been able yet to return into the conditions before this 
recession so that it seems, some countries of the world have experimented the awful situation 
than before. Maybe, we should say that the Europe Union’s countries have had the most 
horrible economic status. The low rate of the growth, the high number of people, who lose 
their job every day, and labor unions protest were problems that countries like Greece, 
Cyprus, Ireland, Spain, and Italy were struggling with them. Even if the Euro Union had not 
supported them eventually were falling into the bankruptcy trap and it was possible the Euro 
was disappeared. In short, Europe governments now have been confronted two major 
problems; low rate of economic growth and debt crisis. 
Although the downturn in Europe has dramatically affected the labor market and increased 
the number people who lost their job position to 5.4 million duration between March 2008 
and May 2009(Hijman, 2009), it has been a positive opportunity for students and scholars of 
political economic filed in Europe. Based on this, economic experts have represented 
numerous reasons to happen the recent financial crisis, if we want to conclude, we should 
mention the financial crisis is due to fail the foreign and domestic decision.  
Pauly (2009) and Schneider and Kirchgässner (2009) indicate, reluctance of government to 
develop coordinating policy between domestic and foreign course is a root to occurrence the 
financial crisis in Europe. Begg (2009) argues that deregulation and failure of regulation is 
factors which caused the global crisis in financial markets. 
The important point in studying of financial crisis in 2007 is even the economics have not 
found any convincing answer why the recent financial crisis happened. Although, in duration 
of the recent crisis, which started from advanced countries like the United States, 
governments had to inject liquidity to financial organizations and systems and even some 
governments and nations to prevent bankruptcy, one definitive solution has not been found 
yet and economies, which have confronted downturn and bankruptcy, especially, some 
European countries are vulnerable and fragile.  
Pauly (2008) believe albeit integrated financial and capital markets in Europe have deeply 
prospered, financial crisis by 2008 showed they have not been able to contrast with crisis and 
protect economic stagnation and collapse into insolvency and failure. Then we cannot ignore 
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forming global governance with effective and undeniable instrument like free, integrated, 
efficient and resilient financial market can be an engine of economic growth when in Europe 
these markets are matched with what European named them as complex politics. In better 
word, we need a responsible power parallel by markets. As result, according to the theory of 
Akerlof and Shiller (2010) we accept that rebellious mind of people as animal spirit was a 
reason to fall the value of Dow Jones in the United States, FTSE100 in England, CAC40 in 
France, and DAX in Germany. In addition, the appearance of government, as kind parents to 
bring up and train of children, is necessary to control and manage the economic situation of a 
society or government is as a necessary bad. Nevertheless, bad government not only cannot 
reform the critical situation but also it can worsen the condition even can be a reason to 
bankruptcy of a country.  
Davidoff and Zaring (2009), by emphasizing on theory of Kindleberger and Aliber (2000), 
illustrates sometimes response of government could push the circumstance of economy to 
downturn and even bankruptcy. Then we can mention what governments have done to restore 
the economy of Europe although was creatively, in most time they have been executed 
imperfectly because of low confidence of government. Then what they have done to decrease 
the effect of crisis was hastily, as well as was good and enough only in short time. This kind 
of policymaking could not guarantee the long run improvement in European societies. In 
addition, the unbounded but complex communications in new world have been causing the 
world move to moral hazard which government has had a major contribution to violation of 
ethics. It means that, we live in the world which free riding on government is a custom even 
in societies are experiencing integrity process and they have to committed to ethics. For 
example, cheating of government of Greece from 2002, when joined to Europe Union, to 
offer the data and macroeconomic information to international institutions entailed 
decreasing the risk of lending from powerful economies and financial international 
organizations to this country. However, by deploying the financial crisis from the United 
States to Europe Union and inability of Greece government to refund the debts, Greeks tried 
the terrible economic situation up to bankruptcy.  
Finally, prevalence of Thatcherism ideology in Europe in eighties recognized the market 
without the intervention of government as only engine of development in societies, as result 
the role of government gradually diminished in economy. Large scale of privatization of most 
economic sectors and deregulation which done in most advanced countries. Benáček (1993) 
believes what accomplished by government as privatization and deregulation was because of 
being unable of government. Benáček (1993) indicates market is a kind of public good, as 
well as Keech et al. (2012) explains that the market failure will happen cause government 
failure. It means when a government is not able to amend the structure of market we will face 
market failure. Recognizing of market as public good displays to construct it we need 
infrastructures, rules and huge investment, which a government could only provide them. In 
other word, market is a special public good that have much authority to affect in economy. If 
we accept the market is a public good, free market without any intervention of government 
and irregular liberalization will be sing of inability of government.   
4) Conclusion 
We can strongly say the first years of twentieth century people of the world experienced too 
agonizing and frightful situation when happening the Great Depression was a tragedy for 
these years.  Between 1930 and 1936, the rate of unemployment fell in to 25%. The financial 
crisis in these years started from the United States and affected whole the world for one 
decade.  Although Ahamed (2009) believes that this crisis befell because of making mistake 
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decision by the presidents of central bank of England, France, Reichsbank of Germany, and 
Federal Reserve of New York, maybe, investigating of the reasons of occurring the financial 
crisis in these years is not more important versus failure to provide the appropriate solution to 
eradicate the downturn. Since lack of ability to recover, the economic situation in during the 
years between 1929 and 1936 caused the World War II was considered as the only solution to 
reform the recession condition by politicians. The result of was death of more than 50 million 
people in worldwide. This issue was more irritating than occurrence the crisis in 1929. That is 
why, repeating the financial crisis in 2007 the world entailed fear and anxious to be pulled 
into other war. 
Moreover, financial crisis in 2007 in developed countries illustrates, in spite of what is being 
claimed, development is not a reason for being protected of economic fluctuations and 
tensions, especially when in definition of development, the prevailing view is the economic 
growth. The increase of the number of unemployment with decrease of national production in 
the United States in during of 2007 and 2009 is a strong proof on this asseveration. 
Transmission of recent crisis to Europe Union also showed that although the economic 
interconnectedness has more profits, in economic inappropriate situation, the crisis could 
have the harmful effects. Chiefly in situation, which the smaller economy is dependent on 
large economies and unstable economy of developed countries, can worsen the conditions of 
economies which have the lower rate of economic growth and even cause the bankruptcy of 
the economy. Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Cyprus are examples, which can 
approve our statement. 
Keynes in his book, “The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money”, has offered 
his theory based on prominent role of government in a strong capitalism economy. Then, the 
thinking of appearance of government, as a necessary bad, formed in whole the world.  
Keynes clarifies how a strong and qualified government can make appropriate policy and 
even borrow to cost in economic stagnation to hire the force labors that are 
unemployment.(Keynes, 2006) Although the prescription of Keynes was never completely 
executed in during the crisis, from the end 1940s the solution of Keynes was performed for 
all the countries of the world then by finishing the Second World War, governments, as 
proper manager to reconstruct and plan of society’s development, could reduce the rate of 
unemployment. As result, the appearance of government to manage the economy is one of 
the undeniable factors in business cycles. Though Thatcherism and Reganism thinking at first 
of eighties was reason to forget this factor, many experts believe this issues was the 
beginning of the numerous economic shocks like financial crisis in 2007. 
The significant point that we should bring up, here, is that governments can have 
considerable effects to decline the negative effect of economic crises. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to remind that sometimes governments, themselves, cause to create fluctuations in 
crisis. The experience of countries of Euro zone is a documentary reason that displays the 
incompetence and inefficiency of European government has been cause of deteriorating the 
situation. As result, most experts believe that the resent economic crisis has been the crisis of 
government. In better word, bad government is one reason to deteriorate also move to 
bankruptcy. We should clarify that the lack of confidence in governmental planning and then 
offering the short time and hastily decision and policies are factors to approve the bad 
government is on reason of recent financial crisis in European Union. In addition, absence of 
morality of governments to respect the rules of process of integration, privatization and 
deregulation, because of inability of government in managing of government not to support 
the private property,	   are causes to define the bad government to worsen the economic 
situation of Europe.  
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Abstract 
 
Thailand had been in the latest episode of political instability since the second 
term of the Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.  The situation reached a string of 
its peak and world-recognized affairs such as the military coup deposing the 
Prime Minister Shinawatra, the closing of the Bangkok International Airport, and 
the wide-spread burning of the downtown Bangkok.  Political-driven community 
radios were observed as a political communication channel for political bodies to 
propagate their information to the followers and played important roles in the 
political turmoil.  Thus, understanding roles of the political-driven community 
radio in the political crisis, as well as finding good guidelines to offer such radio 
program, is extremely important.  In this study, we 1) examine all key 
components of community radio to understand its roles towards the political 
crisis; 2) study the usage, satisfaction, need and expectation of community or 
listeners; 3) analyze and suggest how to improve the community radio in the 
future to better support the community for truly understanding of democracy in 
Bangkok. 
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Introduction 
 
Community radio has been publicly and legally allowed in Thailand in 1997 as a 
result of Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand in 1997; this radio channel has 
been supervised by the Organization of Frequency Wave Allocation and Radio 
Broadcasting, Television and Telecommunications Enterprises Act B.E. 2543 (2000).  
Many progressive mass communication NGOs and academics have been expanding 
efforts to provide education and training to raise awareness of freedom of expression 
and community radio operation among the Thai public.  This has been done under the 
core principle that community radio is of the community, by the community and for 
the community (Berrigan 1981).  In addition, community radio must be operated on a 
voluntary, not-for-profit, free from political intervention and domination by the state, 
capital and politicians. 
 
However, as the instability of the political situation in Thailand since 2005 throughout 
the present time, the community radio has been seen as actively manipulated or used 
by political-backup organization or group of people opposed to the original intention.  
Nevertheless, this claim is needed to examine and study thoroughly as it is unwise to 
jump into the conclusion by observing a few instance or event or even just a rumor.  
In addition, it seems that the effect or influence of the community radio may have 
been promoted or discussed or misperceived. 
 
This study aims to study and explore for good practices to offer preferable political-
driven community radio program by mainly analyzing roles and influence of 
community radio which has been claimed playing an active role in Thai political 
turmoil.  It is hoped that this will help us to understand correctly about community 
radio networks and thus enable us to use or reuse it in a proper way, or rather, back to 
its original intention—the community radio is for community and really by 
community and no intervention from other people whether those are political party, or 
a group of people wanting to manipulate and exploit it. 
 
This paper is organized as follows.  Research objectives are stated in the next section, 
followed by the introduction of the research framework.  Then, the methodology and 
research methods are explained in details.  The findings are presented in two 
following sections: the findings, and the discussions and suggestion section.  The 
conclusion section concludes the study and addresses recommendations for future 
research. 
 
 
Objectives 
 
The objectives of the study were: 
1) Examine all key components of community radio based on research 
framework to understand its role towards political crisis. 
2) Study the usage, satisfaction, need and expectation of community or listeners.  
3) Analyze and suggest how to improve the community radio in the future to 
better support the community for truly understanding of democracy. 
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 Research Framework 
 
From the principles of community radio that community radio is of the community, 
by the community and for the community, and our research objectives, there are two 
main entities in the study: the political-driven community radio and the listener or the 
community.  Understanding the listener in the community radio communication is 
important to fulfill our research objectives.  Uses and Gratifications Theory is one of 
popular approaches to understanding mass communication, especially paying 
attention to answer the question of “what people do with media” instead of “what 
media does to people” (Katz 1959).  Moreover, social situations—in this case, 
political situation—and psychological characteristics motivate the need for media, 
which stimulate certain expectations of that media.  This expectation leads one to be 
exposed to media that would apparently fit expectations, leading to an ultimate 
gratification.  According to Katz (Katz 1959; Katz, Haas et al. 1973), there are five 
categories of media functions in the listener’s use, which are 1) Cognitive needs—
acquiring information, knowledge and understanding; 2) Affective needs—emotion, 
pleasure, feelings; 3) Personal integrative needs—Credibility, stability, status; 4) 
Social integrative needs—Family and friends; and 5) Tension release needs—Escape 
and diversion.  It is possible for us to understand roles of political-driven community 
radio in the crisis by examining the stated aspects of the media functions.  Moreover, 
the use and gratification of media is closely related to the expectation of the listener.  
Theory regarding use, satisfaction, and expectation of media usage (Katz 1959; 
Kaewthep 1998; McQuail 2002) will extend the entities to explore and fulfill the 
study.   
 
On the community radio side, it is contents and activities that mainly drive the 
followers’ behavior.  It has been found that several factors, such as economics and, of 
course, politics, play an influential role in determining the content and activities of 
community radios (Chanprapas 1992; Siriyuwasak 1992).  Studies also suggest that 
business also exploit the use of community radios from its original intention 
(Chanprapas 1992; Siriyuwasak 1992).  Analyzing the development and operational 
structure of community radio stations would also help us to better understand the 
nature of the business.  Thus, we integrate those introduced entities from related 
studies and theories and outline a research framework shown in the Fig. 1.  The 
framework was also employed and effectively executed into the action phase by 
couple of studies (Phrompithak 1996; Polnigongit and Kumchornmenukul 2004). 
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Figure 1. Research framework. 
 
Methodology 
 
This research is a case study of the community radio followers in Bangkok.  The 
study employed a multi-method approach.  Document analysis, content analysis, in-
depth interviews and casual interviewed had been used. 
 
Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis was mainly used for finding two important pieces of information: 
political situation and community radio backgrounds.  We started with secondary data 
research to gain a basic understanding of the community radio, from the ground up – 
history, original ideas, basic statistics, classification, etc.  Then we scoped down to 
the radio which involve in the politics, especially, during the Thai political turmoil.  
The analyses were conducted over news, articles, literatures, websites, related laws, 
and books.   
 
Content Analysis 
 
We listened to and analyze the contents of both yellow (anti-Thaksin) and red (pro-
Thaksin) shirts’ radios.  We followed the yellow shirt radio, FM 92.25 MHz, for a 
week to cover the broadcast schedule which usually repeats its pattern in a week.  The 
analysis was conducted on 3-4 hours a day, not 24 hours.  The content analysis was 
not our major concern and was done to triangulate the interviews.  The red shirt radio, 
FM 92.75 MHz, was also analyzed by following the same manner as the yellow shirt 
radio.  The period of both analyses was a week before the dissolving of the protest on 
May 19, 2010.  According to the research framework, the purpose of analyzing the 
radio broadcasting contents was to recognize their contents and format, and 
participation patterns, which also revealed their roles of this type of mass media 
communication in the political situation.  We submerged into the radio programs and 
let the patterns immerge through our analysis. 
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 Interviews 
In-depth group and individual interviews, and causal interviews were employed 
according to situations as appropriate.  The interviews were conducted to get insight 
into the receiver side of the media communication.  Use and gratification, and 
requirements, as well as satisfaction and expectation, were captured.  We have 
managed to conduct interviews with both yellow and red shirt listeners.  For yellow 
shirt, we conducted three in-depth individual phone interviews and five face-to-face 
casual interviews.  For red shirt, we managed to have an in-depth face-to-face 
interview with a group of 3 people and also five face-to-face casual interviews.  The 
key informants that we selected for the interviews were red and yellow shirt 
community radio program followers, especially, who not only listen to the programs 
but also went out to join the demonstration on the streets.  Their perspectives allowed 
us to thoroughly understand roles of community radio in the crisis, as well as the 
mechanisms that drove them to join the protest.  Unfortunately, for the broadcaster 
side, we could not manage to conduct any interview with them.  We then rely more on 
secondary data, and content analysis of the program. 
 
Due to the limitation of time & man power, we have done primary research by a 
limited number of both telephone and face-to-face interviews.  In addition, since we 
were still in state of emergency by Center of Resolution of Emergency situation 
(CRES or Sor-Or-Chor in Thai), many red shirt community radios and websites have 
been either closed down or blocked.  The most important and influenced one, FM 
92.75 MHz got no exception, also closed down including its website (see Appendix).  
 
This “blocked or closed down” has huge impacted to us, apparently, contacting those 
people (anchor, D.J., staff or manager) of red shirt community radio is almost 
impossible unless we have someone inside which we did not.  The situation was 
worse by the result of government force used in resolving the protester on 19 May 
2010, most red shirts, although, had been sent back to their hometown but still their 
problem or request have not been heard or resolved.  In addition, many red shirts feel, 
especially, in upcountry, feel that they are in danger by the government. There have 
been rumors that many red shirts have been detained by polices. 
 
With all of belief, many red shirts now are very cautious and careful to talk about 
their opinion in public, especially, to any media, many newspaper reporters have 
expressed their view during pass couple weeks.  This make us very difficult to 
identify and ask for an interview whether it will be telephone or face-to-face. 
 
We opted for causal interviews for verifying the reliability of the in-depth interviews 
by having conversations with people who highly exposed to political-driven 
community radio in Bangkok, taxi drivers.  Being general passengers, we conducted 
casual interviews with five taxi drivers of both shirts.  Each conversation lasted 
around thirty minutes.  We found that most of them they were enthusiastic to 
participate the results were consistent. 
 
Findings 
 
The background of community radio and the political situations were briefly given to 
understand the context of the study.  Then, major stereotypes of the group of listeners 
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 in the aspects of their believes in political issues were given, followed by the findings 
according to our research objectives. 
 
Community Radio Background 
 
Community radio was firstly introduced in Thailand in the year 1992 by Surin 
Plangprasopchok via the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand station in the 
province of Chanthaburi (Plangprasobchoke 1991; Polnigongit and 
Kumchornmenukul 2004).  It was based on the principles of democratic media and 
participatory communication at the first place.  Then, its usage and important has 
been recognized leading to the public and legal support by the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand in 1997.  These radio operators have been supervised by the 
Organization of Frequency Wave Allocation and Radio Broadcasting, Television and 
Telecommunications Enterprises Act B.E. 2543 (2000). 
 
The broadcast contents must contain at least 70 percent of the following categories: 1) 
news, 2) programs that promote understanding the democracy, 3) programs that 
support education, ethic and culture & arts, and 4) education programs in the 
development of economics, social, quality of life and environment.  The range of 
broadcasting can be up to 3, 5 or 15 kilometers, according to the type of local 
administration or the population density.  The radio station can broadcast up to 15 
kilometers in the rural areas.  For Bangkok, community radio can legally broadcast in 
a range of only 3 kilometers. 
 
Formerly, community radio stations were formed and operated by the government 
(Polnigongit and Kumchornmenukul 2004).  They have been used as channels to 
communicate with the people especially about the government projects conducting in 
the rural areas.  Government’s own community radio stations are still a large portion 
of the overall community radios.  Since the starting of the political instability in 2005, 
which the details are briefly given in the next section, the use of community radios as 
a political propaganda tool has been proven effective throughout the country.  In 
addition, since radio commercials are allowed in the broadcast schedule, several profit 
and non-profit organizations take their eyes on community radios as another income 
source.  Nowadays, state enterprise communities, business communities and common 
neighbor communities are eager to establish their own one.  Up to date, there are more 
than 6,500 stations have registered for licenses (Post Today 2010).  Several operates 
even the licenses have not been issued yet. 
 
Political Situation  
 
Political situation in Thailand has been changed dramatically since 2001 when 
Thaksin won a historic election becoming single party government, in which we had 
not seen this for long time since military-governed democracy. Together with his 
clever populist platform of economic growth and development, indeed, this really 
helps alleviate rural poverty, esp. 30-baht scheme which is the country’s first 
universal healthcare program. With all of this has strengthened his party (Thai Rak 
Thai – TRT) and won an unprecedented landslide in the 2005 general election (from 
50% in 2001 to 75% popular vote in 2005).  
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 However, with this ‘almost’ absolute power led to many criticisms regarding to the 
corruption, authoritarianism, conflict of interest and even controlled the freedom of 
press & independent organizations. The situation has been worsened when he was 
accused of tax evasion 76 billion baht and many human rights violence from his 
aggressive way handling the drug & southern part problem. In 2006, the People’s 
Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has been established and led by Sonthi Limthongkul 
who had conflict with Thaksin about stopping Sonthi-owned TV program – called 
“Muangthai Raisapda” or Weekly Thailand (ironically, Sonthi used to be  outspoken 
& supporter to Thaksin in 2001, even calling him “best prime minister our country 
has ever had”). 
 
During 2006 period, Sonthi also established an ASTV – a satellite broadcaster, plus 
starting the ASTV radio channel and use the color code (yellow) as symbolic unity – 
hence the name of “Yellow-shirt” created. Since then, the ASTV both TV & radio 
have been actively in PAD protest. 
 
On 19 September 2006, the Thaksin government was seized by military coup and new 
PM (Surayudh) from military connection was appointed. The UDD (United Front for 
Democracy Against Dictatorship) has been formed after the coup to oppose the 
military government, the red colour is chosen to represent the group, hence the short 
name for the group is called ‘red shirt’. As a result, the red shirt community radios 
have been started in 2006 as well. 
 
UDD had been active during 2006-2007 and stopped protest after 2007 general 
election, which the People’s Power Party (PPP – new name of TRT) won. However, 
when PAD rallied and aggressively protest the PPP government in 2007-2008, UDD 
became active again to counter the PAD demonstration.  
 
However, during 2009, the political situation had been more tensed, both by Thaksin 
direct & indirect involvement (Phone-in, Money supply, etc), UDD became more 
active. Red shirt community radio has been used as a communication channel to those 
red-shirt supporters up until the 19 May violent military crackdown, all of red-shirt 
community radios or websites have been shut down.  
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 Listeners’ Belief in Political Issues 
 
The following characteristics of the listeners’ belief provide stereotypes of yellow and 
red shirt people.  However, it they are not absolute, e.g. yellow shirts could be lower 
while red shirts could be higher class people. 
 
Table I.  Stereotypes of Political Belief of Yellow and Red Shirts 
Yellow Shirts Red Shirts 
- do not support Thaksin and Tend to 
support the Democratic Party 
- support the monarchy 
- are the majority of southern Thailand 
- perceive themselves as higher 
educated and middle class 
- believe that Thaksin is corrupted 
- do not believe in Thaksin ability 
- pro Thaksin 
- support a so-call anti-dictatorship 
principle 
- are the majority of north and 
northeastern of Thailand 
- are perceived as low educated and 
lower class 
- believe that Thaksin is innocent 
- belive in Thaksin ability 
 
The findings from the study confirmed with the Limited Effect Theory of Mass Media 
Communication that people tend to open themselves to the media that they already 
believe (McQuail 2002).  Thus the red shirts and the yellow shirts prefer to listen to 
their own stations which broadcast the contents aligning with their belief. 
 
Key Components Characteristics of the Political-driven Bangkok Community 
Radio  
 
In this section of findings, the results given serve the first research objective: 
“Examine all key components of community radio based on research framework to 
understand its role towards political crisis.” 
 
Development, Structure, Operation, Budget  
 
The founding, structure, operation and their budget of political-driven radios of both 
sides was quite similar.  The major difference is the status of the founders.  For the 
red shirt radios, the main radios, Taxi Radio (92.75 MHz), was founded and backed 
by political party of Mr. Thaksin.  For yellow shirt radio, the main station, Manager 
Radio (97.75 MHz), was founded by anti-Thaksin media of Mr. Sonthi.  The 
secondary radios of both colors were founded by supporting followers of both sides, 
which also got part of financial support from the main station operators.  It is to be 
noted the color yellow represent the color of the King’s birthday, Monday.  In 
Thailand, each day of a week has its own color. 
 
The structure and operation of both political-driven community radios are also similar 
but different from common community radios.  Common community radios are 
usually overseen by community’s committees and by government structure, while the 
political-driven community radios are managed in a cooperate style.  The budgets 
came mainly from the founder.  However, there was fund raising during the period of 
the demonstrations.  The donation can be as few as 10 baht to more than 10,000 baht.  
The donors’ names were read aloud every day.  The cost of the operation cannot be 
explicitly determined. 
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Roles in Political Crisis 
 
The political-driven community radio has played important roles in the political crisis 
as follows: 
1) Update News and Current Situations 
Radio not only has an ability to promptly report a breaking event, but it also 
able to provide information in details due to its purpose.  Thus, it is a 
prominent alternative for people who closely follow the politic situations 
2) Open for Exchange the Ideas 
People would like to express themselves.  Radios of both colors use the 
phone-in to encourage their followers’ participation. 
3) Attack the Opposed Parties 
Most of the conversations and program contents try to distrust the opposition.  
It seems that the listeners agree with almost everything from the program.  
This role of the community radio is considered to be an important threat to a 
true democracy.  Information and analyses should mention good points of 
another side as well. 
4) Advertise 
Commercials of special products are provided.  The products were usually 
customized for the group, e.g. insurance for red shirt.  However, in fact, 
insurance can be purchased from any companies.  This kind of marketing took 
advantages over the group attachment. 
5) Raise Fund 
It is a channel to raise for donation.  Everyday, names of people who donate 
will be read.  They were read during the demonstration period. 
6) Entertain 
Songs are sometimes played in the program but is considered really reared for 
both colored radios since the listeners love to listen to the news and 
conversation. 
7) Arouse Listeners’ Hater Emotion 
In addition to distrust another party by attacking their weak points or 
misconduct, words such as bad, corruption, and other impolite and arousing 
conversations and talks are usually broadcast.  The degree of intense is 
according to the political situation. 
8) Call to Join the Demonstration 
It is a pivotal role of community radios in the political crisis. When the anti-
government protesters try to overthrow the government, besides television, 
community radio is one of the major media that can effectively gather 
protesters to strengthen the demonstration. 
9) Broadcast from the Demonstration Site 
It is also an important role of the political community radio in the crisis.  Since 
the ultimate measures to overthrow the government are activities in protest 
sites, listeners are really encourage to join the demonstration with eagerness 
and curiousness on how does it feel to be at the real site. 
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 In both red and yellow community radios, activities of the items 1 through 6 from the 
community radio roles in political crisis above were usually constant, while activities 
of the items 7 through 9 will get very active when the protesters elevate measures to 
overthrow the government.  The intensity of the activities can be depicted as shown in 
Fig. 2. 
 
Thaksin                                                               Thaksin’s             Airport                     
Redshirt Demo 
Second         Early                     Military            Party                   Closure &                 
Dissolving & 
Term            Election                 Coup                 Re-elected           Power Shifting          
Bangkok Burning 
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 2.  Activities of arousing listeners and call for joining the demonstration on 
yellow and red community radios according to the political milestones. 
 
Problems 
 
Key problems in operating a political-driven, as well as general, community radio are 
as follows.  Firstly, the process of getting the license is slow.  Not only there are two 
main regulators, The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) and National 
Broadcasting Commission (NBC), but there are also too few officers to issue licenses.  
The NBC mainly oversees on the contents and public media side, such as TV and 
Radios, while the NTC oversees mainly on the technical and the individual to 
individual communication, such as telephones, the internet, etc.  For those who would 
like to establish a community radio, not only they have to apply for radio broadcasting 
permission from the NBC, they have to apply for the frequency at the NTC.  
 
Secondly, there is lack of real regulator overseeing community radios.  Since the NBC 
is supposed to oversee the operation of the community radios, but the delay of 
establishing the NBC hinders the operation of this regulator.  It was observed that the 
delay in the NBC committee establishment was driven from the parties who were 
going to lose benefits, which were the military owning large amount of frequencies 
and radio stations throughout Thailand (Chaleawchart 1999; Prachachart Business 
1999).  If the allocation of radio frequencies was restructured, the military will lose 
huge benefits.  This leads to several other problems; for example, there is no authority 
that will take care of the over-power broadcast station that it interferes with other 
stations, etc.  Up until now, the NTC and NBC will be combined together to form the 
National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission (NBTC).  This might 
accelerate the license issuing and leads to better regulations.  Thirdly, after the 
dissolving of the red shirt demonstration, anti-government station had been shut down 
liming the freedom of speech as indicated in the methodology section and in the 
appendix. 
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 Competitive Media: 
 
Apart from community radio, there are many media that people can choose among 
television, cable TV, satellite broadcast, newspaper or regular radio. Especially, 
satellite broadcast which has been used by both colors shirts (Yellow shirt called 
ASTV, Red shirt called PTV), as its nature, multimedia feature of television is more 
interesting and higher richness comparing to radio. For yellow shirt supporter, ASTV 
satellite broadcast is more popular, partly because most of them are in middle class 
that can easily afford TV and ASTV satellite dish. However, for red shirt supporter 
which most are in lower income class, having TV and PTV satellite dish is not easily 
affordable. 
 
Nevertheless, there are many advantages of radio that attract the listener, for example, 
the much cheaper cost to access comparing to TV set. Another key advantage is 
everywhere or convenient, nowadays most mobile phone, even the cheap model, can 
receive radio signal. This advantage is strong & valid especially for red shirt 
supporters where as mentioned, lower income. 
 
Furthermore, for red shirt community radio, the other 2 key advantages are becoming 
more important during the red-shirt demonstration in March – May 2010.  First is the 
quick and up-to-date news, esp. status update from the stage within the demonstration, 
sometimes, the radio program just switch to broadcast the voice from the stage instead 
of normal program. 
 
The other key advantage is so-called “Truth” or the other side of the story. Base on 
the belief of most red shirt supporter, most mainstream medias (TV, Radio or 
Newspapers) all take side to government or yellow shirt. They found that these 
medias always report news or anything about red shirt in such a bad image. 
 
Content & Format, Participation 
 
For content & format, there are huge differences between yellow and red shirt 
community radio. For example, the radio program schedule, for yellow shirt, there are 
quite structure (see appendix) and well mixed between politics and others (general 
news, economics, religious, sports). Meanwhile, red shirt community radio program is 
not well structured and mostly all about politics. Sometimes, there is only one or two 
anchors, reading newspapers and criticize the comment in the news. Both colors have 
a mix of anchor reading/talking and interview with others. 
 
Those 2 colors community radio do allow listener to participate in the program thru 
phone-in. Any person, including those who are on opposite color can call and talk to 
the anchor. The anchor will allow them to talk and comment, sometimes, anchor will 
argue back but if thing goes out of hand, the line will be cut off. 
 
Usage, Satisfaction, Need and Expectation of Community or Listeners 
 
To truly understand the role & influence of community radio towards Thai political 
turmoil, we have to separately study between the red and yellow shirt radio as its 
result are quite different.  
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 Red Shirt Community Radio 
 
Based on our interview with red shirts people in Bangkok, 2 radio stations have been 
identified as famous & most listening which are FM 92.75 & 97.25 MHz. All of them 
listen to the radio almost all day, both at home & work. The program mostly about red 
shirt news or activity update by the D.J, news can be from the regular media or just 
told by D.J. Although there are song & commercial advertisement but all are specific 
for red shirts, e.g. songs have been modified by putting the red shirt activity/thought 
into lyrics instead. Or those product/service in commercial are from small business or 
even some special made for just red shirt people.  
 
Regarding to the program itself, before the large protest in March, mostly D.J. reading 
the news, talking on his own though or information, interviewing the red shirt leader. 
However, this had been changed when the protest occurred in March, most the 
program was just broadcast the sound from the protest stage. 
 
Content & D.J are the most important reason that they listen to. Based on their beliefs, 
those mainstream media (TV, newspaper, radio) are not reliable & they took side 
(government side or/and yellow shirt side). So community radio is an alternative 
source of information for them to learn about the information that they cannot get 
from elsewhere and know the so-called “truth” about red shirt and country. D.J 
talking style is very entertaining, esp. those who talk in an aggressive way. Speed is 
also another factor, as the news is very up-to-date compare to newspaper or even 
television. 
 
When asking how they know that all of those contents are truth, first re-action is a bit 
awkward and short silence, it does imply that they may just believe whatever coming 
out of the radio speaker. However, they replied that they will rethink of those contents 
whether it does make sense, also they will try to play on the other side and find the 
counter argument to those content. They said all of the time, they could not find the 
good reason to counter those content from community radio. 
 
The reason to listen has shift a bit when the protest has been progressed and becoming 
more and more serious with tension, esp. during March – May 2010. The interviewees 
have been actively participated in the protest but as all of them have regular work to 
do. Listening to the community radio is a way that they can keep up the news and 
progress from the demonstration. When they wake up in the morning, first thing to do 
is turn on radio to check any progress. Then during work, they also find time to listen, 
either in the car or at office, once back home in the evening, sometimes, they even 
gather with friends to listen to the radio while discuss/comment about the situation. 
 
 
Yellow Shirt Community Radio 
 
The usage, satisfaction, need and expectation of yellow shirt listeners were pretty 
much the same as red shirts’. Based on our interview with yellow shirt people in 
Bangkok, 2 radio stations have been identified as famous & most listening which are 
FM 97.75 & 92.25 MHz.   
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 Discussion & Suggestion 
 
In this section the discussions on the findings above are extended and the 
recommendations for more preferable community radios are elucidated, serving the 
third objective of the research: “Analyze and suggest how to improve the community 
radio in the future to better support the community for truly understanding of 
democracy.” 
 
Although there are many similar aspects of both colors community radio from 
structure, operation, budget, participation to program itself, the differences in details 
and the magnitude of these aspects are observed.  Especially in the role of community 
radio and its importance as a source of information are very different. 
 
In yellow shirt community radio, its role is acted like a supporting media or as a 
substitute for television or internet and it is regarded as a minor source of information 
comparing to other media. Conversely, in red shirt community radio, particularly 
during the red shirt demonstration (Mar-May 2010), many supporters heavily relied 
on the community radio as an important and reliable source of information. As most 
of red shirt supporters perceived the mainstream media had taken the government side 
reporting only bias news and information.  
 
Looking from the other point as a radio station, managers or owners, they have been 
using the community radio as a channel to disseminate information, and sometimes as 
a tool to persuade the supporters to act according to their plan, e.g. joining the 
demonstration at a particular place. Community radio has been an highly effective 
tools for them, notably for red shirt community as from the interviewing with key red 
shirt leaders said that the radio was very important to them, if they have more radio 
stations, they would be able to draw larger crowds. One of the most well-known red 
shirt leaders, Kwanchai Praipana, based in Udornthani, north-east Thailand, has seen 
his listeners grow to over 300,000 people, most of who live in villages and small 
towns in at least three provinces in north-eastern Thailand. 
 
As we can see, the community radio has been manipulated and driven by group of 
people whether they might be politician, businessman, corporation or even some 
invisible hands. The program and content have been created to support their needs 
which sometimes it is not easily and clearly to say that it is good for the community. 
The community radio has been established with principle that “community radio is of 
the community, by the community and for the community”. In addition, community 
radio must be operated on a voluntary, not-for-profit basis, free from political 
intervention and domination by the state, capital and politicians (Heinrich Bll 
Foundation 2008). However, Political-driven community radio, as seen from both 
colors, has distorted the original meaning & objective of community radio.   
 
In addition, the problem of prolonged licensing acquisition process has thus 
discouraged people to legally apply for the license. Hence, there are many unlicensed 
community radio station which create many problem, such as interfering wave/signal 
due to using over-power station or inappropriate content. As a result, government 
should expedite the process of establishing a new organization so-called “National 
Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission (NBTC)” as soon as possible. 
Government has to breakthrough any challenge created by any group of people or 
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 organization which are believed to lose the benefits and trying to thwart this new 
organization setup. We believe that this is like “killing 2 birds with one stone”, once 
this organization setup, we can facilitate and streamline the license acquisition 
process, then we can legalize those unlicensed community radio. As a result of that, 
we can control as well as monitor the content to be broadcast and enforce the law as 
appropriated.  
 
Drawing above discussions and the research framework together, it shows that the 
operator structure of community radios and expectation of media usage played 
leading roles here.  In short, the operators of the community radios overwhelmingly 
influence the media contents.  One of the most important recommendations for a more 
preferable political-driven community radio is that the station should be supervised by 
a variety and proper selected community representatives.  For the listener side, 
listeners preferred choice of the station were mainly driven by their existing believes 
corresponding with the Limited Effect Theory (McQuail 2002), predicting that people 
prefer the station on their side.  Thus, authorities have to enforce all community radio 
stations to comply with rules of content proportion.  Education, economics, cultures, 
etc., must be in the program besides politics.  Furthermore, to reduce the extremity of 
bipolar political believes, we can ask community radios from both sides to exchange 
their programs.  For example, yellow shirt programs can be on red shirt programs and 
vice versa.  This strategy will train Bangkok political radio followers to make critical 
thinking beyond exposed contents.  Especially, when consider the last three roles that 
put the city into turmoil, reasons from both sides should exist in the programs so that 
the political issues can be solved by peaceful and logical manner. 
 
Ideally, as the current government attempt to solve the political situation and plan the 
national reform with setting up many committees, one strategic area should be 
educating people what the real democracy is, as this word have been abused by many 
people and interpreted different way. Community radio is one of the best 
communication channel choice, as its wide reach, easy to access (low cost & 
convenience) and reliable source of information (as most anchors are familiar face for 
them). We should utilize this strength of community radio by blending the content 
about democracy, such as Democracy 101, what is the basic right that they can and 
should do as well as what cannot do. The contents still serve the followers; 
nonetheless provide several perspectives of the political issues to promote the critical 
thinking ability of the listeners. 
 
Conclusion and Future Work 
 
It was clear that the community radios play pivotal roles in the political crisis.  The 
suggested recommendations analyzed from the study would be effective guidelines to 
rebuild the community radio to serve its real purposes.  In the next step, we should 
conduct an action research trying to implement the community radio which serve the 
followers yet promote a peaceful democracy and evaluate the community satisfaction. 
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Abstract 
 
Prostitution is a world that is here to stay, like it or not it is time to make the best of it. 
Barbara Walters 
Prostitution has long been called the world's oldest profession. Evidence can be established of 
people selling sex for money or some sort of gain for as long back as we have records for. There 
is no denying that the sex industry has taken international dimensions, so much so, that it is 
recognized as an economic motor for several countries. 
The exploitation of prostitution is considered to be a staid issue in most of the countries across 
the globe. The number is only increasing enormously by the year, making it a far more serious 
concern than the past centuries, yet very few to none of the countries have succeeded in 
completely solving this problem. While the nations of the world have long been debating on the 
merits of legalizing or decriminalizing prostitution, with questions such as, would legalization 
condense some of the inequalities and exploitation suffered by the women involved; is 
prostitution debauchery, etc., however, the question should no longer be that of morality, instead, 
whether prostitution is a form of exploitation to be obliterated or an occupation to be 
legalised/regulated, should be posed. 
Key words : Prostitution, legalizing, sex industry, exploitation 
JEL field code: (L6) Law of Human Rights and Social Justice 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
Prostitution has long been called the world’s oldest profession. Evidence can be 
established of people selling sex for money or some sort of gain for as long back as 
we have records for. There is no denying that the sex industry has taken international 
dimensions, so much so, that it is recognised as an economic motor for several 
countries. However, according to the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 
(“ITPA”), ‘prostitution’ means the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for 
commercial purposes.1 Prostitution in India is a Rs. 40,000 crore annual business and 
thirty percent of the sex workers are children whose exploiters earn a whopping Rs. 
11,000 crore.2 According to a survey, there are approximately 10 million sex workers 
in India out of which 100,000 are in Mumbai alone, Asia’s largest sex industry 
centre.3 There are about 300,000 to 500,000 children in sex trade in India4 among 
which Bangalore along with five major cities together accounts for 80% of child 
prostitutes in the country. 5  These figures are startling and point towards the 
importance of a genuine intervention of the State to curb this necessary evil.6 
Prostitution has a long history in India right from the ancient times7 till the 19th 
Century8 in British India and a widely recognized social reality today. Indian Courts 
have also recognized “Prostitution in society has not been an unknown phenomenon... 
The victims of the trap are the poor, illiterate and ignorant sections of the society and 
are the target group in the flesh trade; rich communities exploit them and harvest at 
their misery and ignominy in an organized gangsterism, in particular, with police 
nexus...”9 It was also said that “[A] class of women is trapped as victims of 
circumstances, unfounded social sanctions, handicaps and coercive forms of flesh 
trade, optimised as ‘prostitutes’.”10  
Throughout this paper, the term ‘sex worker’ will be used wherever possible. 
However, the term ‘prostitution or prostitute’ may be referred to, when discussing 
case law or legislative text that has adopted this term. This paper aims at exploring 
aspects of legalization of commercial sex work in India and whether it is a possibility 
in light of the various social and legal constraints that are existent in India.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 § 2(f), Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as “ITPA”). 
2 S. Sridevi Goel, Girl Child Prostitution, Society’s Responsibility – Indian Scenario, 7 CBI BULLETIN 
14 (1999).   
3 Robert I. Freidman, India’s Shame: Sexual Slavery and Political Corruption Are Leading to An AIDS 
Catastrophe, The Nation, April 8, 1996 c.f. Donna M. Hughes et al, Factbook on Global Sexual 
Exploitation, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW), 
http://www.catwinternational.org/factbook/india.php.  
4 Donna M. Hughes et al, Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation, Coalition Against Trafficking in 
Women (CATW), http://www.catwinternational.org/factbook/india.php.  
5 Robert I. Freidman, Supra note 3.  
6 Asim Sarode, Contesting legal positions on prostitution from a human rights perspective, Prostitution 
and beyond: an Analysis of Sex Work in India (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 2008) 231. 
7 See Sukumari Bhattacharji, Prostitution in Ancient India, 15 (2) SOCIAL SCIENTIST 32 (1987).  
8 See Sumanta Banerjee, The 'Beshya' and the 'Babu': Prostitute and Her Clientele in 19th Century 
Bengal, 28 (45) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 2461 (1993). 
9 Gaurav Jain v. Union of India and others AIR 1997 SC 3021 (K. Ramaswamy J.,). 
10 Id.  
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 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There are numerous international treaties and conventions that protect the interests 
and human rights of sex workers. Among them, the primary international treaty 
dealing with sex workers is the 1949 UN Convention for the Suppression of the 
Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.11 This 
Convention reflects the Abolitionist12 view to the point that it has failed adequately to 
recognize the human rights of sex workers and is based on the promise that sex work 
should end and that all sex workers should be regarded as victims who must be saved 
from themselves and be rehabilitated.13 Under this Convention, it is an offence to 
procure or entice another person even with their consent into prostitution,14 to exploit 
the prostitution of that person even with their consent,15 state parties shall agree to 
punish any person who keeps or manages of finances a brothel16 or knowingly rents 
or lets a building or other place for purpose of prostitution.17  
 
The most recent international instrument on the issue is the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime18 but this has not yet been ratified by India and is not in force so far. This 
Protocol criminalizes acts of receipt, transportation, harbour, recruitment, and transfer 
of persons; by means of use of force, abduction, threat of use of force, frauds, 
deception, and abuse of position of vulnerability; for purposes of prostitution, forced 
labour or other forms of sexual exploitation.19 This protocol is still couched in 
language similar to the 1949 Convention and does as little to respect the rights and 
agency of women in the industry. It fails to draw a line between trafficking and forced 
prostitution on one hand and unforced prostitution on the other, providing justification 
for criminalization and denial of basic rights of these workers.20 Similarly, the Slavery 
Convention of 192621  and its Supplementary Convention of 1956 22  have some 
provisions relating to sex workers. Article 1 of the Supplementary Convention 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 96 U.N.T.S. 271 (1949) [hereinafter 1949 Trafficking Convention]. 
12 The Abolitionist approach declares that the institution of prostitution itself constitutes a violation of 
human rights, akin to the institution of slavery. The Abolitionist approach requires governments to 
abolish prostitution through the penalisation of this 'third party', which profits from the transaction 
between prostitute and client. The prostitute cannot be punished, as she is the victim of a process she 
does not control. See Jo Bindman & J Doezema, Redefining Prostitution as Sex Work on the 
International Agenda, http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/redefining.html. 
13 Laya Medhini et al, 2 HIV/AIDS AND THE LAW (New Delhi: Human Rights Law Network, 2007) 
715. 
14 Article 1 (1), 1949 Trafficking Convention. 
15 Article 1 (2), Id.  
16 Article 2 (1), Id. 
17 Article 2 (2), Id. 
18  G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. G.A.O.R, 55th Session, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25, (2000) (hereinafter, 
Trafficking Protocol). 
19	  Id	  Article	  3	  (a),	  Trafficking	  Protocol.	  
20 Laya Medhini et al, Supra note 14.  
21 International Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, 60 L.N.T.S 253, 46 Stat. 2183 
(September 25, 1926). 
22 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
Similar to Slavery, 266 U.N.T.S 40 (April 30, 1956). 
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includes debt bondage and other forms of tied labour, under which the working 
conditions of sex workers may fall.  
 
Apart from these, there are general international human rights instruments that are of 
importance for those working in the sex industry. A general overview of the 
respective contributions of the protections available under these instruments needs to 
be outlined. The fundamental international framework on human rights23 protection is 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights24 (“UDHR”) and the other instruments 
that have become synonymous with protection of basic human rights of individuals 
are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights25 (“ICCPR”) and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women26 
(“CEDAW”) which is perhaps the best basis for the protection of sex workers.27 The 
preamble of the UDHR affirms equal rights and dignities of men and women, right to 
life and liberty,28 equal protection before law and right against all forms of slavery 
and servitude,29 protection against arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, 
or correspondence30and of particular importance to sex workers is right to work, to 
free choice of employment and to just and favourable working conditions.31 Also 
significant is the right of each person to a standard of living adequate to food, 
clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services.32 Thus the UDHR 
outlines a series of very important rights and principles relevant to the protection of 
sex workers. ICCPR also reflects the similar rights with emphasis on right to freedom 
of association that needs to be in the interests of national security, public safety, the 
protection of public health and morals, or the protection of rights of others33 and 
effective protection against discrimination to be granted.34 Under CEDAW, there are 
provisions that deal specifically with trafficking and prostitution35 and the right of 
free choice of profession and employment.36 The Committee on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, CEDAW acknowledged that poverty and 
unemployment can force many women into prostitution and that they are “especially 
vulnerable to violence because of their status, which may be unlawful, tends to 
marginalize them.”37  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See generally Laura Reanda, Prostitution as a Human Rights Question: Problems and Prospects of 
United Nations Action, 13(2) HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 202 (1991).  
24 G.A. Res 217 A (III), U.N. G.O.A.R, U.N. Doc A/810, 171 (December 10, 1948).  
25 999 U.N.T.S 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (December 16, 1967). 
26 1249 U.N.T.S 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (December 18, 1979). 
27 Laya Medhini et al, Supra note 14 at 717. 
28 Article 3, UDHR. 
29 Article 4, UDHR. 
30 Article 12, UDHR. 
31 Article 23, UDHR. 
32 Article 25, UDHR. 
33 Article 22 (2), ICCPR.  
34 Article 26, ICCPR. 
35 Article 6, CEDAW. 
36 Article 11 (1) (f), CEDAW.  
37 United Nations Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, U.N. 
Doc. A/47/3B (1992). 
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The International Labour Organization has addressed the issues of discrimination in 
employment and occupation38, forced labour39, occupational safety and health40 and 
protection of workers’ health.41  
 
United Nations has come out with a handbook of guidelines42 to provide examples of 
best practices and legislation in relation to prostitution and it contains many 
progressive provisions of relevance to the issue of sex work and also HIV. It states 
that regulation short of criminalization can also stigmatize the sex workers leading to 
human rights violations, by imposing restrictions on forced detention in rehabilitation 
inter alia. The handbook also criticizes prostitution laws as being founded on 
nineteenth century notions of morality, which were as ineffective as they are now in 
suppressing the industry. It recommends that an alternative approach of treating sex 
work as a personal service industry, which is neither condemned nor condoned and 
also removal of a range of offences in fear of prosecution and harassment by the 
police.43  
 
The above instruments if incorporated into domestic law could be a very strong 
weapon for the legislature, the courts as well as the concerned groups and individuals 
to ensure that all rights are upheld.44 
 
 
Legal Framework of Certain Other Countries: 
 
The countries listed below may be far advanced than India in terms of social 
structures and public moral definitions, but the cases for legalization have been 
considered purely for an analogical comparison and whether such systems could work 
in India. 
 
Netherlands: 
 
The current law regarding prostitution in Netherlands45 legalizes brothels as long as 
they do not disrupt the public life and they will operate like any other commercial 
establishment. The law aims to legalize the organization of voluntary prostitution and 
penalize involuntary prostitution characterized by coercion, exploitation and fraud for 
which imprisonment is guaranteed. Powers are vested with local authorities to control 
and regulate the conditions under which prostitution is permitted.46 Sex work is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See Discrimination (Occupation and Employment) Convention, No. 111 (1958) ; 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 
39 See Forced Labour Convention, No. 29 (1930) http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 
40  See Occupational Safety and Health Convention, C155 (1981) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm. 
41  See Protection of Workers’ Health Recommendation, R97 (1953) 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp1.htm. 
42 Handbook for Legislators on HIV/AIDS, Law and Human Right: Action to combat HIV/AIDS in view 
of its devastating Human, Economic and Social Impact, UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, 
UNAIDS/99.48E (November 1999) http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/aids_en.pdf. 
43 Id. 
44 Laya Medhini et al, Supra note 14 at 719. 
45  Jo Visser, The Dutch Law Proposal on Prostitution: Text and Explanation, 
http://www.mrgraaf.nl/2_ef.htm; Ministry of Justice, Press Release: Heavier Penalties for Abuse of 
Prostitution, http://www.minjust.nl/8080 /c_actual/persber/pb0121.htm.  
46 Id. 
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organized in a variety of ways in Netherlands, for e.g. window prostitution, street sex 
work both of which work independently.47 The tolerant nature of Netherlands portrays 
that sex workers have good working conditions which are similar to other industries – 
but reality is far from it.  Even though public policy has taken a pragmatic approach 
towards sex work, they are victims of stigma, marginalization and bereft of human 
rights protection.48 
 
Victoria, Australia:  
 
The Victorian government has continued to criminalize all forms of prostitution 
except for prostitution through escort services or licensed brothels (zoning and 
licensing requirements for brothels to be determined by the proper municipal 
authorities).49 The Victoria experiment has failed for two reasons: firstly, because 
municipal authorities have control over issuance and revocation of licenses and due to 
community pressure legal brothels have existed in very small numbers.50This results 
in an increase in illegal prostitution as there is a limited opportunity to work at the 
legal brothels.51 Secondly, because legal brothels are so limited, the brothel owners 
have substantial power in their hands to exploit sex workers who want to work legally 
(there is a huge employment demand by such sex workers) and this has led to 
nefarious and horrible working conditions for these sex workers.52 
 
Sweden: 
 
The new legislation in Sweden criminalizes buying of sexual services. Its main aim is 
to reduce the numbers of sex workers and encourages them to retrain.53 It targets men 
as clients, that the sex workers and penalizes them with imprisonment. This approach 
has led to collaboration of social services and law enforcement officials in sensitive 
treatment of the sex workers.54 The aim is to contain socially unacceptable behaviour 
and to encourage the sex workers back into the mainstream of the society.55 
 
 
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA 
 
The laws governing sex work in India are entailed in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 
(“IPC”); the Constitution of India, 1950 (“Constitution”); and the ITPA. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Jo Bindman & J Doezema, Supra note 13. 
48 Id. 
49 Martha Shaffer & Sylvia Davis, Prostitution in Canada: The Invisible Menace or the Menace of 
Invisibility?, http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/sdavis.html. 
50 M. Neave, The Failure of Prostitution Law Reform, 21 AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND JOURNAL 
OF CRIMINOLOGY 202, 203 (1988) c.f. Martha Shaffer and Sylvia Davis, Prostitution in Canada: The 
Invisible Menace or the Menace of Invisibility?, http://www.walnet.org/csis/papers/sdavis.html. 
51Martha Shaffer & Sylvia Davis, Supra note 50.  
52Id; See also Mary Sullivan, What Happens When Prostitution Becomes Work? An Update on 
Legalization of Prostitution in Australia, http://action.web.ca/home/catw/readingroom.shtml?x=84641. 
53 Judith Kilvington et al, Prostitution Policy in Europe: A Time for Change, 67 FEMINIST REVIEW 78, 
83 (2001). 
54 Id at 85.  
55 Id at 89.  
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Constitution apart from the equality provisions56 and provisions of freedom of 
association,57 right to life and personal liberty,58 guarantees prohibition of trafficking 
of human beings and forced labour.59 Under Part IV of Directive Principles of State 
Policy: the State is required to direct its policies towards securing, inter alia, that both 
men and women have an equal right to an adequate means of livelihood,60 that health 
and strength of workers not be abused, and that citizens are not forced by necessity to 
enter avocations unsuited for their age and strength,61 promotion of the educational 
and economic interests of weaker sections of the society, ensuring their protection 
from social injustice and exploitation(emphasis supplied),62 requirement of fostering 
respect for international law and treaty obligations,63 obligation on the state to raise 
the levels of standard of living64 and the renunciation of practices by citizens that are 
derogatory to the dignity of women.65 The Andhra Pradesh High Court has also 
affirmed that these combined duties are placed on the state and a corresponding right 
is placed on citizens including sex workers.66  
 
The IPC has at least 20 provisions67 that make trafficking punishable. Most of them 
inter alia deal with abduction for illicit intercourse,68 wrongful confinement after 
abduction.69 
The primary piece of legislation dealing with sex work is the ITPA. The Act mainly 
makes pimping and other activities punishable, which gives a commercial aspect to 
prostitution that is likely to exploit the person of the prostitute.70 The Act does not 
prohibit prostitution per se but it does prohibit commercial activities of the flesh 
trade.71 It has been held that all that is necessary in order to prove prostitution is that a 
woman or girl has offered her body for promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire, and 
that sexual intercourse is not an essential ingredient.72 Section 3 of the ITPA provides 
for the punishment of any person in charge of the premises who uses or knowingly 
allows someone else to use it as a brothel. From case law, it seems that even a single 
incident of prostitution, with surrounding circumstances, is sufficient to prove the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 The equality provisions are Articles 14 and 15 in Part III dealing with Fundamental Rights of the 
Constitution of India, 1950. Article 14 provides for equality before the law and equal protection of the 
laws; Article 15 prohibits the state from discriminating on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or 
place of birth, though it can make special provisions for women, children, “socially and educationally 
backward” classes, scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.   
57 Article 19(1), Constitution of India, 1950. 
58 Article 21, Constitution of India, 1950. 
59 Article 23, Constitution of India, 1950. 
60 Article 39 (a), Constitution of India, 1950. 
61 Article 39 (e), Constitution of India, 1950.  
62 Article 46, Constitution of India, 1950. 
63 Article 51, Constitution of India, 1950. 
64 Article 47, Constitution of India, 1950. 
65 Article 51 A (e), Constitution of India, 1950. 
66 P.N.Swamy, Labour Liberation Front, Mahaboobnagar v. Station House Officer, Hyderabad 1998 
(1) ALD 755. 
67 §293, 294, 317, 339, 340, 341, 342, 354, 359, 361, 362, 363, 365, and 366, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 
376, 
496, 498, 506, 509, 511, Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
68 §366B, Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
69 §368, Indian Penal Code, 1860. 
70 Manoj Wad and Sharayu Yadav, The legal framework of prostitution in India, Prostitution and 
beyond: an Analysis of Sex Work in India (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 2008) 212.  
71 Id.  
72 Gaurav Jain, Supra note 9 at ¶ 16. 
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offence of keeping a brothel.73 Offences under the ITPA are listed under sections 3 to 
9.74 It has been held in a couple of judgments that the ITPA did not aim to abolish 
prostitutes and prostitution as such, and did not make it a criminal offence for a 
woman to prostitute herself, but was rather intended to inhibit or abolish the 
commercialized vice of trafficking in women.75 The Gujarat High Court in another 
case refused to recognize prostitution as a legitimate means of livelihood, as that 
would give an open invitation for women to be trafficked and also that the right to 
prostitution in not a fundamental right of women or girls.76 The restrictions imposed 
under Section 7 of the ITPA were held to be legitimate and not discriminatory.77 
Under the ITPA, a Magistrate, if he deems it to be necessary, can order the removal of 
a prostitute from any place in the interest of the general public.78 The ITPA also 
allows for reformation of female offenders by detaining them in established corrective 
institutions79 and for the enforcement of which Special Police Officers can be 
appointed.80 It is interesting to note that the client faces no punishment whatsoever.81 
 
The 2006 Bill82 omits §8 of the original Act, thus removing the offence of soliciting 
or seducing for the purpose of prostitution, it also omits §20 of the Act regarding the 
removal of the prostitute from any place. However, the responsibility, on the flipside, 
and severity of punishment of traffickers and clients is increased. The newly proposed 
§5(c) provides for punishment of any person visiting a brothel for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation of any person. These proposals have been criticized as the 
livelihoods of the workers would be stifled by the increased punishments of the 
clients.83 
 
 
DIFFICULTIES WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
 
The core of the problem lies not in the loopholes of the ITPA, but in its corruption-
riddled implementation.84 The legislation meant to protect the exploitation of sex 
workers operates against them because the customer, without whom the act of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Id. 
74 §3 provides for punishment for keeping a brothel or allowing premises to be used as a brothel, §4 
provides for punishment for living on the earnings of prostitution, §5 provides for offences in 
procuring, inducing or taking persons for the sake of prostitution,§6 provides for detaining a person in 
premises where prostitution is carried on, §7 provides for offences regarding prostitution in or the 
vicinity of public places, §8 provides for seducing or soliciting for the purpose of prostitution, §9 
provides for seduction of a person in custody: Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956. 
75 In Re: Ratnamala and Another v. Respondent AIR 1962 Madras 31 ¶ 5; Bai Shanta v. State of 
Gujarat AIR 1967 Gujarat 211 ¶ 8. 
76 Sahyog Mahila Mandal v. State of Gujarat (2004) 2 GLR 1764. 
77 Id at ¶ 9.5. 
78 §20, ITPA, 1956; See also Prabha Kotishwaran, Preparing for Civil Disobedience: Indian Sex 
Workers and the Law, 21(2) BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD JOURNAL 161(2001). 
79 §10A, ITPA, 1956. 
80 § 13, ITPA, 1956.  
81 Prabha Kotishwaran, Preparing for Civil Disobedience: Indian Sex Workers and the Law, 21(2) 
BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD JOURNAL 161, 170 (2001). 
82 The Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Bill, 2006. 
83 Laya Medhini et al, Supra note 14 at 734; Indian Sex Workers rally over law, BBC News, March 8, 
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4787580.stm. 
84 Harshad Barde, (Mis)Reading through the lines, Prostitution and beyond: an Analysis of Sex Work in 
India (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 2008) 227. 
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prostitution cannot be committed, also goes scot-free.85 This is the reason for the 
limited impact and the outreach of the legislation is very evident where the attitude of 
the police and even the judiciary has not been any different.86 And as a result through 
raids the police frequently rounds up the female sex workers rather than the pimps, 
procurers, brother owners. 
 
The uneven enforcement of the ITPA against prostitute women is attributed to various 
causes: First that there is a strong collusion between elected representatives, law 
enforcement agencies and the brothel-keepers that impedes the strict implementation 
of the provisions of the Act87 and this collusion has to be busted and decimated.88 
Corrupt officials in the law enforcement agencies are widespread.89 An overhaul of 
the prevalent police procedures involved in ITPA cases and the scrutiny of their 
corrupt practices might bring about a more desirable effect.90 For this purpose the 
sensitization of the police is a must.91 
 
The second persistent problem with the enforcement of the ITPA has been uncovered 
during field studies92 and one such study confirms the complexity of collection of 
sufficient proof to make a conviction absolute.93 Some police officers have said that 
there is an immense gap between the number of crimes committed in reality and the 
registration of crimes in the police records as many crimes that are reported are not 
registered (approximately 60 percent).94 
 
The third problem is with the reformative (corrective and rehabilitative) homes that 
are set up under the Act and their inadequacy.95 Such homes are overburdened and 
cannot accommodate the large number of sex workers who are convicted under the 
ITPA.96 The rules for protective homes must compulsorily provide for literacy and a 
range of vocational and occupational training based on the woman's aptitude and 
market value of the job; counselling which helps in redefining inmates as surviving 
human beings must be provided; and subsidised hostels and care homes must also be 
set up to house inmates discharged from homes.97 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls: Need for Tougher Laws and Sincere 
Implementation, 44 JILI 504, 523 (2002). 
86 Id.  
87 P. Kotishwaran, Supra note 84 at 171. 
88 Poonam Pradhan Saxena, Supra note 88 at 527. 
89 P. Kotishwaran, Supra note 91.  
90 H. Barde, Supra note 87 at 227. 
91 P. P. Saxena, Supra note 92. 
92 P. Kotishwaran, Supra note 91.  
93 NHRC-UNIFEM-ISS Project, Supra note 47 at 249; Jean D’Cunha, Prostitution in a Patriarchal 
Society: A Critical Review of the SIT Act, 22 (45) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 1919, 1921 
(1987); The ground realities of the legal framework have also been discussed in: Anil Awachat, 
Prostitution in Pune and Bombay: A Report, 21 (12) ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 478 (1986) 
and Puja Yadav, Ground realities of the legal framework, Prostitution and beyond: an Analysis of Sex 
Work in India (New Delhi: SAGE Publishers, 2008) 229.  
94 NHRC-UNIFEM-ISS Project, Supra note 47 at 363. 
95 Jean D’Cunha, Supra note 97 at 1924; P.Kotishwaran, Supra note 91. 
96 NHRC-UNIFEM-ISS Project, Supra note 47 at 27.  
97Jean D’Cunha, Supra note 97 at 1925. 
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As opined by Justice Ramaswamy in the case of Gaurav Jain v. Union of India and 
others 98 that “women found in flesh trade should be viewed more as victims of socio-
economic circumstances and not offender of the society, some police authorities have 
already set out the process of sensitization towards the sex workers and their 
treatment.”99 
 
 
SYSTEMS OF PROSTITUTION RELATED LAWS 
 
 
Three systems of prostitution related laws have been formulated and applied100 in 
legal strategies and these vary considerably both in effectiveness and 
appropriateness. 101  These systems are classified as: Criminalization, 
Decriminalization and Legalization 102  also known as Prohibitionist system, 
Tolerationist system and Legalized Prostitution.103 
 
The Criminalization or Prohibitionist system aims at changing criminal sanctions in 
order to control the social evil of prostitution and to countenance it by amending the 
criminal law.104 It perceives prostitution as immoral and aims at its eradication for 
which it bans prostitution per se, by criminalising the activities of all categories of 
people involved in prostitution: brothel-keepers, pimps, procurers, clients and 
prostitutes.105 
 
Under Decriminalization or Tolerationist system, prostitution is not regarded as either 
a crime or a licensable activity; it is based on voluntariness and considered an act 
between two consenting adults where the role of the State is limited to eradicate 
coercive prostitution.106 The state can only bring in certain measures to curb excessive 
exploitation and preserve public health. This system does not seek to abolish 
prostitution per se but is only targeted at trafficking in women and girls for 
prostitution, brothel-keeping, pimping, procuring and renting premises for 
prostitution; here prostitutes are not criminalized for their work and they have more or 
less the same rights as other citizens in the society.107 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Gaurav Jain, Supra note 9. 
99 Police IGP Circular (Bangalore, Mysore, Dharwad in Karnataka) under the ITPA, 1956, November 
22, 2005. http://altlawforum.org/Resources/sexwork/DG%20and%20IG%20Karnataka.pdf.	  
100 Jean D’ Cunha, Prostitution Laws: Ideological Dimensions and Enforcement Practices, 27(17) 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY WS-34 (1992); For a general understanding of the USA policy on 
Prostitution, See B. J. George, Jr.,  
 Legal, Medical and Psychiatric Considerations in the Control of Prostitution, 60(6) MICHIGAN LAW 
REVIEW 717 (1962). 
101 Frances M. Shaver, Prostitution: A Critical Analysis of Three Policy Approaches, 11(3) CANADIAN 
PUBLIC POLICY 493 (1985). 
102 Id.   
103 Jean D’ Cunha, Supra note 104. 
104 Frances M. Shaver, Supra note 105 at 494. 
105 Jean D’ Cunha, Supra note 107. 
106 Frances M. Shaver, Supra note 108.  
107 Jean D’ Cunha, Supra note 107.  
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Decriminalization will enable sex workers to practice their work without police 
harassment; this is seen as a major issue with many sex workers in India.108 It is at 
least a partial solution to some of the problems suffered by men and women within 
prostitution.109 Decriminalization is a way to protect workers’ rights and to make the 
brothel owners responsible criminally. 110  This approach of penalizing everyone 
involved in prostitution except for the sex worker works against her interest.111 Along 
with changes in maintenance of rehabilitative homes, the corrupt police and judicial 
authorities who demand sexual favours from sex workers have to be dealt with 
severely punished heavily.112 
 
Finally coming to Legalization or regulation as it is sometimes called, attempts are 
made to license or register prostitutes and brothels and to require that prostitutes be 
monitored and checked for venereal diseases. The underlying assumption being that 
prostitution serves the different sexual needs of men and women and must be 
regulated so as to regulate its worst side-effects.113 “It permits for prostitution 
especially in 'closed houses', this system requires prostitutes to mandatorily register 
themselves with local authorities and submit them-selves to periodic health check-ups 
and receive a police clearance to work professionally, generally in officially 
designated areas. Legalisation is thus perceived as a means of ensuring 'public health' 
through regulation and control of prostitutes and their health, while permitting 
unfettered male access to women.”114 Prostitution as good economic development 
policy means prostitution on demand. 115  The International Labour Organisation 
suggests that by including prostitution as an economic sector, poor countries of South 
East Asia can benefit economically through the revenues generated by the industry.116 
Legalization makes more prostituted women available to more men.117 
 
The idea of legalization is faced with a lot of criticism. “It has been suggested by 
some feminists that licensing and monitoring may not help sex workers to live and 
work with dignity. They feel that regulation leads to a division between legal and 
illegal sex workers, leading to further marginalisation of the latter. Many sex workers 
would not desire regulation as it may mean they will be publicly seen as prostitutes 
and an increase in control over the lives of these prostitutes would be demeaning to 
them and also the aspect of compulsory medical testing.”118 Many feel that legalizing 
prostitution is akin to legalizing child labour119 and tantamount to slavery.120 Some 
suggest that the social stigma regarding prostitution will fade away after legalization 
or decriminalization, yet the shame of those in prostitution remains after legalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108 Geetanjali Gangoli, Prostitution, Legalisation and Decriminalisation: Recent Debates, 33(10) 
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 504,505 (1998). 
109 Id. 
110 Mellissa Farley, “Bad for the Body, Bad for the Heart”: Prostitution Harms Women Even if 
Legalized or Decriminalized, 10(10) VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1087, 1090 (2004). 
111 P. Kotishwaran, Supra note 84 at 184. 
112 Id. 
113 Frances M. Shaver, Supra note 108. 
114 Jean D’ Cunha, Supra note 104 at WS-35. 
115 Janice C. Raymond, Prostitution on Demand: Legalizing Buyers as Sexual Consumers, 10(10) 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1156, 1162 (2004).  
116 Id. 
117 Id at 1163. 
118 Geetanjali Gangoli, Supra note 112. 
119 P. Kotishwaran, Supra note 115. 
120 Frances M. Shaver, Supra note 105 at 497. 
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or decriminalization.121“If brothels are to be legalized, the employees should be 
protected like any other workers under the appropriate provincial labour standards 
legislation. Regulation going beyond this minimum is likely to contribute to the 
continued stigmatization of prostitutes and to the institutionalization of yet another 
working ghetto for women.”122  
 
 
CONCLUSION AND WAY FORWARD 
Legalization of Prostitution is not the best way to go forward in tackling the problem 
of human trafficking and the necessary social evil of prostitution. In India, with such 
diverse societal ingredients, sex work has survived in parallel with the society where 
it is looked down upon due to the degrading aspects of the profession. Sex Workers 
across the country, especially in major cities, have been largely limited to a particular 
area where thousands of sex workers live as a community. Provisions such as 
licensing, registration with local police and local municipal bodies will not be 
possible until the stigma attached with sex work is done away with. For this, the 
police needs to be further sensitized to the field of sex work and they need to respect 
the human rights of such sex workers. The legislature first needs to provide all the 
basic human rights of these sex workers that are guaranteed under international law 
and municipal law. Their social conditions need to be uplifted; they have to be 
rehabilitated and trained to transfer to better paying jobs where they are given dignity 
and reasonable support. With legalization, the sex workers’ problems will just worsen 
and prostitution will be further entrenched into our society without a way of getting 
out of it. A distinction needs to be made between sex workers who have taken up the 
profession voluntarily and sex workers who have been or are being forced into this 
profession. Both sections are to be looked after with the latter requiring immediate 
proactive support. They need to be given life insurance123 and voter’s rights.124 Only 
when the complicity of the policemen and the brothel owners is broken off and the 
nexus between them is annihilated, will the sex workers have a say in their own 
matters.125 The best way to go ahead for India will be decriminalization of prostitutes 
and criminalization of brothel-owners along with penalizing demand in form of the 
consumer of sexual services.126 The sex worker needs to be rehabilitated with state 
protection and care and has to be relocated to another sector of the industry with 
proper training. 
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Abstract 
 
Changes in the business environment, including macroeconomic changes, enhance the 
use of various management tools. In the era of seeking by banks a new way to reduce 
costs, the role of isolating certain tasks outside the organization is growing. In the 
banking sector crisis reducing costs through the use of outsourcing grows to become 
the strategic decision. This is a trend seen in recent years in the Polish banking sector. 
This article aims to analyze and evaluate outsourcing in the banking sector in Poland. 
Poland is one of the global BPO centers and at the same time, has avoided economic 
recession in recent years. The banking sector continues to be one of the most 
profitable sectors of the economy. At the same time, there is a large share of foreign 
capital in the Polish banking sector. Authors try to answer the questions about what is 
the scale of outsourcing in the polish banking sector?, and which tasks are the most 
popular outsourcing? The authors of the study have advanced thesis that the most 
common types of activities outsourced by banks does not belong to their core 
business. Authors are also working on the model of outsourcing in the polish banking 
sector. The method used in the paper is a survey among banking workers and banking 
reports and other documents analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last few years have brought significant changes in the functioning of banks. 
Doctrinal concepts such as "too big to fail" have become less important. Some well-
known banks in the world fell, but the Polish banking sector has avoided 
bankruptcies. As a result of the global economic crisis, many foreign customers have 
lost their mortgages and places to live. Mortgage-based credits are the best pay off 
credits in Poland. Banks are adapting to changes in the environment - quickly began 
to cut the costs of their activities. Since staff costs are a very important part of the 
operating costs of banks, during the crisis the reductions were popular. Another way 
to reduce the operational costs is outsourcing. For some banks, outsourcing has 
become a vehicle to reduce costs, while for others it was used to improving the 
management. The first mention of outsourcing dates back to the turn of the 70s and 
80s, but its actual popularity occurred in the 90 years of the twentieth century - 
especially in polish economy, which was central command economy up to 90. 
Interestingly, in contrast to many other management tools coming from the West, 
growth of outsourcing popularity was in Poland and in the West simultaneously. This 
reflects the relatively short history of outsourcing used in practice. 
 
The article examines the literature concerning outsourcing. Reasons for outsourcing 
implementation, and factors influencing success of outsourcing were defined. Than 
methodology of research was presented and final empirical research results were 
analysed. 
 
2. The need of outsourcing and factors of success - literature review 
 
Outsourcing, most often, is understood as the contracting out of a business process to 
a third-party, with participation in a separate organisational unit or without the 
participation. There have been many reasons for outsourcing selected in the literature, 
but the first position extends striving to reduce operating costs. When we outsource a 
range of activities we get rid of organizational problems and we can concentrate on 
our core business. It is significant that, at least in some jurisdictions, like in Poland, 
when we outsource to business, we commission vendor and also the legal services and 
we are not interested in social issues about the outsourced spheres. Using outsourcing 
you can reduce additional labor costs, such as social services. Cost savings are made 
in some cases by reducing both direct and indirect remuneration of persons who 
ultimately perform outsourced tasks. Furthermore, vendor assumes much of the risk 
associated with the ongoing maintenance and management of employees. Principal 
act paying and demanding. Possible consequences of the problems with the staff, etc. 
focus on the vendor. Sometimes outsourcing vendor is a big player with a special 
equipment or experience that cannot afford a small client. He has the technological 
advantage. A. A. Gokhale asses that “…offshore providers, who are at work while 
U.S. workers are sleeping, enable faster turnarounds during crunch time, quicker than 
most firms can deliver internally” [A. A. Gokhale, p. 11]. It can be concluded that the 
main reasons for outsourcing are: cost reduction, risk reduction, striving to resources 
elasticity, growing of the quality of resources, access to resources. 
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Table 1. The reasons for outsourcing implementation 
No. Author Reasons 
1. S. Chatterjee, R. Chaudhuri Internal organizational stability and flexibility in 
obtaining improved satisfaction and better 
service with the outsourcing project 
2. J. Harasim  Willingness to get rid of burdensome 
administrative tasks 
3. Z. Shi et al. Assemble knowledge from suppliers 
4. J. T. C. Teng et al. 
 
Lack of resources 
Resource gaps 
Acquiring resources from outside the firm 
boundaries by souring arrangement 
5. A. Vashista, A. Vashista Lower labour costs 
Technological advances 
Source: S. Chatterjee, R. Chaudhuri, A System Theoretic Analysis of IT/IS 
Outsourcing: A Case Based Approach, Journal of Modelling and Simulation of 
Systems (Vol.1-2010/Iss.2), p 132; J. Harasim, Bankowość detaliczna w Polsce, 
CeDeWu, Warszawa 2005, p. 264; Z. Shi, A. S. Kunnathurb, T. S. Ragu-Nathan, Is 
outsourcing management competence dimensions: Instrument development and 
relationship exploration. Information & Management 42, 2005, p. 901-919; J. T. C. 
Teng, M. J. Cheon, V. Grover, Decisions to outsourcing information system function: 
Testing a strategy-theoretic discrepancy model. Decision Science, 26(1), 1995, p. 75-
103; A. Vashista, A. Vashista, The Offshore Nation, New York, McGraw-Hill, 2006, 
from S. Kumar, E. C. Aquino, E. Anderson, Application of a process methodology 
and a strategic decision model for business process outsourcing, Information 
Knowledge Systems Management 6 (2007), p. 325. 
 
According to A. M. Porter’s studies, the tasks assigned to the outsourcing 
concentrates on the three areas. It was: information technology (30%), human 
resources (16%), and marketing & sales (14%) [A. M. Porter, p. 47]. Many factors 
influence using outsourcing – encourage or make some troubles. Outsourcing can be 
contracted-out to entities operating in the same country or entities operating in another 
country. India is one of the most famous countries that established vendors of 
outsourcing. The increased interest in Indian outsourcing services results not only 
from lower cost of providing such services, but also from a satisfactory quality of 
services, which is directly related to the increasing level of education of local society. 
Another, perhaps less well-known, but still growing, BPO center is the Central and 
Eastern Europe, including Poland. Polish scholar ratios are one of the highest in the 
World, and polish people, especially young, easily take commercial rules coming 
from the West. 
 
Table 2. Factors influencing success of outsourcing 
No. Author Factors 
1. P. Babcock Growth of education in the developing countries 
2. S. Chatterjee, R. Chaudhuri Flexibility  
3. A. Gurung, E. Prater Cultural factors 
4. J. N. Lee Knowledge sharing by client and supplier  
Source: P. Babcock, America's newest export: white-collar jobs. HR Magazine, 49(4), 
2004, p. 6; S. Chatterjee, R. Chaudhuri, A System Theoretic Analysis of IT/IS. 
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Outsourcing: A Case Based Approach, Journal of Modelling and Simulation of 
Systems, Vol. 1-2010/Iss. 2, p. 142; A. Gurung, E. Prater, A Research Framework for 
the Impact of Cultural Differences on IT Outsourcing, Impact of Culture on IT 
Outsourcing, Journal of Global Information Technology Management, 2006, Vol. 9 
Issue 1, p. 24; J. N. Lee, The impact of knowledge sharing, organizational capability 
and partnership quality on is outsourcing success. Information & Management, 38(5), 
2001, p. 323-335. 
 
However, history of outsourcing is short, this management tool is still changing. As 
mentioned, A. Gurung, E. Prater, “…managing outsourcing relationships is becoming 
increasingly complex. Contracts have moved from a focus on cost savings to include 
value-based outsourcing, equity-based outsourcing, and business process outsourcing” 
[A. Gurung, E. Prater, p. 29]. Both outsourcing vendors and commissioners learn how 
to cooperate. The length of term of cooperation is at high level dependent on quality 
of that relationship [T. Kem]. 
 
The same characteristics, which were mentioned as advantage of the outsourcing 
could be a disadvantage, if they are not satisfactory. For example, growing 
educational level in the developing countries conducive to outsourcing 
implementation can be an advantage, but when the same outsourcing vendor is not 
ready to anticipate new technological changes, it can be a reason for collapse of the 
vendor and principal cooperation. The same problems can occur in the field of 
language, and communication barriers [T. Nolle]. All of them are connected to risk. 
 
Tabel 3. Risks and challenges in outsourcing 
No. Author Risk 
1.  R. Aron, E. Clemons, S. Reddi Long-term intrinsic risks of atrophy 
2. B. A. Aubert, M. Patry, S. Rivard  
 
Cultural dissimilarity  
Delayed delivery of data 
Slow implementation 
3. R. Click, T. Duening Human capital risk 
4.  M. J. Earl Not enough edge expertise of providers 
5. T. Herath, R. Kishore Knowledge hoarding 
Loss of core group 
Loss of core capability 
Disparity between what it negotiated and what is 
delivered 
Cost escalation 
Vendors providing legacy technology 
Operational risks due to vendor locations 
Risks due to environmental, cultural, legal 
differences 
Deliberate underperformance by vendor 
Reverse engineering of critical business processes, 
stealing and/or using proprietary information for 
secondary purposes 
Lock-in situations 
Loss of bargaining power leading to disputes and 
litigations 
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Antiquated communication infrastructure 
Complexity in codes 
Conflicting standards 
Poorly articulated requirements 
Incompatible development tools 
Forgoing the development of the knowledge base 
6. N.  Kakabadse, A. Kakabadse Underestimation of the time and skills  
7. N. V. Oza, T. Hall, A. Rainer, S. 
Grey 
The degradation of service 
8. W. E. Sullivan,  
O. K. Ngwenyama 
Opportunistic behaviour by the vendor 
Vendor's lack of experience 
Vendor's financial instability 
Vendor performance monitoring 
Contract horizon and technology discontinuity 
Loss of proprietary information 
9. A. Vashista, A. Vashista Country risk  
Intellectual property protection 
Source: R. Aron, E. Clemons, S. Reddi, Just right outsourcing: Understanding and 
managing risk. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 38th Hawaii International 
Conference of System Sciences (HICSS), January 3-6, 2005, Hawaii; B. A. Aubert, 
M. Patry, S. Rivard, Assessing the Risk of  IT  Outsourcing, IEEE  Proceedings 31st 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 6, 1998, p. 685-692; R. 
Click, T. Duening, Business Process Outsourcing, The Competitive  Advantage, New 
Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005; M. J. Earl, The risks of outsourcing it. Sloan 
Management Review, 37(3), 1996, p. 26-32; T. Herath, R. Kishore, Offshore 
Outsourcing: Risks, Challenges, and Potential Solutions, Information Systems 
Management, 26, p. 316; N. Kakabadse, A. Kakabadse, Critical  Review-Outsourcing:  
A Paradigm  Shift, The Journal of Management Development 19(8), 2000, p. 670-
728; N. V. Oza, T. Hall, A. Rainer, S. Grey, Trust in software outsourcing  
relationships: An empirical investigation of Indian software companies, Information 
and Software Technology, 48(5), 2006, p. 345-354; W. E. Sullivan, O. K. 
Ngwenyama, How are public sector organizations managing is outsourcing risks? An 
analysis of outsourcing guidelines from three jurisdictions, Journal of Computer 
Information Systems, Spring 2005, p. 74; A. Vashista, A. Vashista, The Offshore 
Nation, New York, McGraw-Hill 2006. 
 
We can classify outsourcing risk factors into four groups: vendor attitude problems, 
vendor competence problems, vendor coordination problems, and in-house 
competence problems [N. Gorla,  M. B. Lau, p. 91]. It seems, however, that division 
does not cover all types of risk. It cannot be accepted due to the lack of reference to 
the employee. Benefits and costs of outsourcing implementation appear on both on 
employer` side - the entity that has decided to outsource some of the tasks outside the 
organization, as well as on the staff side. Employees who expect their employer 
intends to subcontract part of the tasks beyond the organization, often expect that it 
will cause reduction of employees. As with any other redundancies, it can cause a 
series of negative consequences. Employees are likely to increase competition among 
themselves. They will use more or less ethical moves designed to keep the job. Some 
of them (including those more productive) will decide to anticipate the movement of 
the employer and they begin to look for another job. Certainly reduction period is also 
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characterized by increased stress and anxiety about the future, which are not 
conducive to building a culture of trust and cooperation. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
The article uses objective data from reports, strategies, prospectuses and other 
documents of banks and near bank institutions. There were also used the other 
methods: questionnaire survey of employees in banks in Wielkopolska region and the 
results of in-depth standardized interviews with randomly selected HR managers and 
staff members of the boards of banks operating in Wielkopolska region1. 
 
The survey examined the opinions of bank employees on employment in the sector. 
Each survey question was analyzed using several criteria. The questionnaire consisted 
of the three essential parts relating respectively to the economic, social and 
technological determinants of employment. A pilot study was conducted among the 
employees of the banks. It was not possible to determine the total number of 
employees in banks in the Wielkopolska region and the structure of employment in 
the banking sector in Wielkopolska. In view of the above problems, the author 
decided to use a non-random sample selection. Two series of reminders about the 
study via e-mail were organized. Responses were received from 342 employees of 
banks (of which 17 questionnaires were rejected due to their low accuracy and 
reliability). It should be noted that the banks, which were surveyed control more than 
90% of the assets of the entire banking sector in Poland, and employ more than 74% 
of all employees of the Polish banking sector [The report about bank system situation 
in 2009, p. 20-23]. The analysis excludes the central bank - National Bank of Poland, 
because of its superior character in comparison to other banks and specific functions. 
 
4. Outsourcing in the Polish banking sector 
 
Outsourcing is commonly used in many polish banks (see table 4). The vast majority 
of managerial employees (77.97%) and non-managerial employees (76.32%) 
recognized that outsourcing is used in their bank. Answers confirming using of 
outsourcing were dominated by almost every of analyzed criteria. It was often the 
result of foreign capital engaging, which was transferring know-how to polish banks. 
 
Table 4. Using of outsourcing in banks 
 
All 
respondents 
A. Yes, outsourcing is 
used 
B. No, outsourcing is 
not used 
C. It is 
difficult to 
state 
No response 
Managerial employees 
266 203 76.32% 36 13.53% 26 9.77% 1 0.38% 
Non-managerial employees 
59 46 77.97% 12 20.34% 1 1.69% 0 
Source: own research. 
 
                                                
1 An aditional results of the research on determinants of employment in the banks were presented in J. 
Kaźmierczyk, Technologiczne i społeczno-ekonomiczne determinanty zatrudnienia w sektorze 
bankowym w Polsce, CeDeWu, Warszawa 2011. 
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From the foundations of the literature analysis, it can be concluded that the areas such 
as: security, safety, transport, legal services, and social and technical IT issues were 
often transferred beyond the organization [W. Baka, p. 250]. What we should 
emphasize is that every Polish bank must obtain permission from the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority for outsourcing business [W. Wielanek, p. 17]. Employees, 
who had been 'kicked-out' of the organization were then often, at the beginning of the 
outsourcing process implementation, employed in the so-called 'near-bank' 
companies, usually owned by that bank [A. Janc, Współczesny…., p. 16-17; A. Janc, 
Bank…, p. 79-90]. In some cases banks separated legally and organizationally a 
narrow range of tasks (e.g. security), in order to sell this separated company. 
Moreover, as noted by J. Harasim, e-banks outsource some part of their activities to 
reduce costs [J. Harasim, p. 148, 152].  This has been confirmed by the analysis of 
banks' reports. For example, ING outsourced cash services in the form of cash centres 
and also isolated outside the bank' structure training and recreation centres. ING 
outsourced also vindication what caused the decline in employment of 354 people in 
2007 [Wyniki ING Banku Śląskiego po czwartym kwartale 2005, p. 15; 
Sprawozdanie z działalności grupy kapitałowej ING Banku Śląskiego w 2002 roku, p. 
47; Roczne sprawozdanie finansowe ING Banku Śląskiego S.A. za okres od 1 
stycznia 2007 roku do 31 grudnia 2007 roku, p. 62]. Similarly, in 2003 Citibank 
commissioned handling of thirteen cash converting branches to the separated 
companies [Raport roczny 2003, Citi, p. 38]. The situation of Pekao and BPH bank 
was specific. After taking over most of BPH by Pekao in 2007, Pekao became an 
outsourcing vendor, in the field of IT services for the rest – a single independent 
component of BPH. The aim of this was to separate the two parts of the BPH database 
[Raport roczny 2008, Bank BPH, p. 65]. On the other hand, after signing the contracts 
for outsourcing of security (bank guards) and cash handling, BOS reduced the level of 
employment of 1744 people at the end of 2003 to 1680 people at the end of 2004 
[SAB-R/2004, Bank Ochrony Środowiska, Załącznik 5, p. 49]. Fortis Bank reduced 
its' employment in 2001 as a result of processes improving, automation and 
outsourcing to 953 people [Komentarz Zarządu z działalności Fortis Bank Polska w 
roku 2001, p. 95]. There is an interesting case of outsourcing concerning Citibank. 
Due to bank secrecy and confidence in banking institutions polish central bank (NBP) 
recommended Citibank to employ employee so far acting on behalf of Citibank and 
employed by outside companies. This concerns employee of the Citibank call centre 
(CitiPhone – 190 people) and a group of direct sales agents in the department of small 
businesses (13 people). According to the bank's estimates, this has affected personnel 
costs increase [Sprawozdanie z działalności grupy kapitałowej Banku Handlowego w 
Warszawie w 2003 roku, p. 14]. 
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 Diagram 1. The spheres outsourced by banks (according to the opinion of 
managerial employees, in %)  
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Note: 46 managerial employees answered the question. 
Source: own research. 
 
This surveyed managerial employees, who recognized outsourcing in their bank, 
mostly indicated, that their bank outsources narrow range of activities (52.17%) and 
the activity requiring technical knowledge (47.83%). Simultaneously, the difference 
between answers: 'A' and 'B' was not significant (diagram 1). Security, legal services 
and training system were mostly indicated as the outsourced functions (diagram 2). 
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Diagram 2. The functions outsourced by banks (in %) 
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Note: 203 non-managerial employees and 46 managerial employees answered the 
question. 
Source: own research. 
 
In the theoretical part of the article, we raised the aspect of incentives which 
determine the use of outsourcing in banks. Some researchers pointed that there is a 
fundamental importance of striving to increase quality of services. However, surveys 
and interviews with bank recruiters show that main factor of outsourcing in Poland is 
still striving to reduce costs (82.61%, table 5). This applies to the most of analyzed 
criteria. Only higher level managerial employees and the managers of cooperative 
banks pointed out that the most important factor was striving to increase of the quality 
of services (respectively 88.89% and 60%). 
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Table 5. Factors of using outsourcing in banks (according to the opinions of 
managerial employees) 
 
Source: own research. 
 
Table 6. Separation of the operations area from a bank (in the opinion of 
managerial employees) 
Criterion All respondents A. Yes, an area was separated B. No No response 
All banks 59 23 38.98% 29 49.15% 7 11.86% 
Banks with 
domestic 
capital 
15 1 6.67% 13 86.67% 1 6.67% 
Banks with 
foreign capital 37 20 54.05% 11 
29.73
% 6 16.22% 
Source: own research. 
 
As previously stated, some of banks separated a certain operations area (function, 
range of tasks), to allow to operate as a separate company in the future (e.g. security). 
This process was more popular in banks with predominance of foreign capital 
(54.05%) than national capital (6.67%) (table 6). We can conclude that strong 
measures of HR management were more popular in the banks with predominance of 
foreign capital. Due to analysis of banks' reports we can notice that in 2003 BRE 
separated two departaments from its structure and moved them to a newly formed 
subsidiary company – Centrum Rozliczeń i Informacji (CERI) [The Centre of 
Settlement and Information] [BRE Bank SA Raport z badania sprawozdania 
finansowego za rok obrotowy od 1 stycznia do 31 grudnia 2003 r., p. 28]. The Pekao 
separated security [B. Wawrzewska, M. Wiśniewska, p. 87]. 
 
5. Summary 
 
Our results should be considered as starting materials for further in-depth analyses. 
Due to the reluctance of banks to provide information about their activities, and also 
because of the current Polish law, a problem is to implement the research 
representative for all Polish banking sector. Moreover, there is not enough official 
data concerning the structure of employment in the Polish banking sector.  
 
Criterion All respondents 
A. Striving to reduce 
costs 
B. Striving to increase of 
the quality of services 
No 
response 
All banks 46 38 82.61% 16 34.78% 1 2.17% 
Commercial 
banks 37 34 91.89% 11 29.73% 0 0 
Cooperative 
banks 5 1 20% 3 60% 1 20% 
Higher level 
managerial 
employees 
9 4 44.44% 8 88.89% 0 0 
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Analysis shows that the main reason for the application of outsourcing by Polish 
banks was striving to reduce operational costs. The first phase of outsourcing in 
Poland was to reduce employment and outsource some tasks beyond the organization. 
That's why outsourcing is associated to employees with dismissal. The demand for 
outsourcing there banks in Poland has been influenced by many factors. Apart from 
focus cost reduction, there was a significant increase in the level of education among 
employees, which allowed for the employment of new staff, with the right skills, by 
vendors. 
 
We also see a potential growth in the significance of Poland in global banking 
outsourcing web. This assumption is based on the analysis of comparative advantages 
of the country, often mentioned by e.g. World Bank reports like: well-qualified 
workers (high level of schooling, high learning ability, easy access to capital from 
European Union funds on entrepreneurship-supporting programs), political stability, 
benefits for foreign investors (i.e. Special Economic Zones), the developing of 
infrastructure and overall developing of the banking sector. This was done on a secure 
and sound basis accurately supervised by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. 
However, there is still much to do in cases like: easing the taxing system, running 
business procedures, and with getting permits for building.    
 
Another issue that very clearly appears, when we consider outsourcing is, the ethics 
and morality of many moves of customers and vendors outsourcing. Many questioned 
bank employees, who pointed out, that the theoretical reasons for outsourcing 
implementation were different from the outsourcing they`ve seen in their banking 
branches. It requires further analysis in the future. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the nature and likely developments in the relations between two 
leading economies in Asia. 
At the macro level of analysis the perspectives of Sino-Japanese relations are 
projected in the framework of transcontinental geopolitical model regarding to 
China's and Japan's interaction and orientation towards political poles and power 
centers in the world and taking into account different formation possibilities of 21st 
century grand-coalitions as well as the role of the two East Asian nations played in 
those coalitions. 
At the regional level we observe Sino-Japanese relations in the system of regional 
affairs. Namely the paper explores the influence of two Asian giants on the East Asian 
subsystem, competition between them for markets and zones of political influence, as 
well as subsystem's retroactive impact on China and Japan. 
Finally, at the level of bilateral relations the paper focuses on problematic aspects and 
fields of cooperation. We divide the problematic aspects and analyze them in the 
groups of disputed territories and historic legacy related issues, issues connected with 
security policy and geopolitical- economic competition. Concerning the arguments in 
favor of cooperation we examine the phenomenon of pyrrhic victory in case of a 
conflict as a stabilizing and restraining factor in bilateral relations. In terms of 
political psychology the paper also observes phenomenon of balancing between 
nationalism and economic benefit in the mass thinking the two nations. 
Based on the three-level analysis and dialectics of factors influencing Sino-Japanese 
relationship the author suggests possible scenario of its development in the near 
future. 
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Introduction 
 
Sino-Japanese relations are one of the most important bilateral interactions in the 
Eastern hemisphere strongly influencing and determining the regional order of East 
Asia. As relations between the second and third largest economies in the world they 
also greatly impact the global politics generally and receiving impulses from those 
politics they are somehow shaped by them.  
 
Speaking about the nature of these relations one could describe them as dramatically 
altering ones in terms of quickly transforming strategies and approaches, as well as 
changing ratio of potentials of the two nations.  
 
Japan and China normalized their relations in 1972 and in 1978 they signed the Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship pledging “to develop relations of perpetual peace and 
friendship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 1978). Since then China has become 
Japan’s most important trading partner and the primary destination for Japanese 
foreign direct investment (FDI). At the same time Japan is China’s third largest 
trading partner and second-largest source of FDI and one of the top destinations for 
Chinese students studying abroad as of 2010 (Jerdén, Hagström 2012: 216; 
International Monetary Fund 2010; Naughton 2007). Much has also changed with the 
disintegration of the old triangular relationship between US, Soviet Union and PRC 
when the Sino-US-Japanese interactions were subject to experience some 
readjustment (Yunling 1997:452). 
 
Regarding the nature of Sino-Japanese relations most of the researchers tend to 
describe them as ones of power balance (Terada 2006: 5-12; Mochizuki 2007: 756-
757; Hughes 2009: 846-848; Sohn 2010: 497-519), while others consider not the 
balance of power but major world power interactions as the primary determinant of 
those relations (Zhang 2013:2). Still other scholars tend to look at the Sino-Japanese 
interactions as Japan’s accommodation towards rising China (Jerdén, Hagström 2012: 
215-250). 
  In our research we are prone to examine the period of modern Sino-Japanese 
relations by looking at several changing paradigms and strategies, instead of trying to 
describe the relations from 1978 sticking to one concept. We also try to analyze the 
international and interstate situation that affects the change in political strategies.  
   
Finally, we have made an attempt to understand the logic behind the contemporary 
developments (both positive and negative) in Sino-Japanese relations and forecast 
future behavior of the states in the scope of strategic development scenarios from 
Japanese and Chinese perspectives separately. When doing so we do not project past 
or present development trajectories to the future rather try to foresee their possible 
alterations based on the new factors in Sino-Japanese relations. 
 
 
IR theories implications to Sino-Japanese relations: patterns of strategic behavior 
 
There is no certain International Relations theory that would be right for all cases of 
conflict and development in each region and in any historic period examined. On the 
contrary, the level of adequacy of any particular theory in describing the situation and 
explaining the trajectory of future developments depends greatly on the region: level 
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of its development, quality of relations between the states, presence of influential and 
encompassing institutions, the peculiarity of its politics and last but not least the 
incumbent leaders’ strategic priorities in their thinking and decision making-process. 
E.g. neo-functionalism and neo-liberal theory can be efficient when applied to 
European politics but will fail to describe the logic of Middle East politics. 
In this part we have tried to track the most corresponding theory and concept to Sino-
Japanese relations while taking into account the political realities of the region. And 
for this purpose it is important to consider three factors: (1) the reality of rising power 
in the region, (2) the trajectory and nature of its rise and (3) the response of the 
international and regional systems as well as the response of the system’s individual 
components to that rise. 
   
Here we use the definition of a rising power as a nation, building up its capabilities at 
a rate exceeding that of other powers (Jerdén, Hagström 2012: 220). In other words it 
is a state whose relative share in the overall economic and military potential of the 
system grows. In our case that state is China. 
   
The second key point is the trajectory of Chinese rise. As Kennedy puts it rising 
powers ascend differently (Kennedy 1989). It is not necessary for a rising power to 
pursue the policy of imperialism rather it also can lead status-quo policy with some 
relative improvements of its position in the system without  challenging the whole 
order (Morgenthau 1985). “For example, Japan’s pre-war rise was completely 
different from its rise in the postwar period; militarist Japan in 1930s simply had a 
different purpose or grand strategy than the “pacifist” “trading state” in the 1960s 
through the 1980s, and the outside world’s response differed accordingly” (Jerdén, 
Hagström 2012: 220). Nowadays some scholars try to represent ascending China as a 
status quo-power (Bojiang 2006: 130) though still much concerns remain in Sino-
Japanese relations regarding the security issues.     
   
Finally, the third key point is the response strategy. Several fundamental response 
types in addition to balancing are outlined by Randall Schweller: “preventive war”, 
“bandwagoning”, “binding”, “engagement” and “distancing/buck-passing” (Schweller 
1999: 7-18). It can be marked that preventive war and balancing are typical of (neo-) 
realist theory, while binding and engagement adhere to neo-liberal theory. At the 
same time bandwagoning and distancing can be welcomed by both. 
   
Though preventive war was never started by these two countries at the modern stage 
of their relations, balancing has always been a crucial question. Opinions on 
balancing vary from absolutizing its significance to Sino-Japanese relations to total 
denial. In this paper we argue that balancing and containing did not have the 
determining influence on Sino-Japanese relations, as Japan did not make any 
significant military steps or undertake harsh economic sanctions to prevent China’s 
rise in the second half of the 20th century. However, countries were always ready for 
balancing as a “plan B” because of the mutual distrust. The strengthening of the US-
Japanese alliance in 1990s and acceleration of that process after Global Recession of 
2008-2009 (Wan 2011: 76) can serve as an example of balancing-pattern thinking as 
an alternative scenario measure. 
   
Binding, allying with the rival in order to control it, has not appeared in its classical 
form but had its share in the economic alignment of the two states. Engagement, as a 
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policy of rewards for ameliorating the non-status quo elements of a rising power’s 
behavior, perhaps has been one of the most prominent approaches of Japan to China 
throughout the last three decades of the 20th century. When busy with the engagement 
Japan voluntarily or involuntarily benefited to China’s rise, thus simultaneously 
behaving in the frames of bandwagoning. Finally, due to its “introvert” and peaceful 
foreign policy pursued throughout most of the post-war period Japan also 
demonstrated much of distancing/buck-passing while leaving some vacuum of power 
fields in Sino-Japanese relations and more broadly in the international relations of 
EAR. So judging by the steps of China and Japan it could be argued that their 
relations mainly flow in a liberal paradigm but also bear some elements of realism. 
They are not totally liberal mainly for (1) the absence of strong, binding institutions in 
EAR, like those of Europe that bound together France and Germany, (2) security 
worries based on historic precedents. So, much in the future of Sino-Japanese 
relations depends on international institution-building in EAR. 
   
Further in the article we are going to discuss the impact of the abovementioned 
strategies on the logic of Sino-Japanese relations and their significance.    
 
 
Three Options for East Asian Order 
 
“Unless Japan responds to the growing power of China, China will dominate its 
region and become increasingly influential beyond it” (Waltz 1993: 68-69). Waltz, 
one of the propagators of neorealism in Sino-Japanese relations, was wrong when 
predicting harsh Japanese response to Chinese growth but he was right in his 
anticipations of Chinese influence in case of the absence of that response. Now when 
China has already surpassed Japan it is purely academic question whether it was in 
Japan’s interests to avoid harsh countermeasures against China and even provide 
tangible aid to its development or whether the benefits from that kind of policy 
(saving resources that otherwise would have been used to contain China, benefiting 
from trade with rising Chinese economy) outweigh the risks of China surpassing 
Japan as the second biggest economy and building up a huge military sector. What is 
now of practical importance is the understanding of logic behind the future 
developments and its implication for security issues of the region as well as for its 
economic development. 
   
It is obvious that since the end of the WWII Japan has never sought a Japan-
dominated EAR and its interest in the regionalism remains inappropriately low 
compared to its potential even nowadays. So the possibility of a Japan-dominated East 
Asian (EA) order is very low. The remaining options are a (1) China-dominated EA 
order, (2) US-dominated EA Order or (3) EAR without dominance of any single 
power.  
   
When speaking about EA Order some researchers bring forward the argument that 
“Historically it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China 
has been strong and stable, order has been preserved. East Asian regional relations 
have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the 
West” (Kang 2003: 66). They propagate the bandwagoning policy of certain EA states 
towards China and predict the establishment of Chinese hegemony in the region once 
again. If we take a look at the military expenditures dynamics of EA countries (both 
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US-allies and non-allies) in 1988-2012 as an indicator of region’s fear of China’s rise 
we can notice a significant drop measured as a percentage of total GDP. The major 
exception is of course China whose defence expenditures measured in 2011 dollars 
“grew from $18 billion in 1989 to $157 billion by 2012, an increase of over 750 
percent” (Kang 2013). These data argues that EA states do not tend to balance China, 
rather they are prone to bandwagon or buck-pass.  
   
However, a survey (Evan et.al. 2008) including extensive in-country interviews, poll 
data analysis, responses to China's rise in East Asian US-ally nations shows that these 
countries see China primarily as a source of economic opportunity, but many have 
concerns about China's regional goals. They want Chinese productive regional 
engagement but do not want PRC to become dominant. For this purpose they are 
clearly for the US involvement in the region to continue — but sometimes only in 
certain ways, at certain times, and on particular issues. All in all being still far ahead 
of China in military terms, having a steady net of bilateral alliances in EA and a great 
economic deal with the region US yet remains as a primary power in East Asia. 
But still the third option of being protected by American umbrella and benefiting from 
China’s rise (which can even take place at the expense of American positions) is 
perhaps the most welcomed by the region and the trajectory of the developments goes 
in the direction of complementary politics. 
   
In the next two parts we will look closer at these options from the perspectives of 
Japan and China separately. 
 
 
Rise of China in the Light of Rising Sun: Japanese Perspective 
 
The modern phase in Sino-Japanese relations started with the normalization of 
relations in 1972. Six years later the sides activated their interactions after striking a 
Treaty of Friendship. Since 1978 up to present those relations have witnessed 
dramatic changes and gone through several periods in their development. We are 
prone to divide the contemporary phase of the relations between China and Japan into 
several stages according to distribution of power between the two nations and the 
character of mutual treatment when it comes to choosing a strategy vis-à-vis the 
opposite number.  
   
In 2010 China surpassed Japan as world’s second largest economy. This year as well 
as the two preceding and three following years, when the gap between the economic 
potentials of the two was not dramatic, are regarded as the dividing line in the 
evolution of Sino-Japanese relations. Period of 1978-2008 period of Japanese primacy 
(vis-à-vis China) witnessed an off-balanced international relations system in East 
Asian Region. In 2000 Japanese economy was 4 times larger than the Chinese one, 
while already in 2005 the gap shrank to the level of double exceeding. The years of 
2008-2013 can be described as the time of establishment of the balance in economic 
terms. Practically the same regarded the military expenditures in 2001-2006 (Kang 
2013). With the accession of this period the era of Japan’s ability to contain China 
was over. It should be remarked that Japan indeed took no practical steps to contain 
the Chinese dragon and prevent its future rise during the whole period of 1978-2008. 
What is interesting about the new era of balance (here we use balance in the meaning 
of equality of potentials and not balancing response) in Sino-Japanese relations is that 
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it coincided with the rise of contentiousness in Sino-Japanese relations. Starting from 
Koizumi military balance period of “lost half-decade” (Bojiang 2006: 4) for Sino-
Japanese relations, which surprisingly was a period of “warm economic ties in times 
of cold political relations”, the economic balance-era went on to be characterized by 
the aggravation of both (Yi 2013). E.g. 2010 fisher-boat conflict, 2012 island-related 
local crisis, 2012-2013 year to year weakening of economic ties, decline in trade and 
FDI. Another interesting aspect of current balance-phase in Sino-Japanese 
interactions is its unprecedented nature. Throughout their history Japan and China 
interacted with each other, while one of the two was weak and the other strong and 
the two nations have the experience of strong-weak type of bilateral interaction. 
However, both have never been strong simultaneously (Yunling 1997: 456). 
   
Following the developments in Sino-Japanese relations and asymmetric rise of 
Chinese economic and military capacities towards Japan’s ones it can be predicted 
that the balance-era can end shortly and Sino-Japanese relations can one more time 
enter another era of “one weak – one strong” period of asymmetric off-balance. And 
this time the strong party would be China. It is even projected by some experts that in 
2030 China-Japan economic ratio would be 4.1 to 1 (Jimbo 2012). So, it is crucial for 
Tokyo to understand whether China would pursuit the type of liberal policy towards 
Japan, which the latter did during the 1978-2008 Japanese primacy period.      
  
In order to prevent itself from relying on pure good will of China, Japan has to 
consider two preventive scenarios:  
1. balancing China together with other ally/allies (external balancing) which can 
logically be accompanied by internal mobilization 
2. entangling-binding China 
   
If Japan was tolerant to China’s rise when it had big pre-eminence in its economic 
potential and feeling confident often avoided direct and harsh balancing measures 
while considering the gains, it might be much more anxious and more assertive in its 
balancing policy when it feels Chinese growing superiority and aggressive tone. So, 
much depends on China to employ trust-building measures and not to escalate the 
grievances in the relations. Or PRC can choose another option and confront Japan 
together with its present and would be allies. However, the second scenario would be 
regarded by the US as an attempt to overthrow the status-quo which will lead to direct 
American intervention (Yunling 1997: 462-464). This is unlikely to happen until the 
military potentials and expenditures of US and China differ greatly. So, the most 
likely development scenario for coming five years – the years of end of equality 
period of 2008-2013 and establishment of Chinese dominance period- would be 
pacification of 2010-2012 tumultous developments and rapprochement by 
reactivation of economic ties. At the same time Japan is likely to come up with some 
binding initiatives until it’s not too late to restrain empowered China from 
overthrowing the status-quo. 
   
Nowadays it has become much more dangerous for Japan to leave fields of influence 
vacuum in East Asia. Japan understands that if in the past or Japanese primacy period 
(1978-2008) she lacked resources to feel them, they were either left vacuum or were 
filled by her ally – the United States. Nowadays, vacuum of power is primarily to be 
filled by China which is described by some authors, perhaps with a several degree of 
exaggeration, as a rival but not yet enemy (Wan 2011: 73) for Japan. In this sense, 
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Japan is likely to activate its role in the regional affairs, however, trying to avoid 
direct confrontation with China. So, another prediction for Japan’s foreign policy in 
the coming years is its stress on regionalism.  
 
 
Return of the Dragon: Chinese Perspective 
 
“China that is either too strong or too weak could undermine regional stability” (Evan 
et.al. 2008: 234). Though it is still difficult to state with confidence whether China’s 
rise will remain peaceful in the near future (because of several acts of demonstration 
of power and other reasons) it can be already argued that China is not a status-quo 
power anymore, while just the sole magnitude of its rise changes the ratio of 
potentials in the EA Order-system so dramatically that a qualitatively new level of 
relations and linkages emerges in East Asia bringing forward a transformation of the 
existing status-quo.  
   
In this transforming reality, as it was discussed, Japan has two options of active 
behavior: balancing and entangling/binding. The first one is unlikely to happen. As 
long as the period when Japan was able to contain China has passed, now she has only 
the option to balance PRC with a coalition of other states while it would be practically 
impossible for Japan to drag her unwilling allies into highly costly and risky 
confrontation with China.  
   
However, if Japan fails to counter China’s rise with the help of the second 
binding/entangling strategy as well (or by means of both simultaneously), there is still 
another factor restraining the Sino-Japanese relations from rivalry. We call it the 
phenomenon of “Pyrrhic victory” in the relations between these two giants. It should 
be comprehended as the understanding by the decision-makers of the two nations of 
the reality that in case of a conflict the losses on the two sides will far exceed the 
gains and may even cause irremediable harm. The application of this factor should not 
be limited to merely direct military conflict rather its possible operation field spreads 
on a wide range of aspects of Sino-Japanese relations dealing with a wide-scale 
confrontation including economic/financial losses, protectionism or even full-range 
armament race. 
   
It is also interesting to note that “Pyrrhic victory” thinking would be much more 
common and subsequently efficient when restraining sides in the “post-balance 
period” or “Era of Chinese Primacy” (after 2015) than it could have been in the “pre-
balance” (1978-2008) period or “Era of Japanese Primacy”. The reason for this is the 
relatively smaller difference in the potentials of China and Japan now (to the benefit 
of China) than the difference that existed between leading Japan and catching up 
China in the “Era of Japanese Primacy”. However, one should take into account that 
parallel to the further widening of the gap between China and Japan the “Pyrrhic 
victory” factor will gradually lose its restraining and stabilizing power and relevance.  
   
Still another factor determining China’s Japan policy greatly is the trilateral 
relationship between US, China and Japan – the triangle of interests and threats. The 
three parties are not at odds with each other (two have not joined hands to oppose a 
third (Yunling 1997:462)) and they have not formed a united bloc to oppose external 
forces. Despite the argument of having US and Japan against China (Wan 2011: 76) 
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the collaborative part of Sino-American relations prevents the triangle transforming 
into a bilateral relationship between China and American-Japanese bloc. At the same 
time the only military alliance among these three the US-Japan Alliance suffers a lot 
from the “alliance dilemma” – fear of entrapment and fear of abandonment (Snyder 
1984: 461-495) especially under the conditions that Sino-American economic and 
namely trade relations with the turnover of $536 billion as of 2012 (Morrison 2013) 
have become one of the most profound cooperation in the world far surpassing US-
Japanese (trade turnover $293 billion as of 2012 (Cooper 2013: 4-5)) and Sino-
Japanese economic relations (trade turnover $333 billion as of 2012 according to 
JETRO). In other words, since last decade Japan pursues a policy to become a normal 
major state with strong army, as well as large influence on international arena (e.g. 
Japanese bid to become a permanent UNSC member) and does not want to be too 
much dependent on the US. But on the other hand, she is afraid of rising China and 
fears abandonment by USA. Bearing in mind these realities and options of 
maneuvering between each other rather than the firm choice of allies and enemies 
China understands that the role of Japan is most likely to be of bandwagoning because 
of its decreasing relative potential compared to China. According to the research 
conducted by Tokyo Foundation the “In 2030, it is estimated that nominal GDP in the 
US will be 28.4 trillion dollars, China 34.7 trillion dollars, and Japan 8.4 trillion 
dollars. The ratio of the size of GDP of the US to China to Japan will be 3.4 to 4.1 to 
1 (Jimbo 2012)”. So in the Sino-Japanese relations it would be in the interests of 
China to make Japan bandwagon Chinese policy rather than US. 
   
Keeping in mind these realities we make an assumption from Chinese perspective – 
during the coming 5-10 years Chinese policy towards Japan would liberalize due to its 
“safe-passing” through the balance-period. However, afterwards in case of (1) 
absence of binding and strong institutions-initiatives and (2) China’s equaling or 
surpassing the USA (at least in the region) the risk for aggravation would return, 
because of China’s final goal for China-dominated East Asian Order. 
   
Another argument for ameliorating of Chinese Japan policy is that Japan represents 
less threat to China than China to Japan. If security is a crucial point for Japan, 
history-related issues are of great importance for China. But at the same time it can be 
argued that Chinese nationalism is less dangerous than Japanese one. The reason for 
that is the difference in natures of political regimes in the two states. While China has 
more authoritative rule it keeps the nationalistic sentiments of the population under 
control and even employs them as a political leverage. On the other hand Japanese 
democratic system brings to the power people representing the feelings and thoughts 
of the large masses. Thus nationalism at the grass-root level may result in the 
nationalism at the highest levels of political decision-making. However with gradual 
opening and liberalization of Chinese economy and politics the impact of nationalism 
among Chinese and Japanese can become pretty much the same. “A more democratic 
China might have a worse relationship with Japan … because public resentment 
against Japan may find greater opportunity to be expressed” (Wan 2011: 81); though 
this could happen after the predicted 5-10 year period of amelioration.  
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Conclusion 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the previous analysis. First of all it was 
demonstrated that Sino-Japanese relations remain mainly in the framework of the 
liberal theory of international relations but realism is always there as “plan B”. The 
states are too much dependent on each other in economic terms and their worries 
don’t overcome their benefits from mutually beneficial cooperation. However the 
level of bilateral entanglement remains unsatisfactory to secure their relations from 
competition and even possible rivalry in the future. Sino-Japanese relations are very 
much influenced by the ratio of the potentials of the two states and the three periods 
in their relations witness changes in politics and strategy. 
   
East Asian Order development trajectory is naturally oriented complimentarily to US 
and China. States of the region want China’s constructive engagement and economic 
benefit from it but still feel comfortable under the protection of American umbrella 
and don’t look forward to China’s dominance in the region. 
   
In this context Japan is likely to activate its regional foreign policy and come up with 
binding/entangling initiatives towards China and the EAR. This is most likely 
development scenario in the China’s primacy period when Japan is afraid to leave 
vacuum of power fields as long as they are to be filled by China. And this is one of 
the basic changes in the development trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations. 
   
On the other hand China will not turn aggressive to Japan and even will strive for her 
bandwagoning at least until PRC surpasses US (at least in the region) – Japan’s 
largest ally and the main power interested in avoiding China-dominated EAO. The 
main reason for that is China’s safe-passing through the balance-period and taking 
more confident yet shaky positions when she would not want to provoke a bloc of 
states trying to balance her further growth. Tumultous 2008-2013 balance-period 
developments will calm down in 2015+ China’s Primacy Period but without strong 
institutions the risk for aggravation will be always there.  
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Abstract 
 
Patenting of genes is not a novel matter, but it is one of the most eagerly debated 
issues of modern intellectual property law. As biotechnology is emerging as a pillar of 
an economy based on hi-tech, the incoherence of modern practice and regulations can 
be noticed. Innovative solutions often need huge investments, but on the other hand 
society benefits hugely from such inventions. However, numerous ethical and legal 
considerations question the granting of gene patents. The legal situation with respect 
to the patent-eligibility of genetic inventions varies in different jurisdictions. The 
judgment in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics highlights the 
essence of the problem, which relates to the limited scope of the patentability of 
inventions comprising laws of nature. But this case also shows that a different 
approach to the patentability assessment, basing on conceptual disaggregation, is 
possible and advantageous. This approach may be particularly useful in terms of 
inventions concerning intangible subject matters.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Modern economy is based on knowledge and information. Hence, research and 
technological innovations are recognized as a driving force of socio-economical 
progress. Moreover, hi-tech industry has its central place in the developed economies, 
significantly affecting their growth1.  
 
Although, for centuries technology has been stimulating the development and 
prosperity of societies, this connection has become even more apparent in recent 
years. Tab. 1 depicts that the countries with a high level of innovation achieve at the 
same time the highest GDP. Definitely this is not a coincidence. Moreover, a stronger 
protection of intellectual property rights impacts the economic growth (Gould, 
Gruben 1996). Therefore, the tendency to confer greater protection to inventions is 
linked with the presumption that it will have a positive effect on the number of 
innovations and ipso facto on the economy in general. Since 1995 patent offices have 
witnessed a stable increase of patent applications, which have more than doubled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inventions from the fields of emerging technologies always posed a challenge for 
patent law. This was the case with computer programs, and generally computerized 
inventions whose patentability is still unclear. But contemporary emerging 
technologies have become increasingly problematic. Their advancement and level of 
specialization make them very difficult to assess within the current regulations. For 
example, since 2003 nanotechnology inventions, although still making up only a 
slight fraction of those inventions which are granted protection, have seen one of the 
biggest percentage rises among all patented solutions by the European Patent Office 
(hereinafter EPO)2. But the patent-eligibility of nanotechnology innovations is a 
bothersome issue (Watal, Faunce 2011). Current emerging technologies do not fit 
well with how inventions are assessed, as they are model-based inventions being 
connected with intangible subject matters (Schindler 2013c). 
                                                             
1 For more on knowledge-based economy see: Report of the OECD, Knowledge-based 
Economy (1996), available at: http://www.oecd.org/sti/sci-tech/1913021.pdf.  
2  European patent applications 2003-2012 per field of technology, EPO, available at: 
http://www.epo.org/about-us/annual-reports-statistics/statistics/patent-applications.html 
 Top patent applications 
by origin 
Countries with the highest 
GDP (nominal) 
1 Japan U.S.A. 
2 China China 
3 U.S.A. Japan 
4 Republic of Korea Germany 
5 Germany France 
Tab.1. Juxtaposition of top patent applications by country of origin and countries 
with the highest nominal GDP. Source: 2012 World Intellectual Property 
Indicators, WIPO Economics & Statistics Series, p. 57; World Bank GDP 
indicators, available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD     
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Certainly, biotechnological innovations, and in particular those comprising genes, 
should be included into the group of inventions whose patenting is controversial. This 
issue is discussed not only within the patent law doctrine, but also as a topic involving 
the interests of society. The question that arises with regard to the abovementioned 
problem is whether current regulations and methods of patent assessments are 
inadequate for the demands of emerging technologies?  
 
The objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly, it aims at answering the questions, if 
gene patents should be allowed, and if so, under which circumstances. Secondly, it 
looks for the solution of the problem of analyzing patent-eligibility and patentability 
of inventions from emerging technologies that concern intangible subject matters.   
 
 
PATENTING OF GENES – OUTLINE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
A gene is defined as a “unit of heredity information that occupies a fixed position 
(locus) on a chromosome”, composed of a sequence of deoxyribonucleic acids 
(DNA). Genes should be differentiated from the human genome, which constitutes all 
pairs of DNA making the entire set of human organism, including both genes and 
noncoding regions of the DNA (Encyclopedia Britannica 2013). Patenting of human 
genes is the main focus of this paper. However, significant parts of the discussion can 
be universally referred to biological inventions. 
 
In 1972 F.K. Beier accurately predicted that the development of biological inventions, 
and in particular those related to genetic engineering, will be a challenge for patent 
law (Beier 1972). Now the actual question is not whether genes can be patented, but 
rather under which circumstances are they patentable (Ng-Loy 2002)3. The results of 
the study conducted by K. Jensen and F. Murray in 2005 and published in the Science 
illustrated the scale of the problem. Namely, they found that nearly 20% of human 
genes have been patented so far. This represents 4382 out of 23,688 genes contained 
in the National Center for Biotechnology Information at the time of research. Private 
firms own approx. 63% of patented genes, with the largest – Incyte 
Pharmaceuticals/Genomics – controlling 2000 of them (Jensen, Murray 2005).   
 
The opposition to the practice of gene patenting is based on ethical, social, and 
economical considerations. Critics claim that allowing gene patents leads to an 
infringement of human dignity, an impediment of research, and uncompetitive health 
care systems (Chuang, Lau 2010). However, these arguments should be supported by 
evidence, and it should not be forgotten that exclusiveness constitutes the essence of a 
patent. On the other hand it is justifiable that the human genome is qualitatively 
different from other natural subjects (Chuang, Lau 2010). Hence, ethical reservations 
towards the patenting of genes concern mainly the question if one entity can own or 
                                                             
3 The first known patent for a living organism was obtained in Finland in 1843, 30 years 
before Louis Pasteur was granted a patent in the U.S. for yeast free from organic germs of 
disease (Elizalde 1998). First gene patents were granted in the early 1980s through extensions 
of the legal doctrines permitting patents on natural products, which were turned into useful 
forms (Cook-Deegan 2008). But patenting of biological inventions was boosted by the U.S. 
Supreme Court Judgment in 1980 in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty case (447 U.S. 303), 
highlighted by a famous expression that everything under the sun made by man may be 
patented. 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
88
control something that essentially and universally belongs to every human being. 
Authors are divided on this issue, and the answers to this question are not uniform. 
Some of them claim that the patenting of genes is ethical and without a threat for 
human dignity and welfare (McGee 1998)4. D.B. Resnik believes that a problem 
would arise only in the case of a patent covering the entire human genome (Resnik 
2001). However, critics provide other ethical arguments against this practice, such as 
the inability to control whether activities leading to the creation of a genetic invention 
are in compliance with ethical standards. Moreover, the issue of genetic 
discrimination is also raised as problematic (Kawłatow 2012)5. Anyway, there is no 
doubt that ethical considerations penetrate the patent law, having a strong influence 
on it (Moufang 1994).              
 
Notwithstanding the above, perhaps the greatest opposition to gene patents derives 
from the socio-economic perspective. Authors claim that social costs outweigh the 
benefits of gene patenting (Jackson 2003). Also the nature of gene patents has 
changed. In the beginning they looked like patents on drugs, yet currently they 
resemble patents on scientific information (Eisenberg 2003). This is also the reason 
why gene patents have a negative effect on innovation (Matthijs 2004). Results of a 
study showed that gene patents have a negative impact on research and development 
(Williams 2013). Moreover, the practice of preemptive patenting by scholars in order 
to continue conducting scientific research (Hemphill 2003) is unfavorable. 
 
Another research, based on the influence of BRCA gene patents, proved that those 
which have a very broad scope are disadvantageous for the development of a highly 
effective genetic testing scheme within the health care systems (Sevilla et al. 2003).  
Hence, the patenting of genes is criticized from the feminist point of view, as 
threatening women’s right to health (Foster 2012). 
 
In sum, some commentators state that in spite of the fact that social and ethical 
arguments against the patenting of genes surpass those in favor, the economic 
interests of the biotechnological sector have greater influence on the patent law and 
practice (Kluge 2003). It is worth to take into account that developments in the 
biotech industry are primarily focused on profits, and that the human body itself has 
in fact been subject to a recent commercialization (Nelkin, Andrews 1998).  
  
 
GENE PATENTS – LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
At the outset it should be noted that numerous international legal acts address the 
problem of potential threats to human dignity from biotechnological developments. In 
particular, UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights envisages that the human genome is the heritage of all humanity6. Most 
notably, art. 4 of this document provides that the human genome “in its natural state” 
                                                             
4 See also the dissenting opinion from some scholars (Merz, Cho 1998, and Magnus 1998) 
5 The problem of genetic discrimination is apparent in the case of the patented BRCA gene. 
Since Ashkenazi Jews were found to be more likely to have breast cancer because of genetic 
conditions, they were also exposed to aggressive advertisement of genetic tests that identified 
the risk of a cancer (Kawłatow 2012). 
6 Art. 1, UNESCO, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 
11.11.1997.  
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shall not give rise to financial gains7. But the issue whether it can be patented is 
unresolved8. It has been argued that since art. 4 mentions “the natural state of the 
genome”, its unnatural state is not covered by this definition. Hence, the definition of 
“the natural state of the human genome” is problematic (Kapelańska-Pręgowska 
2011). Notwithstanding the non-binding character of this declaration, two facts 
indicate its importance. First, it was adopted unanimously and by acclamation. 
Second, the United Nations General Assembly endorsed it in Resolution 
AIRES/53/1529.        
 
Art. 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(hereinafter TRIPS) contains an international standard of the patentable subject 
matter. This provision refers to a large scope of inventions, as in fact it requires that 
patents shall be available for any invention in all fields of technology (therefore gene 
patents as well). Nonetheless, art. 27.2 and .3 envisage that certain exclusions from 
patentability are acceptable. Hence, those that are necessary to protect the public 
order or morality are in accordance with art. 27. Specifically diagnostic, therapeutic 
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals, likewise plants and 
animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological processes for the 
production of plants or animals other than non-biological and microbiological 
processes may be excluded from patentability by national laws10. Therefore, the exact 
scope of patentable subject matter is to be resolved on the national level. Besides, 
genes may not be considered as inventions within a national law (Correa 2007).     
 
The described issue has been on the agenda of European institutions for a long time. It 
resulted in the adoption of the Directive 98/44/EC on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions. Art. 5.1 provides that the human body, at the various 
stages of its formation and development, as well as the discovery of one of its 
elements, cannot constitute patentable inventions. However, subsequently art. 5.2 
specifies that an element isolated from the human body or otherwise produced by 
means of a technical process, may constitute a patentable invention, even if the 
structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element11. Both these 
provisions include also the sequence or the partial sequence of a gene. Therefore, a 
gene may be only patented if it has been isolated from the human body or technically 
produced. It is believed that the ordinary sequencing of a gene does not lead to an 
invention, even if it is a significant discovery. After all it is just a chemical compound 
(Markl 2002).   
 
Notwithstanding the above, such inventions still need to fulfill all other requirements 
of patentability12. In order for an invention to be patented, it has to be novel, non-
                                                             
7 Art. 4 Ib.  
8 See also point 12 of the Recommendation 1425 (1999) Biotechnology and intellectual 
property of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, where inter alia human 
genes were regarded as non-inventions.   
9 Resolution A/RES/53/152 The Human Genome and the Human Rights, Adopted by the UN 
General Assembly on 9.12.1998.   
10 Art. 27 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights of 
15.4.1994. 
11 Art. 5 of the Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, OJ L 213, 30.07.1998, 13 – 21. 
12 See art. 3 Ib. 
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obvious (resp. have an inventive step), and useful (resp. be possible to be applied in 
the industry)13.  
 
An invention is considered novel if it does not form a part of the state of the art. With 
respect to gene patents, their critics claim that inventions comprising genes do not 
pass the novelty test, as they already exist in nature. However, not the mere existence, 
but the isolation or transformation of a gene is crucial for the determination of its 
patentability. Consequently, the fact that the gene has been just discovered and does 
not belong to the state of the art may be interesting with regard to its qualification as 
an invention, but it is irrelevant in the context of its novelty assessment (du Vall 
2008).   
 
To determine whether a solution in question fulfills the criterion of an inventive step, 
one needs to evaluate whether in regard to the prior art, it is not obvious to the person 
skilled in this art. One of the ways to assess that is to look at the methodology used to 
sequence the DNA. If it becomes routine it may be an indication of the lack of 
inventiveness. So for an invention concerning gene sequencing to be non-obvious, the 
methodology used should not be standard. Similarly, no inventive elements may be 
found in a solution, which - compared to the already known isolated DNA sequence - 
shares the same function and is structurally related to it. Therefore, an invention 
involving a sequence of a DNA, should have properties, which are unpredicted in 
order to deserve the patent protection (Warren Jones 2004). 
 
The industrial applicability condition of patentability means that an invention should 
be feasible to be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture. Article 
5.3 of the Directive 98/44/EC requires that the industrial application of a sequence or 
a partial sequence of a gene must be disclosed in the patent application. This is, in 
particular, problematic regarding those DNA sequences whose function is unknown 
(du Vall 2008)14. Therefore, the function of such inventions plays a crucial role in the 
assessment of their patentability (Ilag 2002). A mere description of the sequence is 
insufficient to render it patentable. This means that its useful applications should be 
precisely specified. Guidelines from the U.S. Patent Office require that the utility 
should be described in a specific, essential, and credible way. Similar rules were 
adopted in the case law of the EPO. It is the person skilled in the art, whose 
understanding of the patent description is a point of reference (du Vall 2008). It is 
worth mentioning that across Europe the jurisprudence on this issue differs (e.g. see 
Fitt, Nodder 2010). 
 
 
ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM 
 
A recent case (Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics15) decided in 
June 2013 by the U.S. Supreme Court (hereinafter USSC) has changed the landscape 
of gene patenting. Not only the USSC explained under which circumstances genes 
can be patented, but more importantly it provided some hints on how to assess 
inventions from emerging technologies. Although this case was based on the US 
                                                             
13 See art. 27 TRIPS. 
14 This applies in particular to EST sequences, which do not constitute any technical solution 
to a specific problem (Straus 1995). 
15 Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics 569 U.S. ___ (2013) 
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patent law, its influence should not be underestimated, since in the globalized world 
such ideas spread quickly.  
 
A biotech company, Myriad Genetics, discovered the precise location and sequence of 
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes for which it obtained patents. Mutations of these genes 
can increase the risk of breast and ovarian cancer. Such knowledge allowed Myriad 
Genetics to develop medical tests, which detected mutations of these genes, and 
therefore to assess a patient’s risk of such a cancer. The dispute, which arose around 
these patents, concerned their validity under U.S. patent law (35 U.S.C. §101). If the 
USSC would uphold their validity, Myriad Genetics has maintained the exclusive 
right to isolate these genes and synthetically create BRCA composite DNA 
(hereinafter cDNA). It should be pointed out that this case has not focused on method 
claims, new applications of knowledge, or the patentability of a DNA in which the 
naturally occurring order of nucleotides has been changed16.  
Section 101 of the Patent Act reads as follows: 
 
“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to the 
conditions and requirements of this title.”17 
 
 
Therefore, the question that was to be resolved by the USSC was whether the 
inventions at issue constitute a new and useful composition of matter, or if they fall 
under the scope of laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas, all of 
which are patent-ineligible. Indeed they are “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work”. In consequence, patents obtained for these matters would deter 
research and innovation, and so derail the premise on which they are granted, i.e. the 
promotion of creation. However, as the USSC accurately noticed “all inventions at 
some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas”18. Thus, the abovementioned exclusion should not be 
interpreted too broad, in order to maintain a balance between inventiveness and the 
flow of information that may stimulate the invention19. In order to determine whether 
gene patents should be situated within the law of nature exception, the USSC cleverly 
divided the discussion into one about DNA and cDNA20.   
 
 
                                                             
16 Ib. 
17 35 U.S.C. §101 
18 See Mayo v. Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___ (2012) 
19 Myriad Genetics … (2013) 
20 USSC in a simple way abstracted the difference between DNA and cDNA: „Each human 
gene is encoded as deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), which takes the shape of a “double helix.” 
Each “cross-bar” in that helix consists of two chemically joined nucleotides. Sequences of 
DNA nucleotides contain the information necessary to create strings of amino acids used to 
build proteins in the body. The nucleotides that code for amino acids are “exons,” and those 
that do not are “introns.” Scientists can extract DNA from cells to isolate specific segments 
for study. They can also synthetically create exons-only strands of nucleotides known as 
composite DNA (cDNA). cDNA contains only the exons that occur in DNA, omitting the 
intervening introns”. Ib.  
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Regarding Myriad Genetics’ DNA claim, the USSC found that it falls into the scope 
of the exception from patent-eligibility, just like laws of nature and natural 
phenomena do. The USSC based its main argumentation on the fact that Myriad 
Genetics’ contribution to the art was simply the uncovering of the precise location and 
genetic sequence of the BRCA genes. It does not constitute a new and useful 
composition of matter. Referring to an earlier case decided by the USSC, i.e. 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, an invention should have a “markedly different 
characteristic from any found in nature”. Myriad Genetics did not create or change the 
genetic information of the genes or the structure of the DNA. And although what they 
found was important and useful, not every innovative or even brilliant discovery is 
patent-eligible. Moreover, the detailed description of an extensive process of this 
discovery is insufficient to render it patent-eligible21.   
 
With respect to cDNA the USSC ruled that it is patent-eligible under §101, since it is 
rather a “product of man” than a “product of nature”. The creation of an exons-only 
molecule is different from isolated DNA segments because it is not naturally 
occurring. Although some elements may be imposed by nature (i.e. order of exons), 
the work done in the laboratory is clearly creative – the removal of introns from the 
DNA sequence in order to make cDNA. Hence, ultimately a distinct product is 
received (if the cDNA is undistinguishable from the DNA then it will not be patent-
eligible)22. Obviously, cDNA will still need to satisfy all the other conditions of 
patentability.  
 
This decision was received with the approval of the scientists’ community and the 
majority of the public opinion, and with understandable disappointment from the 
biotech industry. Commentators claim that this decision will have a strong impact on 
the health care market, innovation and patient’s care. Yet, the actual consequences of 
this judgment for the medical and biotech sectors are unknown (Kalyvas, Little 2013). 
Some authors argue that the USSC judgment in Myriad Genetics, in particular with 
respect to distinction of patentable and non-patentable DNA subject matter, leaves the 
issue more confused and uncertain than it was before (Burk 2013). Moreover, the 
argument has been raised that the USSC’s narrow view of patentable subject matter 
may lead to a decrease in investment and in the commercialization of new 
technologies (Daily, Kieff 2013). 
 
The USSC’s judgment in Myriad Genetics was mistakenly seen as barring the 
patenting of genes. Such a conclusion is imprecise and incomplete, bearing in mind 
the distinction between DNA and cDNA “inventions”. The latter are patent-eligible as 
“products of man”, assuming they are neither naturally occurring, nor 
undistinguishable from the DNA.  
 
The USSC aptly noticed and highlighted the difference between patent-eligible and 
patent-ineligible subject matter under §101 of the Patent Act. The premise of 
intellectual property protection is that only creations of man deserve it. Therefore, 
even an excellent and significant discovery should be excluded from patent-eligibility. 
A clear line needs to be drawn to avoid granting exclusive rights to mere reflections 
of laws of nature and natural phenomena. Otherwise it would contradict the 
                                                             
21 Ib. 
22 Ib. 
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presumptions underlying the patent law, and detrimental to the progress of science 
and technology. On the other hand it means that inventions, in which naturally 
occurring things were modified are patent-eligible. The level of the contribution to the 
science is vague, but certainly the creativity of an inventor plays a crucial role. Thus, 
additional and creative features should be added to the discussed “inventions” in order 
to make them actually patentable23.   
 
 
NEW APPROACH TO PATENTABILITY EVALUATIONS 
 
As seen above, it may be very problematic to determine for some inventions whether 
they are patent-eligible or not. This is particularly true for inventions concerning 
intangible matters. A recent development in the technology of patent assessment may 
prove to be an answer to the abovementioned problem.  
 
The decisions of the USSC, inter alia in the Myriad Genetics case, provoked by 
emerging technology inventions, altered the paradigm in the system of U.S. patent 
law. These legal developments facilitated a patent technology involving a “partial but 
substantial systematization and automation” of patentability and patent-eligibility 
tests which can increase the productivity of patent practitioners (Schindler 2013c). 
Advantages of this technology are automation, an increased preciseness, but also an 
objectivity of the assessment24.    
 
The abovementioned development in the field of patent assessment is called FSTP 
technology (Facts Screening and Transforming Processor, hereinafter FSTP). It 
provides a tool for enabling a more comprehensive and precise patent analysis. The 
assumptions on which it is based are derived from indications of the USSC on the 
assessment of patentability and patent-eligibility.  
 
The suggestions of the USSC include the idea of an “inventive concept” and refined 
claim construction. The idea of an “inventive concept” was introduced in the U.S. 
patent case law and constitutes a pivotal aspect of the refined claim construction. It 
assumes that patent evaluations should specifically focus on and look for within the 
invention for creative properties. Such proofs of creativity may be regarded as 
“independent thoughts”, which were invested in order to achieve the solution 
(Schindler 2013b).  
 
Such an approach can be applied in an expert system capable of analyzing different 
types of inventions and documents related to it. The expert system, which would 
exploit FSTP technology, could successfully support the user to identify 
abovementioned “inventive concepts” within an invention. Since, the user is provided 
with an insight into the invention’s essence, he may perceive it from an objective 
perspective and better comprehend its significant - i.e. inventive – features, as well as 
its shortcomings. Moreover, he may receive an instant answer to any query 
concerning its inventiveness. Finally, this approach provides the possibility of 
obtaining a precise indication of patentability (Schindler 2012). 
                                                             
23 See Mayo … (2012) 
24 See Brief Of Amicus Curiae Sigram Schindler Betailungsgesellschaft mbH, In Support Of 
Petition For Certiorari - Wildtangent v. Ultramercial, 23.09.2013, available at: http://fstp-
expert-system.com/ 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
94
What makes the FSTP technology most appealing is the fact that it is based on the 
conceptual disaggregation and factual presentation on two levels. Thus, the claims are 
disaggregated into simple and elementary units. Moreover, any analysis is conducted 
not only on a semantic level, but involves the mathematical modeling of the 
invention. And the factual transformation leads to obtaining items depicting the 
differences between an invention and its prior art in an extremely precise way. By that 
means, the user can evaluate creative facts within the alleged innovation25. 
 
Another aspect of the FSTP technology is a computer-implemented method for 
generating and storing a data-structure describing the specific relations between the 
invention at issue and its prior art. The exploitation of FSTP technology allows the 
Innovative Expert System (IES) to assess all such technical and legal relations, and to 
provide answers to any queries regarding them. This data structuring ensures an 
enhanced analysis, but its resources may also be used by other expert systems. The 
importance of this tool is provided with its function that enables a user to store the 
results of a patent document’s analysis and his queries. The user will have an easy 
access to his findings about the solution at issue and its prior art, and he may use them 
as the case further evolves, e.g. in the court (Schindler 2013a). 
 
Eventually, the latest innovation within the FSTP technology provides a tool, 
exploiting FSTP and IES, to determine, whether the solution in question is meeting all 
the requirements of patent-eligibility and patentability (so far under U.S. patent law 
only). Indicating and refining “inventive concepts” leading to their precise 
presentation allows the user to apply “+10 FSTP tests”, which through explorative 
checks enable the user to evaluate whether the solution meets the requirements of: 
well-definedness of its inventive concepts, novelty and non-obviousness, and the 
general patent-eligibility of its claims (Schindler 2013b). Such automation can 
unburden patent practitioners, increase efficiency of their work, and enhance their 
output.     
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Emerging technologies are a challenge for current patent law. The patenting of genes 
is indeed among one of the most controversial issues within it. In this respect it is 
highly problematic to satisfy both the economical interest of research companies that 
invest in the development of new technologies, and the interest of society. Studies 
were undertaken to determine influence of gene patents on research and development. 
Although they indicate negative effects, probably, this issue needs an enhanced 
analysis from different perspectives.  
  
The general outlook, confirmed in numerous regulations, is that the human genome 
should be given protection, and genes should not be subject of excessive 
commercialization. Nevertheless, laws allow the patenting of some genes. 
Specifically, isolated genes can be patented in Europe. But they still need to fulfill the 
requirements of novelty, non-obviousness, and industrial application.  
 
                                                             
25 Ib. 
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However, a different standpoint was presented in the USSC jurisprudence. The 
Myriad Genetics judgment provided that the mere isolation of genes is not enough to 
render it patentable, and for them to be patented there must be a human contribution 
to a new composition of matter that is different from the one occurring in nature. 
Therefore, an inventor must be involved in the process of creation or modification. 
That is the rationale of cDNA as a patentable subject matter. This judgment 
accurately describes the essence of the problem with gene patents, and provides a 
useful hint how to evaluate whether a solution at question falls under the scope of 
patentable subject matter. The indication on creativity aptly highlights the way in 
which patents should be considered in order to determine their patentability and 
patent-eligibility.  
 
It is moreover one of the USSC’s decisions, which laid the groundwork for new, 
interesting development in the patent assessment technology, i.e. FSTP. The FSTP 
technology, exploiting the change in paradigm of patent assessment, can prove to be a 
useful tool in every day patent practice. Through conceptual disaggregation and 
focusing on inventive aspects of a solution it will enable an objective insight into an 
invention. Besides, through automation and increased preciseness it can make the 
work of patent practitioners much easier, especially in the case of evaluating 
inventions concerning intangible subject matters.  
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Abstract 
 
Changing from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy since 1932, but being 
interrupted by more than 16 coups d'etat, causes Thailand to have difficulties reaching 
the status of a consolidated democratic country. Thai peoplemostly learn about 
democracy from elections, but during the past decade, Thailand was faced with 
political instability, political cleavages among people in different areas and different 
ideologies, all claiming that their way insures democracy. After the coups d'etat  in 
2006,  apolarized society developed. Clearly from studying the degree of general trust 
and specific trust, especially trust in political institutions, trust seems to get lower but 
still shows significant influence in measuring preference for democracy. This paper 
tries to explain this situation by studying the level of trust in various institutions in 
Thai society over the decades and the impact of trust on support for Thai democracy.   
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Introduction 
The preference for democracy is identified here as the detachment from authoritarian 
governance. Respondents were asked about common alternatives to democracy in 
Thailand such as having a strong leader decide things, having only one political party, 
allowing the army to govern the country, and having experts make decisions on behalf 
of the people. This would mean that no elections are required anymore. The authors 
use data from the King Prajadhipok’s Institute’s various surveys such as   East Asian 
Barometer and Social Quality Survey for this analysis.  
The results show that trust really matters. Higher trust in government leads to higher 
preferences for democracy, but higher trust in the Election Commission, an 
independent regulatory agency, causes negative preferences for democracy. However, 
the positive prospect for future democracy in the country is also a strong variable that 
explains overall preferences for democracy.  
 
Who Prefers Democracy in Thailand? 
Although Thaksin Shinawatra was re-elected Prime Minister by a large majority in 
2005, elites felt excluded from decision-making in government.  Previously, these 
elites were enthusiastic about democratic government, but the Thaksin-style of 
government caused many in the traditional governing classes to question this 
enthusiasm. They had expected people to choose the traditional elites in democratic 
elections. Seeing that there was a populist sentiment among the electorate, elites had 
second thoughts about their enthusiasm for democracy. 
One way in which this cleavage expressed itself was thought to be along class or other 
demographic lines. Analysis of the data, however, shows that this is not the case 
(Table 1). Instead, the major cleavage is based upon cultural traditionalism. Even 
overwhelming support for democracy among peoples of developing nations cannot 
guarantee democratic governments in the face of determined elites who have access to 
instruments of military power (Linz and Stepan, 2001). The military, after fifteen 
years of true democracy, overturned a democratically-elected government in Thailand 
on September 21, 2006, as in 1991, on the pretext of “corruption in government.” 
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Whether “corruption” warranted such a drastic remedy has yet to be proved,1 but what 
is clear is that Thai elites are still willing to sacrifice democracy when they find 
control of government slipping from their grasp. For the time being, they are willing 
to tolerate a ban on all political activities, including meetings of political parties, 
assemblies of more than five people, and restrictions on the news media – specifically 
bans on criticism of the regime and reporting on Thaksin's activities - all measures 
that far exceed actions for which the Thaksin regime was severely criticized. The 
bankroller for the so-called People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), Sondhi 
Limtongkul, now argues that suppression of individual rights is acceptable in order to 
rid the government of all remaining vestiges of the Thaksin regime. 
Before censorship of the media took effect, the coup was challenged by some 
academics formerly opposed to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, even in the 
opposition political party, Prajadhipat (Democrat), which had precipitated the political 
crisis by boycotting the April elections, but few were willing to oppose the coup 
directly, especially after it received blessings from the palace. Clearly, they had 
underestimated the mood of the military and the palace that combined to end the 15-
year trajectory of democratic government. 
Explanations of this turn of events remain complex. Within a year after a landslide 
election victory of Thaksin Shinawatra’s Thai Rak Thai party in the 2005 elections,2 
significant fissures opened in the Thai political landscape. Thousands of Bangkokians 
gathered in Lumpini Park to listen to attacks on the government by Sondh 
Limtongkul, a wealthy businessman who, after supporting Prime Minister Thaksin in 
previous elections, fell out with him over what are not clearly identified issues. Many 
Thais were enraged, however, when the Prime Minister sold shares of the huge Shin 
Corporation to a Singaporean firm. The company included the major satellite linkage 
in SE Asia and a large proportion of cell phone business in Thailand. Some Thais 
argued that these were national assets that could not be transferred to non-Thais 
legitimately. In addition, Thaksin paid no tax on the sale estimated at around $2 
billion, because of a law exempting capital gains from taxation when acquired by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Much is always made of the distribution of money during elections. There is, however, no hard 
evidence that such practices change election outcomes.  
2 A nationwide poll of 1546 respondents by the King Prajadhipok’s Institute in April, 2006, indicated 
over 80 percent approval for the Thaksin Shinawatra government. This nationwide approval, however, 
diverged sharply from Bangkok and the southern provinces.   
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sales through the Securities Exchange of Thailand. On a routine basis, protests of as 
many as 100,000 people marched to demand Thaksin’s resignation or replacement.  
Thaksin had his own supporters located mostly in rural areas of the country and 
mobilized even larger crowds (as many as 200,000 in Bangkok) in his support. 
Eventually, in order to quell the continuous unrest, he dissolved Parliament and 
ordered a “snap” election knowing that his popularity in the countryside would give 
him a new mandate to govern. The opposition parties, however, refused to participate 
in the election and supported a move to encourage voters to mark ballots against any 
candidates. Because the election law (not the Constitution) required that any candidate 
must receive at least 20 percent of the eligible electorate when only one candidate 
runs unopposed, this move was successful and, despite repeated by-elections, 14 seats 
remained unfilled. Although the Constitution of 1997 mandated seating of the 
Parliament within 30 days, political manipulation by the Election Commission 
(requiring that all seats be “validated”) and by the courts prevented such an outcome. 
Commentators now recognize, as though for the first time, deep political cleavages in 
Thai society. They do not, however, often note the long history of this polarization or 
that it has always, in one dimension at least, represented conflicts between Bangkok 
and the rest of Thailand.3 Political dimensions of this division represent a resurrection 
of the “two democracies” thesis that essentially pits the politics of Bangkok against 
politics of the rural populations. Polls, taken in 2005 and 2006, indicated growing 
divisions between urban and rural populations on some of the most fundamental 
social and political dimensions. Post-coup reports on the financial situations faced by 
farmers in the Northeast underline growing tensions between rural areas and the 
Bangkok metropole since the coup regime returned government to traditional 
dominance by Bangkok interests less concerned for adversities in the hinterland. 
What are the sources of the differences between urban and rural society that also 
happen to have significant impacts on tolerance for democracy and democratic 
government? People living in rural areas live a significantly more precarious 
existence. Their livelihood is constantly threatened by nature and they are exposed to 
lack of personal security in a significantly more anarchic society. This leads to a 
greater dependence upon social networks for “getting by” in life and, as in almost any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3Pradit Ruangdit, No End to the Political Polarization, Bangkok Post, 02/02/2007. 
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society, rural dwellers are significantly more communal, as well as being interested in 
the welfare of their neighbors (which can be either positive of negative, from some 
perspectives). This communalism in rural areas also leads to higher levels of trust in 
other citizens, as well as higher levels of trust in government. 
Urban dwellers live in an environment where they are more autonomous, isolated, and 
individualistic, relishing the anonymity presented by urban life – all characteristics of 
what may be described as a “modernistic” culture. For these urbanites, individual 
independence from society and government leads to a greater interest in protections 
from government interference that scholars often associate with what are generally 
described as “civil liberties.” These divergences between urban and rural populations 
appear to have significant impacts on how democracy is viewed by individuals living 
in these two contexts, rural dwellers opting for security and urban dwellers for 
freedom. It is important to note, however, that virtually all societies celebrate rural 
culture so that it persists long after populations become urbanized. 
In the Thai context, scholars have noted disparities in approaches to democracy based 
upon class or status, as well as urban-rural cleavages within society, but Anek 
Laothamatas (1996) suggests that the most fundamental cleavage operating in Thai 
democracy is the sharp difference in political cultures between Bangkok and the 
essentially rural hinterland. Thailand is a “tale of two democracies”: one, of 
sophisticated urban elites (with origins or current residency in Bangkok), the other 
rural, often isolated, parochial interests that view political activity, especially 
elections, as opportunities for personal gain in a Downsian sense (Downs, 1997). 
Among other differences between urban and rural constituencies is that (according to 
the “Bangkok” view): 
 Voting in farming areas is not guided by political principles, policy 
issues, or what is perceived to be in the national interest, all of which is 
(regarded as) the only legitimate rationale for citizens casting their 
ballots in a democratic election. The ideal candidates for rural voters are 
those who visit them often, address their immediate grievances 
effectively, and bring numerous public works to their communities (202). 
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The ability of rural constituencies to acquire substantial political power in the 
parliament under conditions of electoral democracy often leads to doubts among 
members of the middle class, the upper class, the mass media, and even academics as 
to the efficacy of the democratic process. For these groups, “democracy turns out to 
be the rule of the corrupt and incompetent” (Laothamatas, 208). This puts them in a 
dilemma: although they oppose authoritarian rule in principle, they hold 
representatives from rural constituencies in contempt, regarding them as “parochial in 
outlook, boorish in manner, and too uneducated to be competent lawmakers or cabinet 
members” (Laothamatas, 208). 
The problem is that urban, educated, cosmopolitan candidates, who are skilled policy 
experts, are often held in equal contempt by villagers. They are often regarded as 
being alien to rural electorates in terms of taste, culture, and outlook, who “fail to stay 
close to the voters in both a physical and cultural sense” (Laothamatas, 208). Veiled 
contempt for rural-dwellers by sophisticated Bangkok elites posed no problem under 
authoritarian regimes. Once democratic elections tipped the balance in favor of rural 
areas, however, significant gaps in perceptions of and commitments to democracy 
have developed. 
These cleavages have, over the past decade, produced considerable political conflict 
that until recently seemed to be abating. Laothamatas argues that this fundamental 
conflict cannot be resolved until the Bangkok middle class accepts alternative 
versions of democracy that make room for understandings and aspirations of rural 
voters, especially the need for the rural poor to draw benefits away from the center 
and distribute them toward rural areas. “Ideally, patron-client ties might be replaced 
by a more responsive and effective system of local government. On top of that, voters 
are to be convinced that principle or policy-oriented voting brings them greater 
benefits than what they may get from local patrons” (Laothamatas, 223). 
There is growing evidence, also, that, while the Bangkok middle class opposes 
authoritarian forms of government that restrict individual freedoms and exercise a 
heavy hand over commerce, the uncertainty of changes in government, even by 
democratic processes, is often viewed as destabilizing the economic environment on 
which entrepreneurs depend. The possibility that government may be seized by 
politicians with “populist” agendas poses an even more direct threat to the interests of 
a class that stands significantly above the average voter in Thai elections. The 
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traditional emphasis on the “middle class” (that characterizes Bangkok “culture”), as 
an engine of democracy appears to be declining in favor of a view that middle-class 
support for democracy exists primarily when it coincides with class interests in 
curbing the power of government. This means that one cannot expect middle-class 
enthusiasm for democracy when it poses conflicts with private interests of the middle 
class. This latter view is expressed both by Laothamatas (1996), who argues that the 
1991 coup could not have been sustained except for support from the middle class, 
and Samudavanija (1998), who notes that the role of the middle class in Thailand, vis- 
a-vis democracy, has been “reactive rather than proactive” (156) and that its primary 
interest in democracy has been “to safeguard their own freedom and the freedom of 
the market” (158). Similarly, the coup of 2006 is often conceived as a revolt of the 
Bangkok-middle-class against dominance of the government by populist politicians 
who gain their support from rural masses. 
The recent political conflict in Thailand thus represents a resurrection of the “two 
democracies” identified by Anek Laothamatas (1996) that essentially pits the politics 
of Bangkok against the rural North, Northeast, and Central regions from which the 
majority party, Thai Rak Thai, drew its strength. Underlying this cleavage is a 
division rooted in the history of Thai politics, but only now becoming critical to social 
stability as a result of advancing democracy in the Thai nation. Until the development 
of democracy, Thai politics was dominated by Bangkok, even though Bangkok 
comprises only about 10 percent of the population of Thailand. As democracy began 
to take hold (with each voter in the rural areas counting as much as each voter in 
Bangkok), it was only a matter of time before political power would shift to the 
politics and priorities of rural Thailand. The conflict between Bangkok and the 
hinterland was long in building, but, once the structures of democracy were in place, 
it was not long before the rural 80 percent asserted their political strength to the alarm 
of Bangkok elites. 
Our contribution begins with a fundamental premise that meanings of democracy are 
diverse by Bangkok-non-Bangkok sectors in Thailand and examines diverse values 
within the Thai nation that contribute to equally diverse understandings. The 
explanations of these diversities require further analysis, but here are tentative 
elaborations of the factors associated with both Bangkok-non-Bangkok status 
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cleavages that seem to mark the significantly different emphases in approaches to 
democracy, much as Laothamatas describes. 
 
Structure of the Research4 
The data for this analysis were obtained in probability samples of eligible voters in the 
Thai nation through polls conducted in 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006.5 The sampling 
procedure  employs a three-stage probability sample based upon clusters of legislative 
districts, voting units (precincts), followed by a systematic sampling of voters in the 
selected voting units. The sample included 50 of the 400 legislative districts, 100 
voting units from across the 50 legislative districts, and 1500-2000 respondents from 
the 100 voting units. Roughly 1500-2000 respondents were drawn from populations 
of roughly 55,000.  
This process produces true probability samples of the Thai voter-eligible electorate. It 
represents the very few probability-based samples of the Thai population for political 
and social attitudes. The study presents the data that characterize the Thai population 
across the kingdom in their attitudes toward a variety of political and cultural 
attitudes, indicating the level of attitudinal diversity in democratic values among the 
Thai people. Specifically, it examines the rural-urban cleavage and the two cultures 
represented by that cleavage for their impacts on the current Thai political scene. 
The Cleavage between the Metropole and the Countryside 
The sources of both the 1991 and 2006 coups were rooted in fundamental cleavages 
between Bangkok and the hinterland. One source of these cleavages is that there are 
significant class differences between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand, as one might 
expect. Table 1 shows highly significant differences between respondents in the two 
areas in both income and education. What is even more interesting for purposes of 
this analysis are the significant differences in how Thais view themselves. Table 2, for 
example, shows significant differences between these areas in two dimensions. The 
first being how much respondents consider themselves to be “villagers” (chao ban) as 
opposed to “urban” (khonmuang) and how much they think of themselves as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The author wishes to express appreciation for funding of these polls by the King Prajadhipok's 
Institute and the Chung ChingKuo Foundation. 
5Eligible	  voters	  include	  all	  Thai	  citizens	  20	  years	  of	  age	  and	  older.	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“traditional” (maithansammay) as opposed to “modern” (thansammay). (See 
Appendix 1) 
Table 1: Rural-urban Disparities in Income, Education, and “Modern Orientation” 
(2006) ANOVA 
 Bangkok Non-
Bangkok 
F Sig. of 
F 
Mean Household Income 
(Monthly in Baht) 
26,995 10142 168.19 .000 
Mean Education* 3.08 2.09 62.42 .000 
Mean of Subjective Orientation 
to  “modernism”  (Factor scores) 
.561 -.059 66.61 .000 
*Based upon a 10-point scale from 1=no education to 10=post-graduate degree 
 
When these subjective indicators are combined in a factor analysis with objective 
indicators, such as the type of music one prefers, the results show significant gaps in 
cultural orientations between Bangkok and the rest of Thailand. This variable, 
designated as “modernism,” helps to explain other orientations to society and politics. 
Specifically, it contributes significantly to an explanation of support for democracy 
(Table 2). 
Table 2: Effects of Bangkok Location, Subjective Orientations to “Modernism,” and 
SES on Support for Democracy* (2005)  
Variable Regression Coefficient Beta Value of 
t 
Sig. of t 
Bangkok 
Residency 
-.427 -.078 -3.068 .002 
Modernism -.153 -.093 -3.485 .001 
SES .014 .008 .302 .763 
R = .127 F-test = 9.296  Sig. of F = .000  n = 1,705 
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The regression equation in Table 2 includes not only the “modernistic” cultural 
orientation and a variable representing Bangkok versus the rest of Thailand, but also 
an indicator of socioeconomic status (SES). This latter is composed of factor scores of 
income, education, and occupational status – all loading on a single natural factor, 
with loadings in excess of .65. As the equation in Table 2 shows, SES becomes a non-
contributor to an explanation of support for democracy when geographic location and 
cultural orientations of respondents are included. What is even more interesting and 
important, however, is the finding that, when controlling for both variables that are 
highly associated with Bangkok residence, Bangkok location remains strong, 
indicating an additional effect between SES and support for democracy produced by 
both Bangkok location and modernism. 
In addition, it is important to note that the signs of both “modernism” and “Bangkok 
residency” are negative, that is, the more “modern” a person regards oneself, the less 
supportive of democracy one is likely to be. In addition, there is further evidence of 
the finding, duplicated over several years and polls, that Bangkok residents are more 
negative in their evaluations of democracy. Furthermore, this more negative 
orientation persists despite controls for modern orientations and SES, both associated 
with Bangkok residency, indicating an impact of urban location independent of two 
demographic characteristics associated with urbanism.  
 
Ambivalence in Support for Democracy  
Whatever the "meaning" of democracy among Thais, data on support for democracy 
in the Thai electorate show a very high level of respondents expressing support for 
democratic processes and institutions. A poll taken as late as 2010 shows that over 95 
percent of the electorate were satisfied with democracy and the way it works in 
Thailand. In addition, Thais said that democracy is always preferable to authoritarian 
forms of government and, in 2006, nearly 85 percent indicated confidence in the 
ability of democracy to solve problems of the nation. Using a ten-point scale 
evaluating democracy in Thailand, less than 1 percent of the sample agreed that 
democracy is “unsuitable for Thailand” and nearly 46 percent wanted “complete 
democracy now.” 
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Thus, in a superficial way, Thais are highly supportive of the “idea” of democracy in 
virtually every dimension. The fact that 30.5 percent of the sample rated the economy 
as “bad” or “very bad” and only 30.8 percent rate it as “good” or “very good,”6 in the 
2006 poll implies that the high level of commitment to democracy obtains in the midst 
of both objective and subjective economic difficulties, thereby reinforcing 
significance of the high level of democratic adherents.7 
When forced to choose between democracy and economic development, however, the 
commitment to democracy appears somewhat ambivalent. 46.7 percent indicate a 
preference for economic development over democracy, while only 23.0 percent 
remain committed to democracy over economic development defined as “improving 
one’s standard of living.” The question, however, asks respondents to choose between 
an abstract concept (democracy) and a concrete improvement in one’s personal 
livelihood; therefore, one should take these responses with a grain of caution. 
Data analysis even more sensitive to democratic orientations indicates a Thai public 
strongly supportive of democratic institutions. When asked about alternatives such as 
“replacing parliament with a strong leader,” “abolishing opposition parties,” or 
“letting the military run things,” respondents reject these alternatives by large 
margins. Among these alternatives to an elected parliament, support for military 
governance is quite low, with over 78 percent rejecting this alternative (Table 3). 
Table 3: Percent of Respondents Accepting Alternatives to Democracy, 2010  
 Bangkok Non-Bangkok Sig 
Opposition parties should be 
abolished                            
12.3 17.0                            .019
The military should comein to govern 
the country           
29.2             19.5 .104 
We should replace parliament with a 
strong leader                 
9.2 19.6 .009 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The remaining respondents rated the economy as “so-so.” 
7  It is important to note that Thai optimism about the future is high. 66.6 percent of respondents 
believe that the economic situation of their family will be better in the near future; only 7.2 percent 
believe that it will be worse. 
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 By 2010, however differences between Bangkok and non-Bangkok populations no 
longer endured. When it comes to support for these items, a majority of respondents 
in both areas are generally opposed to any of these alternatives, but support for the 
coup of September 19, 2006, clearly has its seeds in the metropole-hinterland divide. 
With control of the instruments of violence, an elite minority can easily overcome 
public opposition to an unconstitutional overthrow of a democratic regime. 
Reinforcing this finding is the fact that abolishing opposition parties has significantly 
higher support among the more highly educated and persons of higher socio-
economic status, probably because parties are viewed as instruments for mobilizing 
the masses against elite dominance of the political arena. 
When these attitudes are differentiated between Bangkok and non-Bangkok 
populations, it becomes clear that non-Bangkok residents are more supportive of 
alternatives to democracy than those residing in the metropole (Table 3), albeit 
marginally. Bangkok residents are less likely to accept a “strong leader” over 
parliamentary government, one-party governance, and even government by experts 
than are citizens who live outside the capital. Non-Bangkok residents are less 
supportive of military rule, but not by a significant amount. Both areas are united in 
the belief that although democracy has its failings, it is still the best form of 
government (95 percent). These attitudes are embedded in the cleavages that emerged 
in association with the coup of 2006. 
When attitudes toward civil liberties are examined, there is somewhat more ambiguity 
in the Thai population’s commitment to traditional, liberal democratic values.  
These cleavages continue to the present and Thais have not been able to accept the 
resolution of differences within parliamentary institutions. As political power began 
to move toward rural dominance, Thai elites began to mobilize. This took the form of 
identification with “colors.” Supporters of the People’s Alliance for Democracy chose 
a yellow color and became known as the “Yellow Shirts.” This had the effect of 
identifying their movement with the monarchy, as yellow is the official color 
representing the monarchy. Their opposition, the United Defenders of Democracy 
(UDD) adopted the color red which also carried the implication of identifying with 
socialist sentiments. The cleavage between the “Yellow Shirts” and the “Red Shirts” 
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now symbolize the polarizations in Thai political society. The PAD used hand-
clappers to celebrate, while the UDD adopted foot-clappers for similar purposes. 
These symbolic gestures also had an effect of creating and solidifying political 
identities, thus contributing to political polarization in the nation. 
In 2012, the Yellow Shirt movement morphed into a movement based upon the 
popular movie “V is for Vendetta” which featured masks that were generally white. 
The Red Shirts responded by adopting red masks for their demonstrations. What is 
often missed is that the white masks (and, indeed, the portrayal in the movie) actually 
symbolized anarchy, a political stance often supported by the Yellow Shirts. This, of 
course, moves Thai politics well beyond a quest for democratic government, 
especially the notion that elected legislatures should have authority to set policy. This 
approach to analyzing support for democracy, rather than examining the superficial 
statements affirming democracy, develops a measure that rejects alternatives to 
democracy. What we find here is that rejection of these alternatives offers a very 
different view of democratic status. This new picture of preference for democracy is 
provided in Table 4. 
Table 4: Preference for Democracy over Alternatives to Democracy 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
 B Std. Error Beta   
(Constant) 14.739 .837  17.617 .000 
trust in national political 
institution 
-.003 .024 -.004 -.125 .901 
trust in Local Government -.010 .046 -.007 -.223 .824 
trust in Media .113 .044 .072 2.568 .010 
SES .195 .083 .070 2.352 .019 
BKK/NonBKK -.485 .267 -.051 -1.818 .069 
Age Group .141 .058 .067 2.447 .015 
Gender -.236 .139 -.043 -1.693 .091 
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New Party .448 .149 .076 2.996 .003 
Religiosity -.328 .086 -.099 -3.814 .000 
PM Support -.493 .091 -.154 -5.438 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: prefer democracy 129-132 
R-square = .061   P = .000  F = 9.709  n = 1,509 
 
Interpretation of Table 4 is relatively simple. Remembering that a negative sign 
means acceptance of alternatives to democracy, we find that respondent’s trust in 
institutions fails to distinguish between those who prefer democracy and those who do 
not. As in previous studies, we find that people of higher SES tend to reject 
alternatives to democracy, while women tend to support some of these alternatives. 
Perhaps the most striking finding is that party ID (as PTP) is more associated with 
preferences for democracy than identification with Prachadipat. What we find is that 
preferences for democracy, that is, rejection of alternatives to democracy, are 
associated with persons of lower SES, respondents who perceive themselves as less 
religious and older respondents. These findings are consistent with past studies of the 
Thai electorate. What is remarkable here is that preferences for democracy, defined as 
rejection of alternatives to democracy, are strongly associated with negative attitudes 
toward the Prime Minister and identification with the Phua Thai Party. For the first 
time we have been able to link party ID with support for democracy. 
One caveat remains, however. The Prime Minister at this time was Abhisit Vejjajiva 
who was clearly the bête noir of rural, populist sentiment. Nevertheless, the 
identification of positive attitudes toward democracy with partisan orientations, 
especially party ID has only recently emerged in Thai politics. The results indicate a 
novel configuration of a two-party system that has been evolving over the past decade 
and, now, associated with the major cleavage in Thai politics. A partisan cleavage is 
quite different from a class-based or rural-urban identification that has characterized 
Thai politics since the ending of the absolute monarchy. Scholars will be intrigued to 
see how long this new configuration lasts. 
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Abstract 
 
In December 2012, Japan's conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained power after a 
three-year hiatus, winning the Lower House elections for the Japanese parliament (known as the 
Diet). Led by Shinzo Abe, who has returned to serve as Prime Minister for a second time, the 
LDP's electoral fortunes have largely continued to prosper, as the economic policies popularly 
known as ‘Abenomics', have seen an improvement in Japan's economic performance. The 
outcome of the July 2013 elections for the Upper House of the Diet could have far more 
long-term implications though. 
Should the LDP and politically allied parties secure a two-thirds majority in the Upper House, the 
Abe Government will be able to pass legislation enabling changes to the Constitution, should any 
proposals to do so be passed with a simple majority by the public at a referendum. The LDP's 
policy platform advocates a number of potential Constitutional changes; the most controversial of 
which is to alter Article 9, the ‘pacifism clause' of the Constitution, which has constrained Japan's 
use of force since its defeat in the Second World War.This would transform the current Self 
Defence Forces (SDF) into 'National Defence Forces', enabling Japan to enage in military 
operations alongside its ally, the United States. 
Other possible Constitutional 'reforms' advocated by the LDP could potentially restrict freedom 
of political expression, and deliver greater overall powers to the government. The Upper House 
election of 2013 may therefore result in changes which will have profound effects on both 
Japanese domestic and foreign policy. 
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Introduction 
 
In December 2012, Japan’s conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) regained 
power after a three-year hiatus, winning the Lower House elections for the Japanese 
parliament (known as the Diet). Led by Shinzo Abe, who has returned to serve as 
Prime Minister for a second time, the LDP’s electoral fortunes have largely continued 
to prosper, as the economic policies popularly known as ‘Abenomics’, have seen an 
improvement in Japan’s economic performance. However, the outcome of the July 
2013 elections for the Upper House of the Diet could have far more long-term 
implications for the state of the Japanese constitution. 
 
In the separate Upper House election held in July 2013, the LDP secured a simple 
majority, but not a two-thirds majority; therefore, the Abe LDP government will not 
be able to easily pass legislation enabling changes to the constitution at present. The 
LDP’s policy platform nevertheless advocates a number of potential constitutional 
changes, should any such proposals to do so manage to be passed with a simple 
majority by the public at a referendum. The most controversial of these is to alter 
Article 9, the ‘pacifist clause’ of the constitution, which has constrained Japan’s 
international use of force since its defeat in the Second World War.  
 
If some of the minor parties manage to join the LDP in eventually supporting 
constitutional change, particularly if the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 
splits, the Upper House election of 2013 could thus eventually result in changes which 
would have profound effects on both Japanese domestic and foreign policy. 
 
Japanese Politics in the Lead-up to the 2013 July Upper House Election 
 
The LDP’s return to power on December 16, 2012 was a decisive defeat of the 
social-democratic DPJ, led at the time by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. The DPJ 
had defeated the LDP only as recently as 2009; however, widespread public 
disillusionment with the DPJ soon set in, due to leadership instability, with a new 
Prime Minister in each year of its government, a continual sluggish economy, and 
most traumatically, dealing with the impact of the March 2011 Tohoku disaster 
(Shinoda, 2013, pp.255-258). The DPJ’s numbers in the lower house collapsed from 
230 to 57 seats; there was no great initial enthusiasm for the new LDP government 
though, reflected in the record low voter turnout of 59%, 10% lower than for the 2009 
election (Fackler, 2012). These dismal results for the DPJ were repeated in the Tokyo 
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municipal elections in June 2013, where the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 
outpolled the DPJ (Warnock, 2013). 
 
Figure 1: The Japanese Diet following the 2012 Lower House Election: 
 
 
Source: The Japan Times 
 
Shinzo Abe’s return to power was a rare event in Japanese politics, having stepped 
down from a previous term as Prime Minister during the previous term of the LDP 
government, serving for about a year during 2006-07, before resigning due to ‘illness’ 
– although a series of government scandals and poor economic performance was 
widely considered the true reason. His remarkable political comeback, having won a 
LDP leadership contest during its last period of Opposition in 2012, enabled Abe to 
embark upon the LDP’s economic growth strategy plan, which is strongly tied to his 
personal leadership, popularly termed ‘Abenomics’ (Tepperman, 2013).  
 
Abenomics comprises three general areas, termed the ‘three arrows’; the first two 
arrows, monetary easing and stimulus spending, have been relatively easy for Abe to 
conduct, and have generally been considered successful. Aggressive quantitative 
easing by the Bank of Japan since April 2013 has doubled the volume of its long-term 
bond purchases, which has greatly increased the money supply, and depreciated the 
yen by about 25% against the US dollar to assist exports, although a record large trade 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
117
deficit continues, of ¥1.09 trillion in October 2013 (Ujikane, 2013). 
 
The second arrow has been a ¥10.3 trillion stimulus package, directed mostly towards 
infrastructure and construction, the traditional means used by the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party to boost the economy and lift employment. Inflation has increased 
to 0.9%, annualised GDP growth has increased to 1.9% for 2013, and the Nikkei stock 
market index has risen by around 50% since December 2012. The core targets of 
Abenomics aim to sustain inflation and real economic growth rates of at least 2% each 
by 2015 (Halla, 2013). Japan’s successful bid to host the 2020 Olympics in Tokyo is 
further expected to encourage stimulus spending and long-term growth, with an 
economic impact of at least ¥3 trillion (Harner, 2013). 
 
The third arrow is far more ambitious, complex, and problematic. It aims to encourage 
deregulation, productivity and competitiveness across an extensive range of sectors, 
including in energy, health care, agriculture (particularly rice and beef production), 
education, science and technology, transport, infrastructure and tourism. Export 
industries, small-to-medium enterprises, and increased participation by women in the 
workforce are to be encouraged, and engaging in more liberalised international trade 
agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), are also considered part of 
the third arrow. The Abe government has also confirmed it will press ahead with a 
controversial hike in the rate of the national consumption tax on the purchase of goods 
and services, from 5% to 8% in April 2014, with a further increase to 10% in October 
2015 (the consumption tax was last increased from 3% in 1997) (Reynolds and Mogi, 
2013). 
  
The 2013 Upper House Election and Constitutional Implications 
 
Elections for half the Upper House (the House of Councillors) are held every three 
years, with members serving six-year terms. Unlike the Lower House, the Upper 
House cannot be separately dissolved for early elections, and so elections for the two 
Houses have long been out of synch; simultaneous elections for both Houses have 
only occurred twice, in 1980 and 1986 (Kobayashi, 2012, p.62). 
 
The Upper House election held on July 21, 2013, continued to build up the LDP’s 
political fortunes; it secured a comfortable majority, winning 76 of the 121 available 
seats with its traditional governing coalition partner, the New Komeito Party (NKP). 
The July election saw a continuing heavy decline for the DPJ, being held too soon for 
it to recover from its poor image, in the wake of its 2012 defeat, losing 27 seats. Of 
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the other minor parties, only the Japanese Communist Party and the nationalist Japan 
Restoration Party (JRP) managed to increase their (small) numbers. Other small 
parties, such as the neoliberal Your Party (YP), the populist People’s Life Party (PLP), 
led by former LDP and DPJ powerbroker and defector Ichiro Ozawa, and the 
left-leaning Social Democratic Party (SDP), and Green Wind also remained marginal, 
their poor performance due to being crowded out by the LDP sweeping success (The 
Japan Times, 2013a). Despite this electoral success though, the LDP still was not able 
to achieve its ultimate desired goal of a two-thirds majority in its own right, which 
would allow for easier constitutional change, although it will allow the LDP to control 
all standing committees. Voter turnout was even lower than in 2012 though, at only 
53% (The Economist, 2013). 
 
Figure 2: The Upper House of the Japanese Diet following the 2013 Election 
 
 
Source: The Asahi Shimbun 
 
Shinzo Abe and the LDP have long held a policy platform of more readily enabling 
changes to the constitution, drafted during the post-war US occupation. The 
constitution has never been altered, which the LDP argues makes it too sclerotic; 
hence the need to allow easier change, so governments can adapt policies and 
legislation for changing national circumstances. This aim was pursued by Abe in his 
first administration in 2006-2007, which passed a bill to ease the requirements for the 
public referendum which has to be held to confirm any vote in the Diet to change the 
constitution; now only a simple majority is required to pass a referendum, rather than 
a two-thirds majority (Kersten, 2012, p.37). However, under Article 96 of the 
Constitution, presently a two-thirds majority vote is still required in both Houses of 
the Diet to approve any such referendum for constitutional change. Once Article 96 is 
altered, the barrier would be lowered for further changes in other areas of the 
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constitution, most notably the ‘pacifist’ clause Article 9, which restricts the military 
use of force by Japan (Hook, 2012, p.526). 
 
After the 2013 election, a two-thirds majority vote led by the LDP is now potentially 
possible, with cooperation from the other minor parties, particularly the YP and JRP, 
which also are generally in favour of constitutional change. Crucially through, the 
more pacifist-leaning NKP remains opposed, and so it remains the vital voting bloc 
likely to prevent revision of the constitution, frustrating the ambitions of the LDP into 
the intermediate future. The other possibility for the LDP to achieve the numbers 
required would be if the demoralised DPJ, which suffered a series of defections in the 
lead-up to the 2012 election, splits even further, and a bloc of its more 
conservative-aligned members supports the LDP in sufficient numbers. However, the 
DPJ, under its post-election leadership of Banri Kaieda, would be unlikely to yield to 
such pressure from the LDP, if it ever hopes to rebuild its electoral fortunes (Sieg, 
2013). 
 
Another complicating factor has been a recent ruling by the Japanese Supreme Court, 
which has found the 2012 and 2013 elections were unconstitutional, due to a 
continuing voter-value disparity in the electoral system; this unfairly gives a greater 
weighting of a voter’s value in a number of rural/regional electorates, ranging from 
two to five times as much, compared to urban areas. While it has effectively ruled the 
current Diet as being unconstitutional, the Supreme Court did not order a re-election, 
merely recommending that the voter weighting be reformed by the time of the next 
election. However, this has been an ongoing issue long neglected by the major parties, 
particularly the LDP, as the disparity tends to benefit its electoral performance. 
Continuing to leave the disparity unresolved only serves to weaken the legitimacy of 
the electoral system overall, and could result in possible further legal challenges to 
any votes to change the constitution itself (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013a). 
 
Domestic Policy Implications 
 
The continuing domestic political success of Abe’s LDP-NKP coalition government 
so far has largely been due to the ongoing roll-out of ‘Abenomics’. Abe is counting on 
firms to raise wages as the economy grows, to offset the increases in the consumption 
tax increases, encouraged by a promised corporate tax cut. However, there are no 
guarantees employers will pass on any salary increases, instead being more likely to 
retain them as higher profits and shareholder returns. The main purpose of the 
consumption tax increase is to attempt to address the ever increasing government 
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budget deficit, which exceeds ¥1000 trillion, with a public gross debt to GDP ratio of 
around 230% in 2013, the largest in the OECD (Japan’s economy is still the 
third-largest in the world, with GDP at nearly US$6 trillion). As the population of 
Japan continues to simultaneously decease and age, the fiscal burden of rising health 
and welfare costs will continue to increase, as the income tax revenue base 
correspondingly declines (White, 2013). 
 
The sales tax hike can only make a minor, temporary impact on this deteriorating 
fiscal dilemma. The consumption tax increase will be partially offset by an additional 
¥5 trillion stimulus package, including one-off compensation payments to low-income 
households and pensioners, and tax breaks for home loans and purchases, but the 
burden will continue to steadily rise on consumers overall in the long term. This poses 
the danger that such a regressive move will discourage consumer spending and blunt 
aggregate demand, threatening the gains of the economic recovery that have been 
achieved so far (Tabuchi, 2013). 
 
The ‘third arrow’ of Abenomics faces other obstacles in its implementation, such as 
an ongoing cultural resistance within many corporations to women rising to senior 
positions in the workplace; although the employment rate for Japanese women has 
risen to its highest ever level, of 63%, it remains difficult for women to secure regular 
full-time positions. (The Japan Times, 2013b) There is also growing opposition to 
Japan’s participation in the TPP, particularly from the influential farmers’ lobby, who 
are strongly against allowing any increase to cheaper agricultural imports. Labour 
unions are also concerned that the trend towards greater casualization of labour will 
continue to expand, further eroding wages and conditions for workers (The Asahi 
Shimbun, 2013b). 
 
Also unpopular are the desired intentions of the LDP to restart Japan’s 50 nuclear 
power plants, which had operations suspended following the 2011 Fukushima disaster. 
Due to the resulting increase in imports of fossil fuels, Japan has announced a 
dramatic decrease in its planned carbon emission reduction targets, from 25% by 2020, 
to 3.8% - which would be a real 3.1% increase on 1990 levels. The slow pace of 
resettlement of those displaced by the Fukushima disaster is also a long-running social 
problem, and concerns about the continuing safety and repair of the destroyed 
Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear power plant will be an ongoing dilemma for the Abe 
government (Australia Network News, 2013). 
 
Abe nevertheless retains a commanding position of firm domestic political dominance 
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for the LDP, as the opposition parties’ numbers in both houses of the Diet are too low 
to present any major legislative impediment. This has been amply demonstrated in the 
Diet session held after the July election, where another set of controversial legislation 
was introduced by the LDP, this time focused on national security. Bills were recently 
passed to establish Japan’s first National Security Council (NSC), modelled on that of 
the USA, to better coordinate responses to potential security crises (Kuromi and 
Tajima, 2013). 
 
Far more controversial has been a bill to strengthen the protection of ‘state secrets’, 
with harsher penalties for the prosecution of public servants who leak such 
information, and also for journalists who ‘encourage’ and publish such leaks. The 
state secret protection bill passed the Lower House plenary session special committee, 
amid protests by some Opposition members, and is set to pass in the Upper House and 
become law. The LDP government has justified stronger protection of state secrets on 
the grounds it will secure greater intelligence cooperation with Japan’s allies, 
particularly the USA, and strengthen national security overall, in light of the recent 
international whistleblowing cases of Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and Julian 
Assange’s Wikileaks organization (BBC, 2013). 
 
Public protests were held against the state secrets bill by human rights groups, lawyers, 
media outlets and authors, concerned about the danger that freedom of expression 
may be eroded. Critics of the bill considered there was a lack of consultation and 
proper scrutiny of the legislation, it effectively being ‘railroaded’ through the Diet. 
They claim the Abe government has been too vague about which criteria of 
information could be considered state secrets, with the potential for restrictions to be 
expanded beyond areas such as defence, foreign affairs, espionage and intelligence. 
This could mean anti-nuclear protesters, and those opposing the greater international 
use of force by Japan may find themselves in breach of the law in future (McDonnell, 
2013). Discussion and criticism of government policies and handling of crises such as 
the Fukushima nuclear disaster could also possibly face restrictions, reducing 
government accountability and transparency overall. Human rights advocates also fear 
other potential changes on the LDP’s constitutional reform agenda, including 
restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, if such activities and associations 
‘harm…public order’ (Jones, 2013). 
 
Expressions of a more virulent nationalism among LDP politicians are also continuing, 
seen in proposals for the ‘government viewpoint’ to be presented in school history 
textbooks, resurrecting long-running controversy about the treatment of Japan’s 
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wartime history (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013c). Visits by LDP members to the 
controversial Yasukuni shrine, which honours Japan’s war dead, including war 
criminals, have also continued. Such events strongly offend neighbouring states in the 
region, particularly China and Korea, creating difficulties in improving relations with 
those countries; however, these demonstrations of nationalism pander to the 
conservative support base of the LDP, demonstrating a projection of assertiveness 
(McCurry, 2013). 
 
Foreign Policy Implications 
 
Apart from securing the LDP’s domestic fortunes, Abe needs Abenomics to succeed 
in order to provide the economic and political capital required to fulfil his 
nationalistic ambitions of restoring Japan as a premier geostrategic nation in East Asia. 
A less noted component of Abenomics is a 3% increase in defence spending, to ¥4.89 
trillion in 2013, mainly driven by rising territorial tensions with China over the 
Senakaku Islands (claimed as the Diaoyus by China and Taiwan), which have steadily 
deteriorated after the previous DPJ government fully ‘nationalised’ its ownership of 
the islands in October 2012. Concerns have also increased over North Korea’s testing 
of nuclear warheads and ballistic missiles, which prompted the Japanese Self Defense 
Forces (SDF) to go on alert on several occasions in 2012-13. This has been the first 
increase in Japanese defence spending in eleven years, and is the highest amount of 
spending in 22 years. The SDF is already one of the best-equipped and most 
well-trained modern armed forces, at a strength of nearly 250,000, including large 
numbers of warships and aircraft, making it the third most powerful military force in 
the region, after the USA and China (IISS, 2013, pp.266-269, 306-309). 
 
As well increasing the amount of military spending, the Abe government is changing 
the operational doctrine of the SDF. This includes expanding the size of the Coast 
Guard and Maritime SDF, seen in the recent launch of its latest helicopter carrier, the 
largest warship acquired by the MSDF in the post-war period, to be operational by 
2015 (Lendon, 2013). Establishment of a unit of specialized amphibious forces, with 
the specific mission of recapturing islands is also under way, as is the deployment of 
US surveillance drones, authorised by a new security cooperation agreement signed 
between the US and Japan. Further to this, large-scale amphibious landing joint 
exercises are being carried out between the SDF and US forces, both in the US and 
Japan, in a clear signal of deterrence aimed against China’s greater military posturing 
in the region (Mie and Aoki, 2013). A full Defence Posture White Paper is to be 
prepared and released by the end of 2013, formally replacing the Security Doctrine of 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
123
previous DPJ Govt (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013d). 
 
These developments are part of the long-term aim of Abe and the LDP to alter Article 
9, the ‘pacifist’ clause of the constitution, officially convert the SDF into the 
‘National Defence Forces’, and allow participation in ‘collective self-defence’ – 
particularly cooperation in military operations with the US, beyond the immediate 
defence of Japanese territory. This would greatly transform the use of the SDF beyond 
previous interpretations of the constitution, which have allowed SDF participation in 
UN peacekeeping operations, UN-authorised anti-piracy operations, and ‘non-combat’ 
operations in support of the US during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Vosse, 2012, 
p.161). The case for this far-reaching change of the use of force by Japan has been 
justified by Abe and the LDP as finally ‘normalising’ Japan’s defence and foreign 
policy. This would allow Japan to strengthen its national security, in a more volatile 
and strategically competitive region. It is argued that Japan would thus be enabled to 
make a greater contribution to international peace and stability, by allowing full 
assistance to be given to its allies in collective self-defence operations, principally 
with the US, as permitted under the UN Charter (Kitaoka, 2013, pp.5-7). 
 
As previously outlined though, the LDP does not presently have the numbers in the 
Diet to effect constitutional change. It is also questionable whether a referendum to 
overturn Article 9 would be passed by the public; a strong pacifist strain endures 
amongst much of the Japanese public, particularly in the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, and in areas enduring the burden of hosting US military bases, principally 
in Okinawa (Clausen, 2013). The Abe government has therefore already taken 
practical steps to prepare for such a contingency, appointing a new head of the 
Cabinet Legislation Bureau, with the purpose of potentially reinterpreting Article 9, to 
allow participation in collective self-defence. Since full constitutional change is 
unlikely in the short-term, existing legislative and legalistic means are therefore 
necessary for the LDP to achieve its goals of a more active role for the SDF (The 
Japan Times, 2013c). However, this more assertive foreign policy direction of the 
Abe government has already worsened relations with China and the Koreas, who view 
the LDP policy as a return to nationalistic militarism. Abolishing the pacifist clause of 
Article 9 would inevitably ratchet up tensions even further, and so be diplomatically 
costly, despite any attempts at diplomatic reassurance the Abe government might 
make (Wallace, 2013, pp.504-509). 
 
Abe has already attempted to pre-empt this, in his foreign policy termed ‘proactive 
pacifism’. This has been personally expressed through his high pace of diplomatic 
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activity during his first year in office. He has recently visited Cambodia and Laos, 
completing his schedule of visiting all the ASEAN member states, which can 
considered an attempt to diplomatically outflank China’s influence in the region, with 
promises of higher levels of Overseas Development Assistance and Foreign Direct 
Investment. This was recently demonstrated in Japan’s swift response to typhoon 
Haiyan in the Philippines, which saw the largest overseas deployment of the SDF to a 
disaster relief operation (Ordaniel, 2013). 
 
Abe has also further developed the already deepening security ties with Australia, 
which has Japan as its second-largest export market. Abe had his first official meeting 
with the new conservative Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott at the 2013 
ASEAN/East Asia Summit in Brunei, where Abbott declared Japan was Australia’s 
‘closest friend in Asia’. Abbott also offered Abe the rare privilege of addressing the 
Australian parliament on his next visit, and aimed to conclude a Free Trade 
Agreement with Japan within a year. A growing level of defence cooperation, 
including a higher tempo of military exercises, was also confirmed in the ongoing 
Transnational Security Dialogue between Australia, the US and Japan held on the 
sidelines of the 2013 APEC summit in Indonesia (Kenny, 2013). 
 
However, the process for another series of trilateral meetings between Japan, South 
Korea and China seems to have broken down, as regional tensions in Northeast Asia 
worsen. This diplomatic standoff intensified after recent media statements by Abe at 
the annual review of the SDF, reiterating that Japan has to increase its defence 
preparedness to secure itself from threats, and to allow Japan to play a greater role in 
international security. Abe directly warned China that Japan would not allow any 
changes to be made by force to the territorial status quo of the region. In doing so, 
Abe raised the prospect of Chinese drones being shot down if they enter Japanese 
territory; China angrily responded, stating any such action would be an act of war 
(The Japan Times, 2013d). 
 
Relations between China and Japan have since only worsened further, with China’s 
recent declaration of an ‘Air Defence Identification Zone’ (ADIZ) covering the 
Senkakus/Diaoyus, a potentially highly dangerous escalation of tensions. As well as 
sparking strong diplomatic protests from Japan, the US and Australia, the move has 
raised concerns among Taiwan and South Korea. The US reiterated its support for 
Japan under its military alliance, again stating that while it does not have a formal 
position on the international legality of the dispute, it regards the Senkakus as 
Japanese-administered territory, and therefore their defence is covered under the 
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US-Japan Security Treaty (US Department of Defense, 2013). US aircraft have 
already joined the SDF in sending patrols into the Chinese ADIZ to reinforce this 
point. This very concerning development underlines the urgent need for more active 
regional diplomacy to reduce tensions, and to finally restore the diplomatic 
momentum required to ultimately resolve the issue, along with the other territorial 
disputes China has with its ASEAN neighbours in the South China Sea (Marcus, 
2013). 
 
Map 1: ADIZ and EEZ claims by China and Japan in the East China Sea 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
While confronting a range of domestic and foreign policy challenges, including that 
of constitutional change, the LDP nevertheless seems set to enjoy a prolonged period 
of political ascendancy. After the brief period of the previous DPJ government 
(2009-12), the LDP may yet become entrenched again as the ruling party, returning 
Japan to its long post-war period of parliamentary dominance under the LDP, 
effectively becoming a ‘one-party democracy’ once more. The DPJ could well split 
and fragment under the pressure of opposition, with the range of other small minor 
parties ensuring the LDP remains relatively politically unchallenged for the 
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foreseeable future (the next general Lower House election is due in 2016). 
 
If the LDP finally does manage to achieve its aims of profound constitutional change, 
this is likely to consolidate its power, and promote the agendas of its traditional 
support base, particularly the business lobbies of large corporations, and influential 
sections of the bureaucracy, including those of the ‘national security state’. The 
danger lies if this comes at the expense of the general public, particularly ordinary 
consumers, taxpayers and wage earners, young people, women, the elderly, and 
vulnerable minorities in society, such as those still displaced in Tohoku. Vigilance 
must also be maintained that civil liberties are not eroded, at the expense of ostensibly 
protecting ‘national security’. The move by Japan to a more assertive nationalism 
under Abe also risks greater instability in the region, unless far greater diplomatic care 
is taken. 
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This year is the tenth anniversary of the final decision on al al Kateb v Godwin (2004) 
HCA 37), a landmark case in Australian migration law. The Australian government 
sought to detain al Kateb, a stateless Kuwaiti, indefinitely after refusing his 
application for asylum.  The High Court ruled in favour of al Kateb on the basis that 
indefinite detention of a stateless person is unlawful.  Since then, Australian law on 
statelessness has failed to develop to the extent that the Australian government has not 
legislated on a determination procedure for stateless people.  Australia does not 
provide protections under United Nations Convention on the Status of Stateless 
Persons (1954) to which Australia is a signatory.  This paper discusses sources 
Australian Country Advice KWT39495 to describe how concepts about stateless 
communities might develop within the Refugee and Migration Review Tribunals.  It 
challenges the veracity of the Country Advice information based on its uses of 
sources.  It explains the reasoning behind American and UK positions on statelessness 
in Kuwait in the Country Advice, which influences determinations on asylum claims 
in the absence of a procedure to determine and resolve statelessness.  It concludes that 
not only are the Australian Country Advices in need of update, there is also a need for 
the quality of evidence sourced and the interpretation of that evidence, to be reviewed 
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  Introduction: 
 
Because of the limited nature of this presentation, I will discuss why statelessness 
matters in the Australian context, the Australian Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship’s sources of advice on Statelessness, the two main sources of the advice 
and the two trends emerging that positioning the stateless population claims.  The 
analysis by close reading of the text will be published in a full-length paper. 
 
 
Why Statelessness Matters  
 
There are approximately 22 million stateless people worldwide (UNHCR 2013).  
Most of these people are not displaced refugees but remain in their countries of origin 
for generations (Refugee Appeal No. 72635/01, 2002).  One of the reasons for this is 
that if they cross a border from their home country, they will not be allowed back in. 
The systematic exclusion of stateless people from legal frameworks in their own 
nations leads to some stateless people taking the risk of travelling, and this manifests 
as asylum flows to adjacent nations and also further afield.  Stateless, they cannot 
leave the second country since they have no nation to be exited to.  Under Australia’s 
new offshore processing procedures for Irregular Maritime Arrivals, stateless persons 
who do not make successful claims as refugees are left on Manus Island or Nauru.  
However, as at 15 May 2012, there were 555 people in detention centres in Australia 
who identified as being stateless, 114 of whom had been detained for over a year-and- 
a-half (Australian Human Rights Commission 2012 at 6.4), ten years after the al 
Kateb case (al Kateb v Godwin (2004) HCA 37) had decided that stateless asylum 
applicants should not be left in indefinite detention. 
 
When his case first came to the attention of the Australian media, Ahmed al Kateb 
was a stateless Kuwaiti of Palestinian descent languishing in indefinite detention in 
South Australia (Zagor 2006).  The Kuwaiti Bidoun Jinsiya provide a particularly 
compelling example of statelessness as, until 1986, this  group was  treated  as 
citizens in Kuwait, while their claims to human rights and citizenship-like benefits are  
today made in competition with more recent arrivals from other regions of the Arab 
world. (‘Kuwait issues 80,000 identification cards to stateless Arabs’ in Arabian 
Business, 20 January 2013).  A discussion on how the problem developed is beyond 
the scope of this paper, suffice to say that the Kuwaiti government has called on the 
international community to treat this problem as an international issue rather than a 
purely Kuwaiti  one (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch, 2011).  
Stateless Kuwaitis seek asylum in nations such as Britain, Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia (Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules, UK Border Agency, 2013; 
Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1999 and 2001; 
DZABG v MIAC (2012) FMCA 36; MRT Case 1218580 (2012); Refugee Appeal No. 
72635/01, 2002).   
 
The international flow of stateless populations changes the complexion of 
statelessness in Kuwait from a domestic problem into an international issue.  The 
current Australian approach to the Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons 
(1954) has seen Australia fail to implement the Convention, despite being a signatory 
to it.  The failure of the Australian government to implement a procedure to determine 
statelessness is the most significant problem for stateless asylum applicants in 
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  Australia as they cannot have their stateless status resolved under Australian law.  
This failure means that stateless people have only the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (1951) under which to apply for protection.  The means of 
protection for stateless persons under international law for those who do not qualify 
for refugee status, remains denied to stateless people who apply for asylum in 
Australia,.  This creates a situation where stateless people and their legal counsel are 
left to ‘fit’ their circumstances into a case for refugee status although, according to 
their circumstances they are eligible for protection from Australia under the 
Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons (1954). 
 
The leads to the second reason for the failure of stateless people to have their cases 
resolved under Australian law.  While stateless people’s asylum claims can only be 
processed as applications for refugee status, these are often rejected.  This leaves their 
cases unresolved if they cannot be returned to their home country (the al Kateb case 
(al Kateb v Godwin & Ors [2004] HCA 37 established that the return of stateless 
Kuwaitis and others is usually refused by the home country from which they came).  
The decisions of the Australian Migration Review Tribunal and the Australian 
Refugee Tribunal, including the rejection of refugee claims by stateless people can be 
related to evidence from documents issued by the Australian Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (now known as the Australian Department of 
Immigration and Border Control).  As  discussed above, because Australia has not 
implemented a statelessness determination procedure, the refugee convention is the 
only convention under which asylum seekers can apply for asylum.  In Britain, 
asylum seekers can now apply for refugee or statelessness status according to either 
the Convention on the Status of Refugees (1951) or the Convention on the Status of 
Stateless Persons (1954), respectively.   Asylum claimants in Australia must 
demonstrate that they are being persecuted in a particular way according to the ‘well-
founded fear’ test to ‘fit’ their case to the definition of the Convention on the Status of 
Refugees (1951) (refer to the Australian government’s Guide to Refugee Law: 
Chapter 3: Well-Founded Fear, September, 2013; Refugee Appeal 72635/01, 6 
September 2002 provides a judicial analysis of how the test was applied regarding a 
stateless Kuwaiti).  
 
If a claim for refugee status is based on membership of a particular group, claimants  
must demonstrate that they are members of that group and that this group has been 
subjected to persecution,  having experienced prejudice or discrimination. .  This 
means that their cases put forward by solicitors rely on proof of difference of race, 
religion or affiliation upon which claims of persecution are constructed.  Where the 
status of a person’s membership of a group subject to persecution cannot be decided, 
or if the existence of that group is not accepted, the claimant’s case is unlikely to be 
deemed to satisfy the definition of a ‘well-founded fear’ of persecution.  Where 
Country Advice documents issued by the Australian Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship questions or denies the status of stateless groups, which are subject to 
persecution, according to the group members’ ‘sameness’ or ‘difference’, this has the 
potential to negatively influence determinations on cases brought before the tribunals.  
Such claims about the group identity of stateless Kuwaitis were found in Australian 
Country Advice KWT39495. 
 
This paper analyses sources Australian Country Advice KWT39495 to describe how 
concepts about belonging and the identity of stateless communities subject to 
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  persecution have developed.  It explains the reasoning behind what appears to be two 
conflicting positions on statelessness expressed in Kuwait in the Country Advice.  
The positions relate to stateless Kuwaitis’ claims to belonging to a group that is 
discriminated against or persecuted.   I challenge the veracity, quality and context of 
information from American sources used in the Country Advice, used to assert that 
the stateless people of Kuwait are the same as Kuwaiti citizens and that stateless 
people have no distinct identity or culture.  On the other hand, information in the 
Country Advice based on British sources, supported assertions that stateless people of 
Kuwait have a distinct identity and a rightful claim to refugee status.  The UK 
information was downplayed despite its better quality and contextual fit.  This raises 
questions about the sources and the interpretation of sources in the Advice.  The 
Country Advices influence determinations on stateless person’s asylum claims in 
Australia the absence of a procedure to determine and resolve statelessness, where 
stateless applicants are expected to prove refugee status in order to be granted 
protection.   
 
The Department of Immigration’s Sources of Advice on Statelessness 
 
Australia has had so many stateless asylum applicants from Kuwait that it began 
issuing summaries to migration department staff via the Australian Country Advice 
regarding the ‘Bidoun Jinisya,’ people without nationality.   Numbers of stateless 
people arriving or staying in Australia from particular countries of origin are not 
published by Department of Immigration and Migration Australia (now known as the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection) or the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics. Therefore I am unable to suggest just how many Kuwaiti stateless 
applicants for asylum in Australia there have been.  However, as at mid-2013 there 
were four advices listed on the Australian Migration and Refugee Review Tribunal 
website including Australian Country Advice: Kuwait KWT37495 (2010), KWT37848 
(2010), KWT38627 (2011) and KWT38642 (2011).  The Advices described various 
issues arising in appeal cases relating to identity, culture, society and politics.   
 
Country Advice KWT39495 was particularly significant because it discussed at 
length, claims to identity made by stateless asylum applicants.  The two main pieces 
of evidence used in the Advice were:  
• About Being Without: Stories of Statelessness in Kuwait by Refugees 
International 2007 
• UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note – Kuwait, March, 2009 
(hereafter referred to as OGN 2009) 
 
About Being Without: Stories of Stateless in Kuwait, Refugees International, 2007 
 
Regarding the abovementioned Refugees International (2007) source information, 
Refugees International is a Washington-based advocacy organisation that has 
produced a number of field reports on the Stateless in Kuwait (see Refugees 
International 25 July 2007, 2 September 2009, 12 September 2009, 17 October 2011, 
5 March 2012 and 12 May 2012).   Ironically, the publication referenced in the 
Country Advice is probably the least rigorous research publication on Kuwait that the 
organisation ever produced on Kuwait.  The document did not even claim to be a fact-
based report.  It was a monograph of six ‘stories’ over just fifteen pages with large 
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  photographs filling the pages, constructed by a field worker who flew into the site for 
around two weeks.   
 
While the research method used to produce About Being Without: Stories of 
Statelessness in Kuwait (Refugees International 2007) included interviews to 
construct a life history of participants, a method used frequently in the qualitative 
social sciences, the manner in which the author used this data to analyse and construct 
‘results’ was creative (in a creative writing sense) rather than rigorous (in an academic 
or humanitarian advocacy sense).  The interview data was pieced together to create 
general biographical life stories, including life stories of individuals and life stories of 
families.  The family research comprised interviews with only certain individuals in 
the group, which were presented as providing a portrait of sorts, of the entire group. 
The first story, ‘A Family Destroyed’ concluded with,  
 
Mohammad remembers that he lay awake all night, repeating the word ‘bidun’ 
and wondering what it meant. 
 
About Being Without: Stories of Statelessness in Kuwait, Refugees International 2007 
pp.5 
 
Principles of beneficence were adhered to by the researcher so loosely in interpreting 
and reporting the results that I believe readers would likely come away from reading 
the work with a somewhat tainted or negative impression of stateless people.  For 
example, in the first story quote above, the married couple’s divorce for the purpose 
of obtaining free schooling for their five children was described by the researcher 
while the couple’s daughter tried to put forward an argument about the discrimination 
she had experienced that prevented her education.  I believe that application and 
disclosure of research methods is a significant concern in humanitarian research on 
statelessness in the Middle East.  In Stateless Aesthetics, Feminist Human Rights 
Discourse on the Stateless in Kuwait (Kennedy 2013) I explored the use of feminist 
methodology to produce results and make recommendations that run counter to the 
principles of beneficence in the research carried out on stateless people in Kuwait.  In 
About Being Without: Stories of Statelessness in Kuwait (Refugees International 
2007) the author relied on sensational language and unverified data to craft his stories 
on statelessness. 
 
 
UK Home Office Operational Guidance Note – Kuwait, March, 2009  
 
Regarding the British source of information for the Country Advice on Kuwait, the 
OGN (2009) issued by the UK Home Office was compiled by the British Asylum 
Policy Directorate.  It drew on information from the British Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (citing humanitarian and diplomatic efforts in the Middle 
East), Freedom House (another Washington-based rights group, whose mandate is 
similar to Refugees International), the US State Department, The National News 
service (a Middle East daily news source), the World Health Organisation and case 
law from three British law cases on stateless asylum claims.  The sources of 
information were authoritative and well spread across a number of genres. 
 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
134
	  As mentioned in the introduction, the analysis by close reading of the text will be 
published in a full-length paper.  
 
Two trends emerge positioning the stateless population   claims 
 
Emerging from the Country Advice are two apparent positions: a British position and 
an American position on Kuwaiti statelessness.  The Washington-based Refugees 
International (2007) work was held out to be comparable with the OGN (2009) in 
terms of the evidence from each publication being used to weigh up claims about the 
stateless Kuwaitis’ cultural identity. I explained in the textual analysis why the stories 
by Refugees International (2007) was not of a comparable quality to the Guidance 
Note, and nor did it seem intended for the purpose of helping a Tribunal to decide on 
an asylum claims.  A field report by Refugees International (2008) was quoted out of 
context, and used to support the ‘sameness’ argument while in fact it argued the 
stateless were treated with discrimination based on their status of statelessness.  On 
the other hand, the US Department of State (2010) information was used to support a 
claim of  ‘difference,’ but it did so by claiming that the Kuwaiti stateless community 
is Iraqi.  If this line of argument was developed fully, it would substantiate that the 
stateless in Kuwait are culturally distinct, but are nevertheless unwelcome foreigners. 
Even the Kuwait government acknowledges that there are stateless populations in 
Kuwait of Kuwaiti descent (Kuwait Government Response to Human Rights Watch 
2011).  It is also well-established that many stateless Kuwaitis were left trapped in 
Iraq and unable to return to Kuwait as a result of the Iraqi invasion (al Najjar 2001). 
 
The authors of Country Advice KWT39495, having elaborated on the Refugees 
International evidence (2007) but not the UK OGN (2009) evidence, appeared to 
favour the American viewpoint that would lead to a negative decision on asylum 
claims.  Had the authors of the Country Advice checked with the sources for the UK 
Home Office Operational Guidance Note (2009) (that is said did not elaborate further) 
it would have found there was ample evidence available to counter the American 
views expressed in the Country Advice.  In BA and others UKIAT [2004] 00256 CG, 
expert witness Dr Abbas Shiblak addressed in detail the issue of stateless people in 
Kuwait being Iraqis.  He soundly refuted the claim, making reference to the change in 
composition and numbers of stateless Kuwaitis in the population over time which he 
argued, justifies the diverse cultural heritage that is shared by Kuwaiti citizens with 
others across the Gulf and the Middle East.   
 
It is not known how the Country Advices are constructed or how evidence is 
evaluated and selected for inclusion.  One wonders then, why the opinion of the UK 
Home Office (OGN 2009) was not explored more thoroughly when it supported the 
claims of stateless Kuwaitis to asylum.  Ten years on from al-Kateb v Godwin and 
Ors [2004] HCA 37, it appears little has been learned in Australia about the 
protections that all stateless people are provided under International Law, whoever 
they are, and wherever they are from. After an update on Country Advices was 
recommended during the 2013 Australian federal election campaign in order to reduce 
the number of positive Iranian refugee determinations  (Hawley, S and Norman, J 
2013), the Australian Country Advices on Kuwait were removed from the Australian 
Migration Review and the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal website.  There was a 
message on the website requesting inquiries about the Advices to be emailed to the 
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  Tribunal.  The Tribunal did not respond to my email requesting a copy of the previous 
advices and a copy of any new advices being used by the Tribunal. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite the success of the al Kateb case (al-Kateb v Godwin and Ors (2004) HCA 
37), which remains a landmark case in Australian immigration law, Australia has 
failed to develop law on statelessness and asylum seekers  who continue to languish 
in detention or in the community with unresolved cases.  There are two main reasons 
why cases are not being resolved.  The first is due to the lack of a statelessness 
implementation procedure with which Australia can apply protections under the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954). The second reason is 
that stateless persons’ claims for asylum are often unsuccessful under the ‘well-
founded fear’ test, according to the definition in the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (1951).  The Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
(1954) is designed to address the special context of stateless persons under 
international law.  Where stateless persons cannot access this Convention (as is 
currently the case under Australian law), the applicant and legal counsel are made to 
‘fit’ their case into the alternate Convention.  Australian Country Advices provide 
information for the Migration Review Tribunal and the Refugee Review Tribunal, 
which is used to determine refugee claims for all applicants, stateless, refugees or 
both. 
 
A close reading of a Country Advice KWT39495 on Kuwaiti statelessness found that 
two different arguments emerged from the sources that could influence decision-
making on asylum claims where stateless applicants apply for protection as refugees 
on appeal.  It was found that not only is there is an urgent need for Australian 
authorities to update and publish new Country Advices but there is also a need for the 
quality of evidence used in the advices to be reviewed. Since writing this paper, the 
Australian Country Advices have been removed from the Australian Migration 
Review and Refugee Review Tribunal website. As yet, they have not been replaced.  
One wonders what new Advices are being used by the Tribunal, if any.  This is an 
unsatisfactory situation ten years after the success of Al-Kateb v Godwin and Ors 
(2004) HCA 37.   
 
 
For M. M. al Anezi. 
 
Thank you 
Marina Lever your for assistance editing this work. 
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The Effects of Social Capital and Culture on Economic Outcomes 
Abstract 
Traditional economic variables have ignored social capital and culture until recently. The role of 
culture and the development of social capital may explain variations in economic outcomes that 
differ from institutions. This article reviews recent works that sought to identify social capital 
and culture and its influence on economic outcomes. The author further discusses the questions, 
“How can social capital be measured?” and “How does one place value on culture?” 
Introduction 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the information age is its relation to economic 
development – with its diversified global networks, increased interconnectedness, and their 
overall impact on a country’s economic stability (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). As any 
research on the subject would recommend, we must identify the instruments of change in such 
cases, especially if they have a direct influence on consumer behavior, their preferences and 
constraints (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). In doing so, it becomes necessary to include these 
instruments in our research to avoid neglecting one or more variables which possibly propel such 
changes in the first place (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011).  
Until recently, however, a large majority of economists have spoken against the role of culture 
and social capital in the economy, with many going as far as eliminating them from the equation 
completely (Kwon & Arenius, 2010). Much of this has to do with the lack of empirical evidence 
confirming the causality between economic growth and cultural traditions, and the difficulty in 
assessing the extent to which culture and social capital influence economic trends 
(Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Another cause for concern is the possibility that there could 
be factors other than culture responsible for variations in economic output – factors that may not 
necessarily be bound by culture, but rather by political triggers and foreign relations (Portes & 
Vickstrom, 2011). Subsequently, the case against cultural impact is further strengthened when 
culture is defined broadly as a system of beliefs, customs and practices which connect a group of 
people, without going into the specifics of what constitutes these preferences and values (Fehr & 
Hoff, 2011).  
Although the revival of culture in economic patterns is a relatively new area of research, it 
nevertheless takes after the writings of prominent sociologists and economists the likes of Max 
Weber and Werner Sombart (Arruñada, 2010). In his book titled ‘The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism’, for instance, Weber provides valuable insight into the socio-economic 
dimensions of religious thought and practices, delving into the dynamic behavior underlying 
financial institutions (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Contrary to popular assumption at the 
time, his research highlighted a dramatic boost in capitalism, following the spread of Calvinism – 
a religion that advocated the principles of asceticism (Arruñada, 2010). According to the study, 
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Calvinism inadvertently contributed to the economy as followers, in their attempt to abide by the 
laws of religion, reinvested much of their profits into work instead of spending it in the way of 
luxury (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). The research conclusively suggested a strong 
correlation between culture and economic activity, as seen from the enormous influence religious 
ideology had over personal financial decisions, which ultimately determined savings and interest 
rate, among other equally important economic factors (Arruñada, 2010).  
Suffice it to say, Weber’s theory paved way for further research into the role of culture in 
business and economics, especially by neo-classical analysts who, in recent studies, have raised 
significant questions concerning the constant undermining of social capital and culture – 
variables that are arguably crucial to economic progress (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). 
Interestingly enough, the deeper we delve into the world of economics, the more we are likely to 
notice that certain factors are largely downplayed possibly due to their intangibility, which 
makes them financially worthless on paper – albeit incredibly profitable in terms of their 
causality (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). The failure to address this issue is most 
commonly associated with the clash of behavioral economics with pure economics, with the 
former using a methodology more in keeping with the humanities, and the latter following the 
sciences in terms of empirical testing (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). This is presumably why a 
number of economists refuse to consider social capital and culture in the context of economic 
growth, for though they may understand how it contributes to the economy at large, they 
nevertheless remain unconvinced by the scientifically weak data frequently provided to confirm 
the hypothesis (Casey & Dustmann, 2010).  
Another reason why many economists dismiss the importance of these variables is because the 
surveys taken into account are largely unsuccessful in actually capturing a direct correlation 
between culture and economic outcomes (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). They tend to focus simply on 
the effect one has over another – an argument that can also be used alternatively to disprove the 
proposition (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). To take an example, Weber indicated the effect of 
culture on economic activity, illustrating how Calvinism shaped the “spirit of capitalism”; yet 
many questioned the legitimacy of his claim, including Karl Marx, who attributed the surge of 
capitalism solely to the Industrial Revolution, rather than the spread of any particular religion 
(Arruñada, 2010). In doing so, the debate was ultimately reduced to the age-old question: what 
comes first – the chicken or the egg? (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). While Marx accepted 
the Weberian theory to the extent that he agreed with religion actively propagating a capitalist 
agenda, he differed on the grounds of causality, claiming that religion was essentially a 
byproduct – rather than the cause – of economic progress (Arruñada, 2010).  
To maintain the validity of our research, we must explore all the possibilities when trying to 
identify where exactly culture stands in an economic setting – regardless of its impact on the 
economy (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). Were we to accept, for a moment, that it has no substantial 
effect on economic outcomes, there would remain, still, the question of its causality, and the fact 
that consumer behavior ultimately comes down to predetermined beliefs, values and preferences 
– all of which are molded, to some degree, by culture (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). With that in 
mind, it becomes easy to recognize the overwhelming influence culture has on the equilibrium in 
the long-run, particularly when it comes to determining a country’s fiscal policy (Herrmann-
Pillath, 2010). Perhaps what is required most from academics in this field is a close reevaluation 
of culture and economics – this time adopting a narrower definition of culture – so that economic 
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shifts are understood in the context of specific socio-cultural mechanisms that are necessarily 
passed on from generation to generation, as opposed to individualist preferences that can 
otherwise be altered through geographical or environmental changes (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). 
By narrowing the scope of culture, therefore, the correlation can be assessed more effectively in 
terms of what does (and does not) have a direct impact on the economy, and we may thus gain 
insight into culture as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, making it easier to determine the value 
of social capital in a broader economic spectrum (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). 
Defining Culture 
When discussing culture, specifically in terms of economic development, it is imperative that we 
specify exactly what is meant by a shared system of beliefs and preferences, for the purpose of 
clear examination (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). It is worth noting that the argument against cultural 
impact is usually justified when the term ‘culture’ is used interchangeably with collective values 
and beliefs, when it clearly goes well beyond the stated definition to include “the norms of 
behavior derived from that set of values” (Gorodnichenko & Roland 2010: 1). In order to refine 
our analysis, therefore, we must explore the reasons why certain norms of behavior exert a 
greater influence on formal institutions and economic patterns, and how they remain unchanged 
when transmitted to future generations, despite the political prowess of globalization (Thornton, 
Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). 
Since, by definition, culture encompasses a set of beliefs and values shared by a collective, it is 
crucial to determine what causes these values to endure, especially when they go far beyond the 
point of being effective or practical (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). In addition, culture works as a 
socio-economic tool which, aside from conditioning and socializing entire generations, is used 
consciously to market potentially profitable ideas, thereby furthering consumerism and adding 
fuel to the economic fire (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Subsequently, every social or 
political movement is, by and large, culturally-inspired, regardless of the part it plays in formal 
institutions (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Underlying these large-scale socio-politico mechanisms is 
a fundamental pattern of behavior which is studied closely to predict sales, spending, savings and 
price (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). In other words, these factors are inextricably linked to 
the economy, which is perhaps one of many reasons why economic super powers such as the 
United States are populated by an array of ethnicities, concurrently reaping the monetary benefits 
of cultural diversity (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). In many ways, the 
homogeneity of globalization also adds considerably to the livelihood of culture, recreating 
aspects of the phenomenon to pave way for other, more profitable ones – for instance, what we 
usually refer to as ‘pop culture’ or ‘youth culture’ (Dockery, 2010).  
It is equally important to consider the different dimensions of culture with respect to causal 
connections; that is to say, certain ‘connectors’ must be identified which weave values and 
preferences into the very fabric of the economy (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). To take an example, we 
know that personality traits influence consumer behavior – but do they also determine culture, or 
do cultural differences give birth to these personality traits? Moreover, variables that connect 
values and preferences to the local economy must be explored in relation to their social, religious 
and national affinity, so we may measure and compare their effect on other economies to make 
for a more concrete analysis (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Evidently, defining culture is of immense 
significance in the analysis due, in large part, to its expansiveness – which explains why the 
channels through which it enters the economy are so difficult to detect (Dockery, 2010). 
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While several sociologists and economists have written extensively on the matter, including 
Adam Smith who published “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” in 1759, there has been little to 
no discussion on how culture contributes to the economy until the recent resurgence of 
behavioral economics in the social sciences. This is not to say that economists do not accept the 
role of culture in the economy, but they find the relationship between the two rather vague, 
trivial and irrelevant, owing primarily to the untestable hypothesis suggested by those in favor of 
the proposition (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). To maintain the standard of our research, therefore, 
we will analyze the various shades of culture and cross-examine its impact on policy-making in 
light of recent macroeconomic trends (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 
Culture and the Economy 
By focusing on specific aspects of culture – for instance, its social, religious and national 
affiliation – the scope of cultural impact can be evaluated more effectively in terms of a 
country’s national identity (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). Although culture is not necessarily bound 
by these parameters, they are there to help us trace the channels through which it seeps into 
economic paradigms (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). We must keep in mind that culture manifests in 
the form of behavior and, as a result, it takes an inevitable toll on social institutions such as 
family, politics, the media, education and religion – rather than being influenced by them 
(Herrmann-Pillath, 2010).  
Building on this theory, recent works in socio-economic research have detected a discernible 
causality between the structure of family and the division (and participation) of labor – a pattern 
of behavior that is exclusive to certain cultures (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). This is where personal 
preferences and values come into play, determining what ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ to be in the 
public and private spheres of human life (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political 
participation, 2011). Similarly, religious practices that play an important part in social 
convention reflect deep-rooted cultural attitudes stemming from a history of inter-generational 
transmission (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). In this case, the focus of our research is not the 
practices per se, but the reasons behind adhering to these practices – namely, the norms – and 
what sustains them (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). This is because cultural attitudes toward 
religion, much like those toward the institution of family, have powerful implications on political 
values and preferences which, in turn, govern policy-making and economic decisions (Arruñada, 
2010).  
As a consequence, political leaders are known to publicize specific aspects of their cultural 
preferences – preferences that would presumably appeal to a larger segment of the population, 
especially around the time of election or popularity surveys (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). To a large 
degree, this determines the country’s foreign relations, depending on the political attitude toward 
other nation-states, which, in the long-run, leaves a massive impact on foreign trade 
(Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). While it is relatively easy to detect political undertones in 
economic outcomes, it is equally important to study how culture shapes these political opinions 
(Arruñada, 2010). The left-wing and right-wing division, for instance, is a classic example of 
cultural differences manifesting in the political arena (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and 
political participation, 2011). Moreover, decisions pertaining to human rights, immigration, 
religious plurality, secularism or globalism are ultimately formed by a philosophy born out of a 
cultural foreground (Miller & Timothy, 2010). What adds to the legitimacy of this assumption is 
that these patterns are evident in several economies operating worldwide, thus making it easier 
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for us to assess their functionality and causal connections in terms of a global pattern dominating 
the economic industry (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011).  
In their extensive research concerning the socio-economic dimensions of the family structure, 
Alesina and Giuliano (2011) discuss the history of such correlations with reference to the 
Industrial Revolution. The reiteration of the perfect nuclear family, for one, reflects the cultural 
indoctrination of certain family values which were propagated specifically to influence financial 
planning (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the family, 2010). In addition, the stereotypical 
chores inculcated within this nuclear family were very much reminiscent of gender roles playing 
a part in the labor market – with the husband fulfilling his obligation as the bread-winner, the 
wife performing her duties as the obedient house-wife and the children (preferably two, a boy 
and a girl) taking inspiration from their parents to continue the cycle for future generations 
(Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). In this regard, family as a social institution has always contributed to 
the economy in some way, regardless of whether it exists as a response to the changing economic 
situation or, conversely, as a trigger for those changes (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the 
family, 2010). Ultimately, it sustains economic progress by constantly evolving to suit its ever-
increasing demands – even if it calls for more or less geographical mobility, or a complete re-
structuring of the family unit altogether (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political 
participation, 2011). We can see this from the fact that the nuclear family, despite existing as a 
traditional norm, is often replaced with several alternatives owing to a shift in cultural attitudes. 
Restructuring in the form of single-parent families or cohabitation, for instance, leads to a rise or 
fall in taxes and property distribution, especially in the face a recession (Alesina, Ichino, & 
Karabarbounis, Gender-based taxation and the division of family chores, 2011).  
Cultural shifts have also left long-standing changes in the economic system, such as the demand 
for gender equality which eventually gave birth to the Equal Rights Act, or the rise of feminism 
which paved way greater female employment (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the family, 
2010). In particular, social movements revolving around women’s emancipation have spurred 
from the reinforcement of such norms in the form of a backlash – feminism, for instance, was a 
cultural aftermath of the supposedly ‘perfect’ nuclear family (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties 
and political participation, 2011). Consequently, a change in cultural attitudes always comes with 
its own set of pros and cons which affect the economy. While not all cultural trends contribute to 
the economic climate positively, they nevertheless create a ripple affect, which causes variation 
in economic outcomes (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the family, 2010).  
While studying the relationship between family and the economy, it would aid our analysis to 
explore the relationships within the family structure, which tend to determine the course of 
economic planning (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political participation, 2011). 
According to recent studies, it was reported that families that do not maintain strong links with 
its members are likely to form weak community ties and express skepticism in the workplace 
(Fehr & Hoff, 2011). As a result, this eventually translates into lack of economic cooperation and 
trust which reduces the chances of their involvement with the outside world (Eagle, Macy, & 
Claxton, 2010). A strong family unit, on the other hand, is likely to encourage a more pre-
defined system of roles and boost labor division, especially with the woman partaking in home 
production, and the man focused on paying the bills (Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis, Gender-
based taxation and the division of family chores, 2011). Subsequently, more time is spent 
together at home which leads to greater fertility rates and consumption (Alesina & Giuliano, The 
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power of the family, 2010). In doing so, these social conditions enable the economy to move 
forward by raising the employment rate, boosting sales, and – by virtue of its ‘normalcy’ – 
ensuring that the cycle is sustained through their children so they do not have to face the threat of 
social ostracism (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political participation, 2011). 
It is interesting to consider, at this point, the cultural conditioning reinforced in schools through 
formal education (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). The process is amplified through 
the reiteration of what ‘is’ and ‘is not’ acceptable in society in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ 
behavior, with an entire curriculum that instructs the youth how to walk, talk, sit and stand – all 
of which are aligned with the predetermined lifestyle they are to have once they graduate and 
enter ‘the real world’ (Tabellini, 2010). When teenagers yearn for a sense of independence and 
adulthood in a typical Western society, they are encouraged to work part-time, which 
inadvertently affects the economy through the provision of cheap labor (Lauer, Wilkinson, Yan, 
Sin, & Tsang, 2012).  
With no substantial qualifications and virtually no professional experience at such a young age, 
many find themselves working in fast-food chains such as McDonald’s, which are known for 
their low wages and lack of social security (Lauer, Wilkinson, Yan, Sin, & Tsang, 2012). In their 
attempt to be financially independent, however, teenagers continually explore these avenues, 
unfazed by the exploitation they are subjected to, which ultimately surfaces as a seemingly win-
win situation for them (Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis, Gender-based taxation and the 
division of family chores, 2011). The predominance of this culture and its influence on the young 
masses is a testament to the close connection between economic progress and the desire to be 
accepted by society (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 	  
It is no coincidence that the approval so fervently sought after by society at large is, in fact, tied 
closely to its dependence on the economy – whether social aspirations include a successful 
career, a stable marriage, a happy family or spiritual fulfillment through God (Thornton, Ribeiro-
Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). To that end, they are all motivated by cultural attitudes and coincide 
with the fundamental functions of one or more social institution(s) (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). One 
may argue that cultures driven by religion are not necessarily compounded by economic triggers, 
but the suggestion is highly debatable (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). As we can see from the 
Weberian-Marxist conflict, it is likely to turn into a debate about reverse causality more than 
anything else; though we cannot deny that religion, despite opposing materialism, may still 
inadvertently boost economic activity, as proven clearly in Weber’s research regarding 
Calvinism (Arruñada, 2010). To a large extent, religious ideology superimposes a system of 
beliefs which determine consumption and spending – with many aiming to redistribute wealth 
and resources for a more egalitarian society (Miller & Timothy, 2010). While this may appear to 
be the case on paper, many religions are successfully manipulated and used intentionally (or 
unintentionally) to further inequality and create circumstances where the poor stay poor and the 
rich get richer (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). This is very much in keeping with the Marxist 
perspective which explains the role of religion in the context of a ‘constant class struggle’ 
perpetuated by cultural indoctrination (Arruñada, 2010). 	  
The emphasis on charity and alms-giving in monotheistic religions is an excellent case in point 
which reflects the intermingling of religion and economic distribution for the purpose of welfare 
and social security (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Whether or not there is truth in these 
doctrines is another debate; our job as researchers is to identify the norms derived from these 
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doctrines, and observe how they influence economic output (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). It is worth 
taking into consideration, for instance, that many non-practicing believers maintain the values 
and preferences put forth by their by-birth religion, making financial decisions based on the 
cultural mindset born from their endogenous beliefs (Arruñada, 2010). In their research 
concerning the economic dimensions of religious discourse, Heinemann and Schneider (2011) 
shed light on the close relationship between religious values and public views on taxation. By 
recalling Jesus’ words in The Gospel of Matthew, the research delves into the workings of 
secular tax laws in light of religious morale: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and 
render to God the things that are God’s” (22:21). This is not to say that the economy operates 
through a strictly secularist ideology, but that there is a strong religious foundation behind the 
general consensus on tax evasion, and the political regulation of tax laws (Heinemann & 
Schneider, 2011). As the study closes in on different religious denominations and faiths from 
Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, the authors identify a strong correlation 
between religious views on the redistribution of wealth and political sentiments toward tax 
regulation (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). 
The deeper we delve into the power and influence of social institutions, the greater our chances 
of understanding the role of culture in economics (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). This is because, as we 
study the social mechanisms behind policy-making and preferences, we come to recognize the 
cultural patterns which prompt and sustain these social institutions (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 
2010). Once it is established that culture and social institutions work together to affect economic 
outcomes, it becomes easier to identify the areas where they are most effective in the economy. 
Defining Social Capital 
With many economists now expressing a renewed interest in cultural diversity and economic 
progress, there are growing concerns about the clash of different cultures and the question of 
what keeps them intact, especially considering the homogeneity of globalization. Having 
discussed the socio-economic dimensions of culture in social institutions, it is important for us to 
highlight how cultural norms are propagated, aside from their constant reinforcement and the 
social conditioning process (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). This is where social 
capital comes into play – described most commonly as the interconnectedness of large-scale 
social networks and their advantage to business and the economy as they enable social 
interaction without incurring the costs of geographical mobility (Kwon & Arenius, 2010). In this 
age of technological innovation, we must keep in mind that the nature and scope of social capital 
is constantly evolving (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). Networks are expanding not only in a social 
and physical sense, but also in the cyber-world as they continue to transcend spatial boundaries 
(Cassar & Wydick, 2010). The argument surrounding this phenomenon is usually one concerning 
the value of these far-reaching networks and the role they play in society, given their intangible 
benefits in economic transactions (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010).  
Often interpreted as an active agent for ‘civic engagement’, social capital is specifically 
discussed in terms of its community-building advantages and the value of this communion in 
terms of information transmission (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). There have been 
a variety of perspectives on the relevance and functions of this phenomenon, with insightful 
research provided by sociologists the likes of Pierre Bourdieu, James S. Coleman and political 
scientist, Robert Putnam, just to name a few (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). By maintaining 
relationships based on mutual trust and cooperation, social capital is known to provide a full-
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fledged service free of cost, becoming the central focus in organizational behavior (Portes & 
Vickstrom, 2011). In the context of culture and economic growth, social capital is a tool used 
primarily to foster social relations which would otherwise require extensive resources and 
considerable finance (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). In its broadest sense, Thornton et al. 
(2011: 107) elaborate on the purpose and value of social capital by surmising that “[Social] 
networks are also a set of relationships that can define the perception of a community, whether a 
business community or a more general notion of community in society. Thus, society, in the 
abstract sense, is a series of connected or ‘tied’ nodes”. In light of this definition, we can assess 
that there is a social embeddedness in networks that qualify as a significant economic resource in 
its own right – a resource worth significantly more than economists give it credit for (Portes & 
Vickstrom, 2011). Access to entrepreneurial ideas, knowledge and important contacts are just 
some of the infinite possibilities offered by social capital, which in turn generate astronomical 
profits in any given economic venture (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). Although 
the nature of these universal relationships may obstruct the exclusivity of information made 
available by social networks, it is only a minor drawback measured against the general 
resourcefulness it provides (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). In this regard, social capital is arguably the 
most important channel for culture to influence economic outcomes, seeing as both are 
undermined in light of globalization and tangible resources (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 
This helps us understand why economies around the world differ on the grounds of causality – 
some quietly reaping the monetary benefits of social capital and culture without as much as 
counting them as economic variables, while others, in their attempt to follow suit, ignore these 
variables entirely, thus depriving themselves of their advantages (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). 
Culture Valuation and Social Capital Measurement 
Once we come to accept the significance of culture and social capital in an economic 
environment, we can attempt to quantify them as we would any intellectual property in business 
(Noruzi & Vargas-Hernández, 2010). As discussed above, there is a definite overlap between 
culture and social institutions wherein economists include the latter in their research but often 
fail to consider the former due, in large part, to its intangibility (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). 
Nevertheless, owing to the close relationship between the two, it is safe to assume that the 
financial and political investment in social institutions goes a long way to reflect the monetary 
worth of cultural traditions – traditions which are essentially passed on to future generations 
through these very mediums (Ortiz, 2011). While there are a number of valuation techniques 
often suggested by economists, it is imperative that we take into account the context of cultural 
transmission before applying a particular technique (Noruzi & Vargas-Hernández, 2010). 
Without considering the context of an intangible resource or asset, Ortiz (2011) argues that the 
value attached to culture may be grossly inaccurate since much of it is determined by the 
perception and feelings of a given society.  
Similarly, measuring social capital too can be tricky, given how intricately social 
networks are connected vis-à-vis technology, globalism, culture and social relations 
(Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). It must also be noted that one of the fundamental reasons 
why, both, culture and social capital are difficult to quantify or measure is because of the 
heterogeneity of their definitions (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). Consequently, it works as a 
chain reaction – that is to say, if they are defined with blurred boundaries, unconfined to a 
specific or distinct position, there is no doubt that quantifying the phenomena would be 
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ineffective (Ortiz, 2011). If, however, we are to narrow down our definition of social capital to 
individuals and organizations alone, then our measurement can be assessed in terms of tangible 
assets such as membership to social networks, number of contacts, time taken to exchange 
information, etc. As we take note of these variables, depending on their priority and purpose, it 
can become relatively easier to measure the value of social capital in terms of a unitary – rather 
than isolated – component (Ortiz, 2011). 
Conclusion  
While there is still a long way to go before economists can agree upon a standard methodology 
to measure social capital and place value on culture, there has been considerable progress in 
recent times. Perhaps if these variables were taken into greater consideration prior to the renewed 
interest, there would be richer empirical data available to refine our analysis for quantification 
and measurement. We must keep in mind that, aside from playing a major role in determining 
economic outcomes, social capital and culture are also key players in the information age – with 
their outstanding contributions in the knowledge economy and globalization. That, alone, should 
remain reason enough for academics in the field to consider its relevance in economic 
paradigms. It is stifling to know that, despite the groundbreaking research into the matter by 
anthropologists and economists alike, there remains an unresolved debate concerning cultural 
prevalence in the world of economics. Taking into account the enormity of cultural impact on 
social institutions (which inevitably affect economic outcomes), it is worth considering how 
much capital would go into creating, recreating and sustaining culture in an effort to alter social 
norms in accordance with economic shifts. Conclusively, the research suggests an overwhelming 
possibility that, together, these variables are perhaps worth more than economies can afford. 
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Introduction 
One of the most fascinating aspects of the information age is its relation to economic 
development – with its diversified global networks, increased interconnectedness, and 
their overall impact on a country’s economic stability (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 
2010). As any research on the subject would recommend, we must identify the 
instruments of change in such cases, especially if they have a direct influence on 
consumer behavior, their preferences and constraints (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 
2010). In doing so, it becomes necessary to include these instruments in our research 
to avoid neglecting one or more variables which possibly propel such changes in the 
first place (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011).  
Until recently, however, a large majority of economists have spoken against the role 
of culture and social capital in the economy, with many going as far as eliminating 
them from the equation completely (Kwon & Arenius, 2010). Much of this has to do 
with the lack of empirical evidence confirming the causality between economic 
growth and cultural traditions, and the difficulty in assessing the extent to which 
culture and social capital influence economic trends (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 
2010). Another cause for concern is the possibility that there could be factors other 
than culture responsible for variations in economic output – factors that may not 
necessarily be bound by culture, but rather by political triggers and foreign relations 
(Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). Subsequently, the case against cultural impact is further 
strengthened when culture is defined broadly as a system of beliefs, customs and 
practices which connect a group of people, without going into the specifics of what 
constitutes these preferences and values (Fehr & Hoff, 2011).  
Although the revival of culture in economic patterns is a relatively new area of 
research, it nevertheless takes after the writings of prominent sociologists and 
economists the likes of Max Weber and Werner Sombart (Arruñada, 2010). In his 
book titled ‘The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism’, for instance, Weber 
provides valuable insight into the socio-economic dimensions of religious thought and 
practices, delving into the dynamic behavior underlying financial institutions 
(Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Contrary to popular assumption at the time, his 
research highlighted a dramatic boost in capitalism, following the spread of Calvinism 
– a religion that advocated the principles of asceticism (Arruñada, 2010). According 
to the study, Calvinism inadvertently contributed to the economy as followers, in their 
attempt to abide by the laws of religion, reinvested much of their profits into work 
instead of spending it in the way of luxury (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). The 
research conclusively suggested a strong correlation between culture and economic 
activity, as seen from the enormous influence religious ideology had over personal 
financial decisions, which ultimately determined savings and interest rate, among 
other equally important economic factors (Arruñada, 2010).  
Suffice it to say, Weber’s theory paved way for further research into the role of 
culture in business and economics, especially by neo-classical analysts who, in recent 
studies, have raised significant questions concerning the constant undermining of 
social capital and culture – variables that are arguably crucial to economic progress 
(Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). Interestingly enough, the deeper we delve into the 
world of economics, the more we are likely to notice that certain factors are largely 
downplayed possibly due to their intangibility, which makes them financially 
worthless on paper – albeit incredibly profitable in terms of their causality (Thornton, 
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Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). The failure to address this issue is most commonly 
associated with the clash of behavioral economics with pure economics, with the 
former using a methodology more in keeping with the humanities, and the latter 
following the sciences in terms of empirical testing (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). This is 
presumably why a number of economists refuse to consider social capital and culture 
in the context of economic growth, for though they may understand how it contributes 
to the economy at large, they nevertheless remain unconvinced by the scientifically 
weak data frequently provided to confirm the hypothesis (Casey & Dustmann, 2010).  
Another reason why many economists dismiss the importance of these variables is 
because the surveys taken into account are largely unsuccessful in actually capturing a 
direct correlation between culture and economic outcomes (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). 
They tend to focus simply on the effect one has over another – an argument that can 
also be used alternatively to disprove the proposition (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 
2010). To take an example, Weber indicated the effect of culture on economic 
activity, illustrating how Calvinism shaped the “spirit of capitalism”; yet many 
questioned the legitimacy of his claim, including Karl Marx, who attributed the surge 
of capitalism solely to the Industrial Revolution, rather than the spread of any 
particular religion (Arruñada, 2010). In doing so, the debate was ultimately reduced to 
the age-old question: what comes first – the chicken or the egg? (Gorodnichenko & 
Roland, 2010). While Marx accepted the Weberian theory to the extent that he agreed 
with religion actively propagating a capitalist agenda, he differed on the grounds of 
causality, claiming that religion was essentially a byproduct – rather than the cause – 
of economic progress (Arruñada, 2010).  
To maintain the validity of our research, we must explore all the possibilities when 
trying to identify where exactly culture stands in an economic setting – regardless of 
its impact on the economy (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). Were we to accept, for a 
moment, that it has no substantial effect on economic outcomes, there would remain, 
still, the question of its causality, and the fact that consumer behavior ultimately 
comes down to predetermined beliefs, values and preferences – all of which are 
molded, to some degree, by culture (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). With that in mind, it 
becomes easy to recognize the overwhelming influence culture has on the equilibrium 
in the long-run, particularly when it comes to determining a country’s fiscal policy 
(Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Perhaps what is required most from academics in this field 
is a close reevaluation of culture and economics – this time adopting a narrower 
definition of culture – so that economic shifts are understood in the context of specific 
socio-cultural mechanisms that are necessarily passed on from generation to 
generation, as opposed to individualist preferences that can otherwise be altered 
through geographical or environmental changes (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). By 
narrowing the scope of culture, therefore, the correlation can be assessed more 
effectively in terms of what does (and does not) have a direct impact on the economy, 
and we may thus gain insight into culture as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, 
making it easier to determine the value of social capital in a broader economic 
spectrum (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). 
Defining Culture 
When discussing culture, specifically in terms of economic development, it is 
imperative that we specify exactly what is meant by a shared system of beliefs and 
preferences, for the purpose of clear examination (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). It is worth 
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noting that the argument against cultural impact is usually justified when the term 
‘culture’ is used interchangeably with collective values and beliefs, when it clearly 
goes well beyond the stated definition to include “the norms of behavior derived from 
that set of values” (Gorodnichenko & Roland 2010: 1). In order to refine our analysis, 
therefore, we must explore the reasons why certain norms of behavior exert a greater 
influence on formal institutions and economic patterns, and how they remain 
unchanged when transmitted to future generations, despite the political prowess of 
globalization (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). 
Since, by definition, culture encompasses a set of beliefs and values shared by a 
collective, it is crucial to determine what causes these values to endure, especially 
when they go far beyond the point of being effective or practical (Herrmann-Pillath, 
2010). In addition, culture works as a socio-economic tool which, aside from 
conditioning and socializing entire generations, is used consciously to market 
potentially profitable ideas, thereby furthering consumerism and adding fuel to the 
economic fire (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Subsequently, every social or 
political movement is, by and large, culturally-inspired, regardless of the part it plays 
in formal institutions (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Underlying these large-scale socio-
politico mechanisms is a fundamental pattern of behavior which is studied closely to 
predict sales, spending, savings and price (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). In other 
words, these factors are inextricably linked to the economy, which is perhaps one of 
many reasons why economic super powers such as the United States are populated by 
an array of ethnicities, concurrently reaping the monetary benefits of cultural diversity 
(Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). In many ways, the homogeneity of 
globalization also adds considerably to the livelihood of culture, recreating aspects of 
the phenomenon to pave way for other, more profitable ones – for instance, what we 
usually refer to as ‘pop culture’ or ‘youth culture’ (Dockery, 2010).  
It is equally important to consider the different dimensions of culture with respect to 
causal connections; that is to say, certain ‘connectors’ must be identified which weave 
values and preferences into the very fabric of the economy (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). To 
take an example, we know that personality traits influence consumer behavior – but 
do they also determine culture, or do cultural differences give birth to these 
personality traits? Moreover, variables that connect values and preferences to the 
local economy must be explored in relation to their social, religious and national 
affinity, so we may measure and compare their effect on other economies to make for 
a more concrete analysis (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). Evidently, defining culture is of 
immense significance in the analysis due, in large part, to its expansiveness – which 
explains why the channels through which it enters the economy are so difficult to 
detect (Dockery, 2010). 
While several sociologists and economists have written extensively on the matter, 
including Adam Smith who published “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” in 1759, 
there has been little to no discussion on how culture contributes to the economy until 
the recent resurgence of behavioral economics in the social sciences. This is not to say 
that economists do not accept the role of culture in the economy, but they find the 
relationship between the two rather vague, trivial and irrelevant, owing primarily to 
the untestable hypothesis suggested by those in favor of the proposition (Casey & 
Dustmann, 2010). To maintain the standard of our research, therefore, we will analyze 
the various shades of culture and cross-examine its impact on policy-making in light 
of recent macroeconomic trends (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 
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Culture and the Economy 
By focusing on specific aspects of culture – for instance, its social, religious and 
national affiliation – the scope of cultural impact can be evaluated more effectively in 
terms of a country’s national identity (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). Although culture is 
not necessarily bound by these parameters, they are there to help us trace the channels 
through which it seeps into economic paradigms (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). We 
must keep in mind that culture manifests in the form of behavior and, as a result, it 
takes an inevitable toll on social institutions such as family, politics, the media, 
education and religion – rather than being influenced by them (Herrmann-Pillath, 
2010).  
Building on this theory, recent works in socio-economic research have detected a 
discernible causality between the structure of family and the division (and 
participation) of labor – a pattern of behavior that is exclusive to certain cultures 
(Fehr & Hoff, 2011). This is where personal preferences and values come into play, 
determining what ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ to be in the public and private spheres of 
human life (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political participation, 2011). 
Similarly, religious practices that play an important part in social convention reflect 
deep-rooted cultural attitudes stemming from a history of inter-generational 
transmission (Casey & Dustmann, 2010). In this case, the focus of our research is not 
the practices per se, but the reasons behind adhering to these practices – namely, the 
norms – and what sustains them (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). This is because 
cultural attitudes toward religion, much like those toward the institution of family, 
have powerful implications on political values and preferences which, in turn, govern 
policy-making and economic decisions (Arruñada, 2010).  
As a consequence, political leaders are known to publicize specific aspects of their 
cultural preferences – preferences that would presumably appeal to a larger segment 
of the population, especially around the time of election or popularity surveys 
(Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). To a large degree, this determines the country’s foreign 
relations, depending on the political attitude toward other nation-states, which, in the 
long-run, leaves a massive impact on foreign trade (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 
While it is relatively easy to detect political undertones in economic outcomes, it is 
equally important to study how culture shapes these political opinions (Arruñada, 
2010). The left-wing and right-wing division, for instance, is a classic example of 
cultural differences manifesting in the political arena (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties 
and political participation, 2011). Moreover, decisions pertaining to human rights, 
immigration, religious plurality, secularism or globalism are ultimately formed by a 
philosophy born out of a cultural foreground (Miller & Timothy, 2010). What adds to 
the legitimacy of this assumption is that these patterns are evident in several 
economies operating worldwide, thus making it easier for us to assess their 
functionality and causal connections in terms of a global pattern dominating the 
economic industry (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011).  
In their extensive research concerning the socio-economic dimensions of the family 
structure, Alesina and Giuliano (2011) discuss the history of such correlations with 
reference to the Industrial Revolution. The reiteration of the perfect nuclear family, 
for one, reflects the cultural indoctrination of certain family values which were 
propagated specifically to influence financial planning (Alesina & Giuliano, The 
power of the family, 2010). In addition, the stereotypical chores inculcated within this 
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nuclear family were very much reminiscent of gender roles playing a part in the labor 
market – with the husband fulfilling his obligation as the bread-winner, the wife 
performing her duties as the obedient house-wife and the children (preferably two, a 
boy and a girl) taking inspiration from their parents to continue the cycle for future 
generations (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010). In this regard, family as a social institution has 
always contributed to the economy in some way, regardless of whether it exists as a 
response to the changing economic situation or, conversely, as a trigger for those 
changes (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the family, 2010). Ultimately, it sustains 
economic progress by constantly evolving to suit its ever-increasing demands – even 
if it calls for more or less geographical mobility, or a complete re-structuring of the 
family unit altogether (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political participation, 
2011). We can see this from the fact that the nuclear family, despite existing as a 
traditional norm, is often replaced with several alternatives owing to a shift in cultural 
attitudes. Restructuring in the form of single-parent families or cohabitation, for 
instance, leads to a rise or fall in taxes and property distribution, especially in the face 
a recession (Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis, Gender-based taxation and the 
division of family chores, 2011).  
Cultural shifts have also left long-standing changes in the economic system, such as 
the demand for gender equality which eventually gave birth to the Equal Rights Act, 
or the rise of feminism which paved way greater female employment (Alesina & 
Giuliano, The power of the family, 2010). In particular, social movements revolving 
around women’s emancipation have spurred from the reinforcement of such norms in 
the form of a backlash – feminism, for instance, was a cultural aftermath of the 
supposedly ‘perfect’ nuclear family (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political 
participation, 2011). Consequently, a change in cultural attitudes always comes with 
its own set of pros and cons which affect the economy. While not all cultural trends 
contribute to the economic climate positively, they nevertheless create a ripple affect, 
which causes variation in economic outcomes (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the 
family, 2010).  
While studying the relationship between family and the economy, it would aid our 
analysis to explore the relationships within the family structure, which tend to 
determine the course of economic planning (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and 
political participation, 2011). According to recent studies, it was reported that families 
that do not maintain strong links with its members are likely to form weak community 
ties and express skepticism in the workplace (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). As a result, this 
eventually translates into lack of economic cooperation and trust which reduces the 
chances of their involvement with the outside world (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). 
A strong family unit, on the other hand, is likely to encourage a more pre-defined 
system of roles and boost labor division, especially with the woman partaking in 
home production, and the man focused on paying the bills (Alesina, Ichino, & 
Karabarbounis, Gender-based taxation and the division of family chores, 2011). 
Subsequently, more time is spent together at home which leads to greater fertility 
rates and consumption (Alesina & Giuliano, The power of the family, 2010). In doing 
so, these social conditions enable the economy to move forward by raising the 
employment rate, boosting sales, and – by virtue of its ‘normalcy’ – ensuring that the 
cycle is sustained through their children so they do not have to face the threat of 
social ostracism (Alesina & Giuliano, Family ties and political participation, 2011). 
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It is interesting to consider, at this point, the cultural conditioning reinforced in 
schools through formal education (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). The 
process is amplified through the reiteration of what ‘is’ and ‘is not’ acceptable in 
society in terms of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior, with an entire curriculum that instructs 
the youth how to walk, talk, sit and stand – all of which are aligned with the 
predetermined lifestyle they are to have once they graduate and enter ‘the real world’ 
(Tabellini, 2010). When teenagers yearn for a sense of independence and adulthood in 
a typical Western society, they are encouraged to work part-time, which inadvertently 
affects the economy through the provision of cheap labor (Lauer, Wilkinson, Yan, 
Sin, & Tsang, 2012).  
With no substantial qualifications and virtually no professional experience at such a 
young age, many find themselves working in fast-food chains such as McDonald’s, 
which are known for their low wages and lack of social security (Lauer, Wilkinson, 
Yan, Sin, & Tsang, 2012). In their attempt to be financially independent, however, 
teenagers continually explore these avenues, unfazed by the exploitation they are 
subjected to, which ultimately surfaces as a seemingly win-win situation for them 
(Alesina, Ichino, & Karabarbounis, Gender-based taxation and the division of family 
chores, 2011). The predominance of this culture and its influence on the young 
masses is a testament to the close connection between economic progress and the 
desire to be accepted by society (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 	  
It is no coincidence that the approval so fervently sought after by society at large is, in 
fact, tied closely to its dependence on the economy – whether social aspirations 
include a successful career, a stable marriage, a happy family or spiritual fulfillment 
through God (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). To that end, they are all 
motivated by cultural attitudes and coincide with the fundamental functions of one or 
more social institution(s) (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). One may argue that cultures driven by 
religion are not necessarily compounded by economic triggers, but the suggestion is 
highly debatable (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). As we can see from the Weberian-
Marxist conflict, it is likely to turn into a debate about reverse causality more than 
anything else; though we cannot deny that religion, despite opposing materialism, 
may still inadvertently boost economic activity, as proven clearly in Weber’s research 
regarding Calvinism (Arruñada, 2010). To a large extent, religious ideology 
superimposes a system of beliefs which determine consumption and spending – with 
many aiming to redistribute wealth and resources for a more egalitarian society 
(Miller & Timothy, 2010). While this may appear to be the case on paper, many 
religions are successfully manipulated and used intentionally (or unintentionally) to 
further inequality and create circumstances where the poor stay poor and the rich get 
richer (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). This is very much in keeping with the 
Marxist perspective which explains the role of religion in the context of a ‘constant 
class struggle’ perpetuated by cultural indoctrination (Arruñada, 2010). 	  
The emphasis on charity and alms-giving in monotheistic religions is an excellent 
case in point which reflects the intermingling of religion and economic distribution 
for the purpose of welfare and social security (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). 
Whether or not there is truth in these doctrines is another debate; our job as 
researchers is to identify the norms derived from these doctrines, and observe how 
they influence economic output (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). It is worth taking into 
consideration, for instance, that many non-practicing believers maintain the values 
and preferences put forth by their by-birth religion, making financial decisions based 
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on the cultural mindset born from their endogenous beliefs (Arruñada, 2010). In their 
research concerning the economic dimensions of religious discourse, Heinemann and 
Schneider (2011) shed light on the close relationship between religious values and 
public views on taxation. By recalling Jesus’ words in The Gospel of Matthew, the 
research delves into the workings of secular tax laws in light of religious morale: 
“Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and render to God the things that are 
God’s” (22:21). This is not to say that the economy operates through a strictly 
secularist ideology, but that there is a strong religious foundation behind the general 
consensus on tax evasion, and the political regulation of tax laws (Heinemann & 
Schneider, 2011). As the study closes in on different religious denominations and 
faiths from Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism, the authors 
identify a strong correlation between religious views on the redistribution of wealth 
and political sentiments toward tax regulation (Heinemann & Schneider, 2011). 
The deeper we delve into the power and influence of social institutions, the greater 
our chances of understanding the role of culture in economics (Fehr & Hoff, 2011). 
This is because, as we study the social mechanisms behind policy-making and 
preferences, we come to recognize the cultural patterns which prompt and sustain 
these social institutions (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). Once it is established that 
culture and social institutions work together to affect economic outcomes, it becomes 
easier to identify the areas where they are most effective in the economy. 
Defining Social Capital 
With many economists now expressing a renewed interest in cultural diversity and 
economic progress, there are growing concerns about the clash of different cultures 
and the question of what keeps them intact, especially considering the homogeneity of 
globalization. Having discussed the socio-economic dimensions of culture in social 
institutions, it is important for us to highlight how cultural norms are propagated, 
aside from their constant reinforcement and the social conditioning process 
(Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). This is where social capital comes into 
play – described most commonly as the interconnectedness of large-scale social 
networks and their advantage to business and the economy as they enable social 
interaction without incurring the costs of geographical mobility (Kwon & Arenius, 
2010). In this age of technological innovation, we must keep in mind that the nature 
and scope of social capital is constantly evolving (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). 
Networks are expanding not only in a social and physical sense, but also in the cyber-
world as they continue to transcend spatial boundaries (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). The 
argument surrounding this phenomenon is usually one concerning the value of these 
far-reaching networks and the role they play in society, given their intangible benefits 
in economic transactions (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010).  
Often interpreted as an active agent for ‘civic engagement’, social capital is 
specifically discussed in terms of its community-building advantages and the value of 
this communion in terms of information transmission (Thornton, Ribeiro-Sorian, & 
Urbano, 2011). There have been a variety of perspectives on the relevance and 
functions of this phenomenon, with insightful research provided by sociologists the 
likes of Pierre Bourdieu, James S. Coleman and political scientist, Robert Putnam, 
just to name a few (Portes & Vickstrom, 2011). By maintaining relationships based on 
mutual trust and cooperation, social capital is known to provide a full-fledged service 
free of cost, becoming the central focus in organizational behavior (Portes & 
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Vickstrom, 2011). In the context of culture and economic growth, social capital is a 
tool used primarily to foster social relations which would otherwise require extensive 
resources and considerable finance (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 2010). In its broadest 
sense, Thornton et al. (2011: 107) elaborate on the purpose and value of social capital 
by surmising that “[Social] networks are also a set of relationships that can define the 
perception of a community, whether a business community or a more general notion 
of community in society. Thus, society, in the abstract sense, is a series of connected 
or ‘tied’ nodes”. In light of this definition, we can assess that there is a social 
embeddedness in networks that qualify as a significant economic resource in its own 
right – a resource worth significantly more than economists give it credit for (Portes 
& Vickstrom, 2011). Access to entrepreneurial ideas, knowledge and important 
contacts are just some of the infinite possibilities offered by social capital, which in 
turn generate astronomical profits in any given economic venture (Thornton, Ribeiro-
Sorian, & Urbano, 2011). Although the nature of these universal relationships may 
obstruct the exclusivity of information made available by social networks, it is only a 
minor drawback measured against the general resourcefulness it provides (Cassar & 
Wydick, 2010). In this regard, social capital is arguably the most important channel 
for culture to influence economic outcomes, seeing as both are undermined in light of 
globalization and tangible resources (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). This helps us 
understand why economies around the world differ on the grounds of causality – 
some quietly reaping the monetary benefits of social capital and culture without as 
much as counting them as economic variables, while others, in their attempt to follow 
suit, ignore these variables entirely, thus depriving themselves of their advantages 
(Cassar & Wydick, 2010). 
Culture Valuation and Social Capital Measurement 
Once we come to accept the significance of culture and social capital in an economic 
environment, we can attempt to quantify them as we would any intellectual property 
in business (Noruzi & Vargas-Hernández, 2010). As discussed above, there is a 
definite overlap between culture and social institutions wherein economists include 
the latter in their research but often fail to consider the former due, in large part, to its 
intangibility (Cassar & Wydick, 2010). Nevertheless, owing to the close relationship 
between the two, it is safe to assume that the financial and political investment in 
social institutions goes a long way to reflect the monetary worth of cultural traditions 
– traditions which are essentially passed on to future generations through these very 
mediums (Ortiz, 2011). While there are a number of valuation techniques often 
suggested by economists, it is imperative that we take into account the context of 
cultural transmission before applying a particular technique (Noruzi & Vargas-
Hernández, 2010). Without considering the context of an intangible resource or asset, 
Ortiz (2011) argues that the value attached to culture may be grossly inaccurate since 
much of it is determined by the perception and feelings of a given society.  
Similarly, measuring social capital too can be tricky, given how intricately 
social networks are connected vis-à-vis technology, globalism, culture and social 
relations (Gorodnichenko & Roland, 2010). It must also be noted that one of the 
fundamental reasons why, both, culture and social capital are difficult to quantify or 
measure is because of the heterogeneity of their definitions (Eagle, Macy, & Claxton, 
2010). Consequently, it works as a chain reaction – that is to say, if they are defined 
with blurred boundaries, unconfined to a specific or distinct position, there is no doubt 
that quantifying the phenomena would be ineffective (Ortiz, 2011). If, however, we 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
161
 
 
are to narrow down our definition of social capital to individuals and organizations 
alone, then our measurement can be assessed in terms of tangible assets such as 
membership to social networks, number of contacts, time taken to exchange 
information, etc. As we take note of these variables, depending on their priority and 
purpose, it can become relatively easier to measure the value of social capital in terms 
of a unitary – rather than isolated – component (Ortiz, 2011). 
Conclusion  
While there is still a long way to go before economists can agree upon a standard 
methodology to measure social capital and place value on culture, there has been 
considerable progress in recent times. Perhaps if these variables were taken into 
greater consideration prior to the renewed interest, there would be richer empirical 
data available to refine our analysis for quantification and measurement. We must 
keep in mind that, aside from playing a major role in determining economic 
outcomes, social capital and culture are also key players in the information age – with 
their outstanding contributions in the knowledge economy and globalization. That, 
alone, should remain reason enough for academics in the field to consider its 
relevance in economic paradigms. It is stifling to know that, despite the 
groundbreaking research into the matter by anthropologists and economists alike, 
there remains an unresolved debate concerning cultural prevalence in the world of 
economics. Taking into account the enormity of cultural impact on social institutions 
(which inevitably affect economic outcomes), it is worth considering how much 
capital would go into creating, recreating and sustaining culture in an effort to alter 
social norms in accordance with economic shifts. Conclusively, the research suggests 
an overwhelming possibility that, together, these variables are perhaps worth more 
than economies can afford. 
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Abstract 
 
Nowadays the most important task of socio-economic development in Russia and the Siberian 
Federal District is sustainable economic growth as the basis for improving the standard and 
quality of life. It requires a dynamic and balanced development of all structural components in 
the regional economic system, which playing a leading role in enhancing the prospects for 
regional socio-economic development. 
At present, the regions of Russia form socio-economic development plans independently, in 
which the most important trends, competitive advantages, growth points and the main indicators 
of the region reflected. A strategy of social and economic development is the main vector 
economic evolution for the region. Today, the transition to innovative development of economy 
is impossible without effective strategic planning at the regional level of the Russia. 
The main purpose of the research is a complex estimation of socio-economic development plans 
on federal and regional level by the example of Russian Federation, the Far East, the Baikal 
region and Siberia. 
As a result of the research, we can conclude that:  
First, basic indicators of strategic socio-economic development plans of Far East, the Baikal 
region and Siberia are mostly corresponded with “The variant of accelerated growth”, which the 
forecast of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation for the period up to 
2030. 
Second, from the position of improving the existing methodology of strategic socio-economic 
development plans formation the monitoring of the management is the mostly appropriated. It 
should use elements strategic analysis, the results of which will be further regional development. 
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The most important task of contemporary socio-economic development of Russia and 
the Siberian Federal District, the Far East and the Baikal region is to ensure 
sustainable economic growth as the basis for improving the level and quality of life. 
This task requires a dynamic and balanced development of all structural components 
of the regional economic system, which playing a leading role in enhancing the 
prospects for regional socio-economic development. 
At present, the regions form socio-economic development strategies independently, in 
which reflect the most important trends, competitive advantages, growth points and 
the main indicators of the region. First of all socio-economic development strategy is 
the main vector for the regional economy. In many ways, the development strategy of 
the region characterizes the full potential of the region's economy and the possible 
risks associated with the implementation of this document in practice. Today, the 
transition to innovative development of economy is impossible without effective 
strategic planning at the level of the region of the Russian Federation. 
High-quality socio-economic region development forecasting is strictly connected 
with the development of major long-, medium- and short-term planning documents. 
There are many national, regional, municipal documents determining goals, objectives 
and directions of perspective development. Thus, in the system of region's strategic 
development documents in Russian Federation we can distinguish such documents as 
the strategy of socio-economic development, territorial planning schemes, annual 
regional budgets, indicative plans, government programs, regional target programs 
and investment programs, etc. 
The purpose of our research is to analyze strategies of socio-economic region 
development of the Far East, Siberia and Baikal region and to reveal methodological 
approaches to the study of socio-economic development. 
The main tasks are: 
• to define the features of the current process of strategic planning in Russian Far 
East, Siberia and Baikal region; 
• to identify the main criteria for regional classification by socio -economic status in 
Russian Far East, Siberia and Baikal region; 
• to typology regional socio-economic development strategies by the key points; 
• to compare regional socio-economic development indicators; 
• to recommend improving measures for the mechanism of regional socio-economic 
development formation; 
Stimulating economic growth and development in rural and economically lagging 
regions is the goal of several federal and state highway programs. 
The most important factor in ensuring the competitiveness of the Russian economy in 
modern conditions is the presence of the effectively functioning system of public 
strategic management. The system of public strategic management allows: 
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- building of long-term priorities of a state in socio-economic development, allowing 
private companies to reduce risks, including when making long-term investment 
decisions; 
- deploying of long-term solutions (with a period of implementation 7 or more years) 
in the range of medium-and short-term targets that are agreed upon among 
themselves;  
- balancing of planned actions that require significant organizational and resource 
costs (projects in energy, transportation, demographics, national security, in the field 
of human development); 
- orientating of national and municipal entities to operate in accordance with the 
established long-term goals;  
- linking solutions which were taken during the state of strategic management and 
budgetary constraints, that were determined both for medium-and long-term 
perspectives; 
- monitoring the implementation of decisions. 
The main problems being solved by the government when implementing the strategic 
planning are: 
- formation of strategic management systems; 
- development and monitoring for the implementation of the concept of the Russian 
Federation long-term socio-economic development; 
- monitoring for implementation of projects in the main areas of activities of the 
Russian Federation Government. 
As of today, activities aimed at overcoming the crisis in the economy have taken took 
on a strategic nature. In accordance with the instructions of the Government of the 
Russian Federation active work is being done on monitoring measures aimed at 
reviving the economy. 
Effective functioning of the strategic management system is especially important in 
the context of financial crisis and Federal budget deficit. Formation of the strategic 
management of the state will change the approach to the medium-term prognosis, link 
it to the prediction of long-term trends, will coordinate the development and 
implement the long-term development strategies and programs of the Russian 
Federation as a whole, as well as those of individual regions and sectors of the 
economy, and their mutual alignment of goals, deadlines and activities. In addition, 
this system involves the development of mechanisms of «performance management» 
or “result based management”, providing a clear connection between performance of 
public authorities and the budget allocated to their achievement [1]. 
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In our research we analyzed following national strategic documents: 
1. The concept of long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation 
for the period up to 2020 approved by the Federal Government on November 17, 
2008 № 1662- p; 
2. Strategy of socio-economic development of the Far East and the Baikal region for 
the period up to 2025, approved by the Federal Government on December 28, 2009 
number 2094- P; 
3. Strategy of socio- economic development of Siberia until 2020, approved by the 
Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation on July 5, 2010 number 1120- P; 
4. New Decrees of the President of the Russian Federation on May 7, 2012 number 
596 - 602 , 606 , in particular the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on 
May 7, 2012 № 596 «On the long-term national economic policies»; 
5. Forecast of long-term socio -economic development of the Russian Federation for 
the period up to 2030; 
6. Strategic documents of the Far East, Siberia and the Baikal region development. 
Considering the relation of the regions' strategic development documents and the 
federal Concept and Prognosis, we can argue that the concept of the Russian 
Federation is the basis of the forecast. Moreover, it determines the strategic goals, 
objectives and directions of economy development of Russia until 2020. The strategy 
of the Far East and the Baikal region and Siberia, as strategic planning documents are 
designed to implement the Russia’s concept of long-term socio-economic 
development for the period up to 2020. Accordingly, the strategy of Far East and 
Baikal Region, the strategy of Siberia concretize the mechanism of national goals and 
priorities at the regional level, identified by the Concept of the Russian Federation 
2020 and ensure coordination of strategies for social and economic development of 
the Russian Federation. In it's turn, socio-economic development program of any 
Siberian region identifies key areas, mechanisms and tools to achieve long-term goals 
of social and economic development in view of the national goals and objectives, 
strategic development priorities. It is identified in the Concept of the Russian 
Federation, the strategy of Far East and Baikal Region and the strategy of Siberia.  
The main Concept «Russia 2020» explores three scenarios for Russia’s economy 
development including inertial, energy and raw product-related and innovative ones. 
It is clear from the scenario names what they are based on. Target parameters set in 
the energy and raw products-based and innovative scenarios do not differ much. This 
significantly complicates choice between the two that set similar quantitative goals 
but are different in terms of required efforts. We will not discuss in detail the 
document (the full text of the Concept with appendices is available at the Ministry for 
Economic Development website), but only give an overview of some moot and 
doubtful points in it [2]. 
After the first decade of the transition period in Russia, a regional policy began to 
form. Strategic development planning of macroregions was considered one of its basic 
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tools. Currently a strategy for socio-economic development of the whole territory of 
Siberia, Far East and Baikal Region are being developed.  
The shift of the production principle to the market one in the socio-economic zoning 
of the country is natural when changing the model of economic relations, but the 
purpose of such zoning should be the development of regional and national economies 
rather than the interests of players in the global market. In accordance with the above, 
we should consider possible strategies of the socio-economic development of the 
Russian Siberia and Far East in terms of increasing dependence on external sources of 
prosperity. 
Today the basic approach to regional development is a reliance on large investment 
projects which should boost the development of the surrounding areas. Besides, there 
is a widely employed mechanism of public-private partnership associated with it.  
Territorial development is a widely used concept embracing a wide range of spatial 
processes. Here the concept of territorial development is focused on forming the 
infrastructure associated with the quality of life and the reproduction of human 
potential. From the set of indicators characterizing the level and quality of life, for the 
sake of brevity we have only chosen to present the result: public attitudes to the 
processes occurring in the territory, or to put it simply – whether people want to live 
in this territory or not [3]. 
Today’s elected officials often tout economic development as their first priority. 
However, although their words may sound the same, their meaning often varies. After 
all, “development” is a deceptively simple term for a remarkably diverse collection of 
strategies to stimulate private-sector investment. Indeed, development strategies are 
often responding to significantly different situations. Some rural communities, for 
example, continue to hemorrhage their historic job base of mining, farming, or low-
wage manufacturing, while others struggle with rapid growth that threatens to 
overwhelm traditional culture or destroy important natural amenities, or economic 
growth that fails to reach a broad spectrum of community residents. 
The different contexts lead to different strategies. Much has been written recently 
about those rural communities that have successfully transformed their economies 
amid the challenges of lost factories and farms. These success stories are mainly 
places with economic bases in retirement, recreation, and trade centers and those near 
urban areas [4]. 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
169
In the research we compared and ranked regions of the Far East and Siberia in terms 
of gross regional product.  
List of Far East and Siberia regions by GDP(billion rubles) 
№ Region 2010 2011 2012 place value place value place value 
1.  Krasnoyarsk Region 9 1108 10 1217,46 12 1256,03 
2.  Kemerovo Region 14 894,2 13 1177,18 16 1163,89 
3.  Omsk Region 21 568,8 20 716,76 21 796,4 
4.  Irkutsk Region 23 539,7 23 692,61 22 763 
5.  Sahalin Region 24 479,4 24 656,2 24 703,26 
6.  Novosibirsk Region 25 422,7 27 504,13 25 564,3 
7.  The Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) 29 381 30 484,09 31 526,79 
8.  Primorsky Region 37 327,8 35 418,27 35 433,46 
9.  Altay Region 34 332,4 37 398,25 38 415,37 
10.  Tomsk Region 42 286,5 41 341,2 40 381,48 
11.  Khabarovsk Region 39 307,7 40 343,72 41 373,16 
12.  Amur Region 59 133,7 58 183 57 197,61 
13.  The Republic of Khakassia 68 110,2 67 133,03 64 150,20 
14.  Trans-Baikal Region 67 111,1 68 132,94 65 149,17 
15.  The Republic of Buryatia 63 113,8 65 141,79 69 139,51 
16.  Kamchatka Region 69 86,3 71 91,32 71 104,68 
17.  Magadan Region 73 57,9 73 77,21 73 95,03 
18.  Chukotka Autonomous District 76 43,3 77 46,58 78 46,23 
19.  The Jewish Autonomous District 77 26 78 29,21 79 27,76 
20.  Altai Republic 79 18,4 80 23,86 81 22,62 
21.  The Republic of Tuva 80 16,7 81 18,11 82 19,41 
In 2012, in the majority of Russian regions the production of goods and services was 
increased. In 2011 the production of goods and services exceeded 1 trillion rubles in 
15 regions and 12 were in the range of 500 billion rubles up to $ 1 trillion rubles. 
Therefore, in 2012 the number increased to 16 and 15 subjects of the Russian 
Federation, respectively. Number of regions with low production of goods and 
services (less than 100 billion rubles per year) declined from 13 in 2011 to 12 in 2012.  
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The amount and growth rate of the total GRP by federal districts 
Against the background of the overall growth regional concentration of production of 
goods services remains high. About 50% of the total volume of goods and services 
produced in Russia accounted for 10 subjects of the Russian Federation.  
 
The total volume of industrial production and the rate of growth in federal 
districts 
 
Among the regions, we can identify Krasnoyarsk, Kemerovo, Omsk, Irkutsk, Sakhalin 
and the Novosibirsk region as the leaders of the Siberian federal district. 
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 Dynamics of production of aggregate GRP by federal districts 2011 - 2015 years 
Today strategic documents of Siberia and Far East are based on strategic analysis 
findings, which delve into the key problems, challenges and competitive advantages 
of territories. The analysis, the basis of the strategic vision and development models, 
outlined the following macro parameters: 
• World oil prices 
• Growth rate of high-tech industries in the Russian Federation 
• The date of Russia accession to the WTO 
• Unemployment rate in the region 
• GDP growth rate in Russia 
• Trends in taxes allocation comparing the centre with the regions of the Russian 
Federation 
• Trends in the population of territories. 
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 Basic principles of regional socio-economic strategic planning in Russia 
Priority economic sectors are tasked for special attention by Siberian and Far East 
Regions. The top priorities are information technology, biotechnology, education and 
research complex, the «new economy», and electrical engineering. The traditional 
priority for Siberian and Far East Regions is the oil and gas industry but is listed here 
as a second tier priority sector along with nuclear energy, food, and mechanical 
engineering. 
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 Goal pyramid proposed by the Strategy developers 
Siberian and Far East regions pay less attention to the development of these second 
priority industries. The third level priorities are the timber, gas and petrochemical 
industries, and agriculture. At the same time, strategic goals of Russian Far East and 
Siberia, specified in measurable objectives and supported by the system of indicators, 
are given as: 
• High level of entrepreneurial development 
• Efficient and balanced economy 
• High investment attractiveness 
• Highly internationalized economy 
• High quality human capital 
• Developed infrastructure 
• Rational use of natural capital 
• Good conditions for life, career, recreation and child education 
• High effectiveness of authorities. 
Integrated assessment and planning is a new methodological planning tool used by 
Russian regions. It proposes integration of socio-economic and environmental goals 
in the development process of a territory, and also close integration of the planning 
and assessment steps with sustainable development. 
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 Socio-economic development planning process 
The process of socio-economic planning includes the following elements: 
1. The terms of reference contains a more detailed description which was developed 
based on interviews with the planning process participants. 
2. Analysis of socio-economic and environmental situations. SWOT analysis of 
environmental development aspects for individual economic sectors was carried out in 
addition to analysis of socio-economic analysis performed by the Strategy developers. 
This helped to identify environmental impact and risks arising from the development 
of some industries. 
3. Strategy and consistency analyses The Strategy was analyzed to ensure the 
inclusion of all necessary elements of strategic planning. 
4. Objective led approach The Strategy was analyzed for compliance with 
recommended environmental and sustainable development goals of Far East and 
Siberian Regions. An objective led approach was useful. 
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Socio-economic development planning process 
Based on a range of priority socio-economic and sustainable development goals found 
in different regional documents, the relevant sustainable development goals were 
defined as: 
• Increasing of life quality 
• Conservation and development of the nature capital of the region 
• Creation of a green image for investment attractiveness 
• Environmental improvement 
• Stakeholder partnership development to address economic, environmental and social 
issues 
• Socio-economic development of the region based on “cohesive development” of the 
territories. Inequality between developed and less developed territories should not be 
increased, but, rather, equal opportunities for different social groups should be sought. 
• Human capital development. 
The objective led approach applied to both assessment of development aspects, such 
as priorities, goals and objectives in Strategies of Far East and Siberian regions, and 
assessment of processes and activities, such as found in the Programs of Far East and 
Siberian regions. 
Analysis of some industries for compliance with sustainable development principles, 
and identification of strategic impacts and risks for the environment, is an example of 
the former, while analysis of risks and impact of project implementation is an 
example of the latter [5]. 
Indicative planning is an important part of strategic planning. The system of 
indicative planning is defined as the forming process of an indicators system which 
characterizes economic development and stabilization efforts of social and economic 
processes implemented by a state in order to achieve these indicators.  
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The system of indicative management 
Socio-economic indicators are using in order to: 
• Estimate a socio-economic situation of the region, it’s industries, cities, 
districts, businesses; 
• define the standard of well-being (threshold level); 
• plan activities to achieve the threshold level ; 
• monitoring the achievement of expected results ; 
• adoption of regulatory actions; 
• evaluation of the state authorities activities and institutions of local 
governing 
Practically indicative planning is the creation of a Region’s economy strategy, its 
sectors, the social sphere, regional territories. Also it includes monitoring for the 
implementation of planned targets and encouraging businesses to follow indices of the 
regional indicative plan. 
The main elements of the indicative planning are: 
- A system of indicators at different levels; 
- The forecast of demand and supply of major services to the population , the supply 
of goods (works , services) for state and municipal needs (state and municipal order); 
- Socio-economic development forecasts for regions, sectors of the economy and the 
social sphere, cities and towns; 
- Regional and municipal budget planning; 
- Regional development target programs for economy sectors and social 
infrastructure; 
- Investment projects; 
- Indicative Plan of the regional economy, industry, local governments and 
businesses. 
There are specific planning systems for each level of strategic management. The 
elements of each planning level are linked to each other: 
1. Macro-planning is based on a system of indicators at the regional level. The results 
can be presented in the macro-planning projections, budgets, national programs and 
investment projects. This level of planning documents are developed and 
implemented by regional governments and municipalities. 
2. Mezo-planning is a planning of socio -economic development sectors, sub-sectors 
represented in the socio- economic projections industries sector programs developed 
and implemented by regional government.  
3. Spatial planning is reflected in the forecasts, budgets of local governments, the 
programs of social and economic development of the country (regions, cities, towns), 
action plans of local administrations, which together constitute the indicative plan of 
the district (city). The indicators of socio-economic development are the basis for the 
planning in industry, territorial districts and towns. 
4. Micro-planning is realized through the indicative plans and investment projects of 
economic entities. 
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Today the system of indicative management is based on the closed circuit scheme. 
1. Goal-setting stage; 
2. Planning of measurable results; 
3. Result-oriented budgeting, which provides development of the regional budget and 
state programs; 
4. The responsibility for the results conducts internal and external monitoring of the 
implementation of policy documents; 
5. Performance monitoring involves analyzing the socio-economic situation of the 
region and evaluation of the effectiveness of budget spending; 
6. Implementation management involves planning, public services calculating, state 
order development for the goods supply and cooperation agreements with 
municipalities and businesses. 
Indicative management system implemented in Russia is based on 5 levels: state, 
region, industry, city and businesses. 
 
The mechanism of formation socio-economic development programs according 
to the draft of federal law «About the state strategic planning» 
All levels are logically linked to each other through the system of indicators, which 
develop with the powers and functions assigned to the authorities. 
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Comparative analysis of basic strategic indicators 
Indicators 
  
Buryatia 
2020 Siberia 2020 
Far East and Baikal 
region 2025 
Russian Federation 
2020 
Indicators 
of The 
Republic of 
Buryatia 
Indicators 
of The Siberia 
Indicators 
of the Far East and 
the Baikal region 
Indicators of Russia 
  deviation  deviation  deviation 
GDP 152,9 - - 188,5 -35,6 106,9 46,0 
GDP per capita 152,1 115,9 36,1 185 -32,9 106,5 45,6 
Investments 161,2 109,4 51,8 110,4 - 113,9 47,3 
Average 
nominal 
monthly wage 
per employee 
151,6 121,6 30,0 149,3 2,3 108,7 43,0 
Real income of 
the population 96,0 108,6 -12,6 111,6 -15,6 108,6 -12,6 
Population with 
incomes below 
the subsistence 
minimum 
84,3 - - 39,1 45,2 50 34,3 
Tax and non-tax 
revenues 138,7 - - 170,1 - -  
the average 
value of the 
deviation,% 
  26,4  -17,0  33,9 
 
Analysis of the structure and quality of regional development strategies on the 
example of the Siberia, Far East and Baikal region testified as follows: 
1. All the regions have strategies of social and economic development. 
2. According to official information, all the regions have medium-term development 
program. 
3. All the regions of the Siberia and Far East have documents regulating the process 
of regional strategic planning. 
4. The structure of regional development strategies based on their characteristics in 
general can be represented, according to the essential elements of the draft federal law 
«About state strategic planning» and the required elements from the point of view of 
strategic management.  
5. Among the long-term strategies with the mission only 8 regions decided (chose) the 
long-term strategies with the mission (republics of Buryatia and Tuva, Kemerovo, 
Novosibirsk, Kamchatka, Primorsky, Amur and Sakhalin Region). The absence or 
slurred mission statement extremely limits region development. There are no regions 
with full PEST-analysis, because there are no guidelines in the «requirements of 
socio-economic development of the Russian Federation». Some elements of the 
PEST- analysis were used by regions like Tomsk, Altai, the Republic of Tuva, 
Kamchatka, Primorsky, Magadan regions and the Jewish Autonomous District. The 
use of PEST-analysis allows identifying force of impact and the causes of negative 
trends in economic development at the regional level for Siberia and Far East. PEST-
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analysis of the results will allow to develop various solutions to social and economic 
problems in the regions. 
6. SWOT-analysis were made by only 13 out of 21 regions of the Siberian Federal 
District. In three regions (Tomsk region, Altai and Khakassia Republic) there are 
some elements of the SWOT-analysis, for example, lists only competitive advantages, 
constraints, opportunities and potential risks, and the strengths and weaknesses of the 
regions are not represented . 
7. Phased update of development strategy allowing for the strategic management. 
Quality ranking list of Far East and Siberia region’s strategies 
Region 
Elements of strategies 
Finally 
According to federal law According to strategic management 
Sum 
ranking* Place 
Sum 
ranking* Place 
Sum 
ranking* Place 
Kamchatka Region 16 1 8 1 24 1 
Magadan Region 16 1 6 2 22 2 
Jewish Autonomous 
District 14 2 8 1 22 2 
Amur Region 14 2 4 4 18 3 
Republic of Tyva 10 4 5 3 15 4 
Chukotka 
Autonomous District 12 3 2 6 14 5 
Khabarovsk Region 10 4 4 4 14 5 
The Republic of 
Buryatia 10 4 4 4 14 5 
Primorsky Region 10 4 4 4 14 5 
Novosibirsk Region 8 6 5 3 13 6 
Zabaykalsky Region 9 5 3 5 12 7 
Kemerovo Region 8 6 4 4 12 7 
Tomsk Region 8 6 3 5 11 8 
Altay Region 6 8 5 3 11 8 
Sakhalin Region 8 6 2 6 10 9 
The Republic of 
Sakha (Yakutia) 8 6 2 6 10 9 
Altai Republic 8 6 2 6 10 9 
The Republic of 
Khakassia 7 7 1 7 8 10 
Krasnoyarsk Region 6 8 2 6 8 10 
Irkutsk Region 5 9 3 5 8 10 
Omsk Region 2 10 3 5 5 11 
Preliminary analysis of regional strategic documents formation showed the following 
problems: 
1) The formalism in the development of strategies, long-term and medium-term plans 
and programs (strict compliance with their standard layouts, often without regional 
specificity); 
2) Undue ambition, underestimation of region’s real opportunities; 
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3) The aspiration to include all possible projects and programs into the socio-
economic development frameworks of regions resulted in loss of document’s integrity 
(as well as difficulty to isolate the long-term regional  development priorities); 
4) Lack of clear goals and objectives in a number of strategies, the lack of 
development scenarios, the choice of strategic alternatives, elaboration of future 
development scenarios, etc. 
5) Most of the regional development strategies and long-term programs have an 
isolated character, interests and underestimate the competitive advantages of neighbor 
regions. 
6) Many of the regional strategies focused on production paying not enough attention 
the social factors. 
7) The scientific organizations of the Russian Academy of Sciences mostly do not 
participate in the development of regional strategies. 
8) At the federal, inter-regional and regional levels the necessary institutions (rules, 
regulations, procedures) and the institutional structures, specifically targeting the 
implementation of the main products of strategic planning are poorly developed. 
9) There is no need for quality information base and a special monitoring system for 
effective tracking system for strategic planning in the regions. The official regional 
statistics and the private information of the regional authorities do not match in some 
cases. 
10) The traditional problem is the lack and poor development work issues related to 
the mechanisms of the inter-regional and regional strategies, as well as monitoring 
and evaluation of the implementation and effectiveness of regional policies and 
programs. 
The results of the analysis of the structure and quality of regional development 
strategies led to the formation of the following recommendations to improve the 
strategic planning at the regional level: 
1. To use the basic elements of the strategy from the point of view of strategic 
management, such as the Mission, monitoring of strategies, PEST- and SWOT-
analysis. 
2. To include all elements of PEST- analysis into the socio-economic development 
strategy for a deeper analysis of the external environment of the region to have a clear 
idea of the political, social, technological and economic aspects of the region, which 
may affect the implementation of the strategy and the quality of its results. 
3. To develop a regional strategy, taking into account the interests and the competitive 
advantages of the neighbor regions. 
4. To provide the technological progress and accelerate the development of innovative 
economy. 
5. To monitor the implementation of regional strategies and programs. 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
181
6. Use the institutional approach in the process of finalizing the development strategy 
by determining the influence of institutional factors on the development of economic 
sectors in the region. There are some institutional factors (property relations, the 
distribution of productive forces, human capital and the labor market, the 
liberalization of prices and tariff policy, quality of life) and economic and 
environmental factors. The institutional approach is the description of the problems 
encountered in the course of the influence of institutional factors on the economic 
sectors development and creation of an improvement plan. In international practice, 
the institutional approach is a modern and effective method of strategic planning in 
the formation of an innovative economy. 
7. To conduct a phased mainstreaming strategy in response to structural changes in 
the economic system and the environment. 
Reference list 
1. Ministry of Economic Development of the Russian Federation (2013), Strategic 
planning, [Online], Available: 
http://www.economy.gov.ru/wps/wcm/connect/economylib4/en/home/ 
activity/sections/strategicplanning/index [20 Nov 2013] 
2. G. Kovalishina (2012) The future of Russia as seen by the Ministry for Economic 
Development. A summary of the roundtable discussion of the Concept of Long-Term 
Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation, Moscow: IFS. 
3. Syssoeva N.M., Dets I.A. (2011) State strategic planning and spatial development 
in the Siberian regions, Poznan: Quaestiones Geographicae 30(2), Bogucki 
Wydawnictwo Naukowe.  
4. Brown-Graham A, Lamber W., Measures and Methods: Four Tenets for Rural 
Economic Development in the New Economy (2008) [Online], Available: 
http://carseyinstitute.unh.edu/publications/PB-Brown-Graham-Measures08.pdf [15 
Nov 2013] 
5. Russia: Integrated Assessment of Tomsk Oblast Development Strategy (2012) 
[Online], Available: 
http://www.unep.ch/etb/areas/pdf/Russia%20FINAL%20Report.pdf [12 Nov 2013] 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
182
An Econometric Forecasting Model for Tourism Demand in Thailand 
 
 
Anothai Harasarn, Surachai Chancharat 
 
KhonKaen University, Thailand 
 
0198 
 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economics and Law 2013 
 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Thailand tourism of foreign tourists is important for income generation, employment and 
contributes to economic development. Therefore, the study to understanding of tourism demand 
is an important part of the tourism development of the country. This article aims to identify        
the factors that determine the demand of Thailand tourism from foreign tourists who arrive from 
important countries. Macroeconomic data affect to the decision of the foreign tourists and         
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Introduction 
 
Tourism industry is important and valuable in terms of the economy immensely both 
directly and indirectly, due to divergence and connection broadly relationship with 
other industry. The current tourism activities have respectively increased and is the 
biggest business in   the world if compare with other business (Tisdell 2002). 
Additionally, tourism industry can create an image and a better understanding will 
lead to better international relationship (Hamsupo 2000). Statistics of international 
tourist which tour in Thailand continuously increase, average 16.24% per year as      a 
result of increasing worldwide tourist and strength of basic factor’s Thai tourism 
(Department of tourism 2013). 
  
As a result of tourism is important industry to economy and revenue of Thailand. The 
government should to promote and develop a strategy for the tourism industry to grow 
even more. Therefore, the study of the appropriate demand models to forecast the 
tourism demand accurately. Moreover, the results and benefits from research will 
affect to plan and policy for supply management that conformity and sufficiency with 
demand in the future. Additionally, will be useful for policy makers to promote 
tourism and investment in line with the characteristics of tourism demand to Thailand 
and empowerment, performance, capabilities and competitive advantage in the 
tourism of Thailand with international sustainable in the future.  
 
The tourism industry is sensitive to changes in a variable environment. That is, 
depend on the politics and policies of tourism in the region, market demand and 
supply responses and the changing trends (Victor 2008). In order to resolve volatility 
problem of tourism, this research aims to investigate a fit model for time series data to 
forecast tourism demand in the five countries which travel  to Thailand  highest  five  
rank  according to statistics namely Malaysia, China, Japan, India and Singapore. 
Data were collected since January, 1971 to July, 2013 and were forecasted by 
ARIMA models with Box-Jenkin technique, due to ARIMA models has been widely 
utilized for analysis time series data compare with GARCH models. GARCH models 
has been widely utilized in financial context to investigate the volatility of the time 
series data. Subsequently the study of the univariate time series analysis of tourism 
demand has been the application of the GARCH models (Song & Li 2008). In this 
research ARIMA models was compared with GARCH models for investigation fit 
models to forecast Thai land tourism demand in the future. 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows: section 2, discuss a literature review of 
GARCH models in tourism demand. Section 3 describes the data used for analysis 
and methodology while Section 4 present the results and Section 5 provides a 
summary and some conclusions. 
  
Literature review on GARCH models in tourism  
 
The study about forecast, especially times series data, found that Autoregressive 
Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models have been widely used. Afterwards, 
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found that research about forecast tourism demand was high volatility, due to 
changing of economy, social, political and other crisis which effect to decision 
making. Therefore, Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) models has been more used for forecast than ARIMA models, for the 
reason that be suitable for the high volatility models (Ghialy & Lee 2008).  
 
Previous, GARCH models have been widely used in the financial modeling context to 
investigate the volatility of the time series (Engle 2001). Subsequently the study of the 
univariate time series analysis of tourism demand has been the application of the 
GARCH model (Song & Li 2008).   As research of Coskun (2011) have been used 
time series data with multivariate GARCH model using monthly data for research 
tourism demand 's Turkey from the tourist of  Germany, France, United Kingdom and 
Netherlands. Coskun found that tourism demand of these countries have correlation 
and accordance with demand volatility,   as a result of economic conditions and other 
factors of the country of origin which have been more effected than internal factors of                
the destination country. Seo, Park and Yu (2009) studied Korean outbound tourism 
demand for Jeju islands, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines by using the DCC–
MGARCH models and VEC models for test correlations of Korean outbound tourism 
demand and volatility for the four destinations country. The MGARCH models help 
to identify outbound/inbound travel pattern which changes resulting from the impact 
of the change in economic conditions of the world.  
 
Moreover, Coshall (2009) tested capability of volatility models for forecast outbound 
tourism demand of the United Kingdom by GARCH and EGARCH models. The test 
revealed that          the both volatility models are able to quantify the impacts of 
positive and negative shocks           on tourism demand. Additionally, Shareef and 
McAleer (2007) investigated tourism demand       to  Maldives  by test Univariate and 
multivariate time series models of conditional volatility which were ARIMA-GARCH 
models, found that conditional correlations from monthly international tourist arrivals 
that show independent effect to shocks. Then, Shareef and McAleer (2008) tested 
variation of international tourism demand, particularly the conditional uncertainty 
with vector ccc-GARCH models in international tourist arrivals to Maldives and 
Seychelles, found that spillover effect from the country of origin. 
 	 
The research about forecast tourism demand, researcher intended to be the most 
appropriate models to get result of precise forecast and nearby possible. As research 
of Ghialy and Lee (2008) compared GARCH models and ARIMA models for forecast 
tourist arrivals from USA, United Kingdom, Japan and New Zealand to Australia, 
found that GARCH models was more appropriate forecast than  ARIMA models in all 
countries except United Kingdom. Furthermore, Chan, Lim and McAleer (2005) 
studied of International tourism demand, which is typically measured of the logarithm 
of the monthly tourist arrival rate from the four leading tourism source countries to 
Australia, namely Japan, New Zealand, United Kingdom and USA, using             three 
constant conditional correlation (CCC) volatility models, specifically the CCC-
MGARCH model ,ARMA-GARCH model  and  ARMA-AGARCH model .The 
results suggest that the three models are not substantially different from each other. 
Hoti, McAleer and Shareef (2007) studied in Cyprus and Malta by using VARMA-
GARCH and VARMA-AGARCH models for analyze monthly time series data for 
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forecast Tourism Growth rate, country risk ratings, found that trend of series is 
positive and similar for the two models. 
 
The research of modeling and forecasting the demand for Thailand Tourism with 
GARCH Model with few research. However, Song, Witt and Li (2003) found that ex 
ante forecast with ARIMA models for analyze growth tourism rate in the period up to 
2010, Korea, Malaysia and Japan were the most tourist arrival in Thailand and South 
Korea has the highest growth tourism rate. Besides that, Bunnag (2010, p.) researched 
risk of foreign tourist who travelled in Thailand by the VAR model (Value at Risk) 
test with GARCH and GJR Model. Data was collected from the monthly data of the 
total tourist arrivals by residence, namely Malaysia, China, United Kingdom and 
USA. The result of forecast revealed that VAR of Malaysia tourist is the highest and 
both models lead to the same average VAR. Chaitip, Chaiboonsri and Mukhjang 
(2008) researched for compare SARIMA,ARIMA, Holt-Winter-addititive, Holt-
winter-Multiplicative, Holt-winter-No seasonal, Neural network, VAR, GMM, 
ARCH-GARCH-M, ARCH-GARCH, TARCH, PARCH and EGARCH models 
estimation for time series analysis to forecasts international tourists arrivals to 
Thailand. The result revealed that SARIMA was the best model, secondary was VAR 
models and predicted that the tourism growth trend to positive direction. However, in 
tourism studies for finding fit models is necessary for the most accurate and 
interesting as well. Additionally, the number of using multivariate GARCH is few, 
especially in Thailand.	 
 
Methodology 
 
This research was conducted by estimating volatility and forecasting tourism demand 
in Thailand of tourist which travel to Thailand highest five rank according to statistics 
namely Malaysia, China, Japan, India and Singapore (Department of Tourism 2013). 
Researcher used the number of tourist arrivals over the period of January 1971 to July 
2013, amount 511 observations.             The secondary data were adjusted to Natural 
Logarithm.  
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Figure 1: Shows log arrival rate from the selected countries 
 
 
 
 
 
Data were forecasted by ARIMA and GARCH models for comparing to find 
appropriate model. Firstly, test stationary with unit root test to determine whether a 
stationary or non stationary,        if data have unit root and were non stationary, then 
differencing data for adjust to stationary. After that, determined the appropriate form 
of the ARIMA models (p,d,q) by consideration correlogram for analyze relation of 
data, used ACF and PACF for identifying ARIMA models should have how many 
Autoregressive (p) and Moving average (q), and estimated equation with lag (p) and 
lag (q) for select the best model which the least AIC. Afterwards, estimated by 
ARIMA and GARCH models, then used coefficient for forecast tourist arrivals in the 
future.       In comparison the best model for forecast, researcher considered model 
which the least MAPE.  
 
Result 
 
The results of unit root test with Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) technique at Level 
revealed that time series data of China and Singapore have the absolute value of  the 
test statistic calculated more than the absolute value of critical value at 0.01significant 
level. Conclude that data was stationary, has not unit root and has relation at zero 
order or has integration of order 0 : I(0).      On the contrary, at level time series data 
of Malaysia, Japan and India were not stationary which not appropriate for construct 
model due to spurious results of data, then differencing data to first difference, 
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afterwards data will be stationary. Result that reject null hypothesis (H0) and accept 
alternative hypothesis (H1). Conclude that data was stationary, have not unit root, 
have               the absolute value of the test statistic calculated more than the absolute 
value of critical value at 0.01significant level, conclude that has relation at first order 
or has integration of order 1 : I(1). 
 
After time series data were tested stationary and lead to construct correlogram. By 
consider ACF and PACF for compare and find possible models. Researcher consider 
appropriate models from the least AIC and SC. The result revealed that appropriate 
ARIMA models for forecast of five countries show in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Coefficient of ARIMA Model from calculation 
 
Country/Model Malaysia 
(2,1,2) 
China 
(2,0,2) 
Japan 
(1,1,3) 
India 
(2,1,2) 
Singapore 
(1,0,3) 
C 13.4143 14.4012 12.0266 16.0644 9.9578 
AR(1) 0.1018 0.9080 - 0.6483 0.9498 
AR(12) 0.8719 0.087409 0.9476 0.3455 - 
MA(1) 0.2186 -0.3487 - 0.1039 -0.5478 
MA(4) - - 0.4967 - - 
MA(6) - - - - 0.4212 
MA(8) - - 0.3931 - - 
MA(12) -0.4678 0.1043 -0.3200 0.2031 0.4043 
AIC -0.3697 0.5800 -0.7591 -1.1560 0.2176 
SC -0.3275 0.6222 -0.7169 -1.1138 0.2591 
Note :  C denotes Constant 
 AR(p) denotes autoregressive at lag p 
 MA(q) denotes moving average at lag q 
 AIC denotes Akaike info criterion 
 SC denotes Schwarz criterion 
 The C AR and MA Term above are statistically significant at 5% 
The result revealed that using Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity Model (GARCH) for forecast tourism demand, found that 
appropriate models was GARCH (1,1)  which construct from ARIMA models of each 
countries, then estimate parameter show in table 2. 
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Table 2: Coefficient of GARCH (1,1) Model from calculation 
 
Parameter Coefficient 
Malaysia China Japan India Singapore 
C 13.1793 -377.5113 15.5390 16.1383 9.4416 
K 0.0084 0.0098 0.0046 0.0008 0.0469 
ARCH 0.2503 0.1032 0.6233 0.0382 0.3812 
GARCH 0.5446 0.8116 0.2807 0.9152 0.0148 
AIC -0.4627 0.5331 -1.1516 -1.1584 0.1847 
SC -0.3952 0.6007 -1.0840 -1.0909 0.2511 
Note: C  denotes Constant 
 K  denotes constant at variance equation 
 ARCH  denotes Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
 GARCH  denotes Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
 AIC  denotes Akaike info criterion 
 SC  denotes Schwarz criterion 
 The Term above are statistically significant at 5% 
 
Equation as following :  
 
Malaysia 
 Mean  Equation  : 
  
  LnMalaysia = 13.1793+ut 
  
 Variance  Equation  :  
 
  H12 = 0.0084+0.2503εt12 + 0.5446ht-12 
 
China 
 Mean  Equation  : 
  
  LnChina = -377.5113+ut 
  
 Variance  Equation  :  
 
  H12 = 0.0098+0.1032 εt12 + 0.8116ht-12 
 
Japan 
 Mean  Equation  : 
  
  LnJapan = 15.5390+ut 
  
 Variance  Equation  :  
 
  H12 = 0.0046+0.6233 εt12 + 0.2807ht-12 
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India 
 Mean  Equation  : 
  
  LnIndia = 16.1383+ut 
  
 Variance  Equation  :  
 
  H12 = 0.0008+0.0382 εt12 + 0.9152ht-12 
 
Singapore 
 Mean  Equation  : 
  
  LnSingapore  = 9.4416+ut 
  
 Variance  Equation  :  
 
  H12 = 0.0469+0.3812εt12 + 0.0148ht-12 
 
 
Afterwards, estimate both ARIMA and GARCH models for finding appropriate 
models for forecast tourism demand by considering models which have the least 
Mean Absolute Present Error (MAPE). When compare result of forecasting found that 
ARIMA models of China and India was less accurate than GARCH models. On the 
contrary, GARCH models of Malaysia , Japan  and Singapore were more accurate 
than ARIMA models show in table 3. 
 
Table 3: Forecasting tourist arrivals to Thailand were adjusted to Natural 
logarithm by comparing ARIMA models and   GARCH models 
 
Country model 8:2013 9:2013 10:2013 11:2013 12:2013 MAPE 
Malaysia ARIMA 12.3330 12.2250 12.2057 12.3031 12.5381 0.4565 
GARCH 12.3134 12.1973 12.1973 12.2780 12.5436 0.6615 
China ARIMA 12.8164 12.7793 12.7734 12.8018 12.8073 1.4630 
GARCH 12.8691 12.8535 12.8614 12.8946 12.9095 1.1905 
Japan ARIMA 11.4034 11.8234 11.5991 11.6946 11.6605 0.0029 
GARCH 11.3418 11.8694 11.6191 11.7289 11.7577 0.1975 
India ARIMA 11.6665 11.4848 11.4504 11.5029 11.5046 1.2831 
GARCH 11.6683 11.4774 11.4425 11.5016 11.5017 1.2406 
Singapore ARIMA 11.4108 11.2733 11.1953 11.2371 11.2929 0.6226 
GARCH 11.4226 11.2911 11.2037 11.2293 11.2743 0.6962 
 
Additionally, result of forecast found that trend of China tourist arrivals to Thailand 
will be        the most amount in the future, instead of Malaysia tourist arrivals to 
Thailand which has the most amount in the current. Moreover, both ARIMA and 
GARCH models were same direction which Thailand tourism demand of all countries 
have trend of increase growth rate in positive direction. 
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 Conclusion 
 
This research aim to forecast international tourism demand of Thailand. Data was 
collected from time series data of foreign tourist arrivals which travel to Thailand 
highest five rank according to statistics namely Malaysia, China, Japan, India and 
Singapore. Monthly data was adjusted to natural logarithm form, over the period of 
January 1971 to July 2013, amount 511 observations.  
 
The research was started from testing stationary of time series data, found that time 
series data of China and Singapore have stationary at level or have integration of 
order d as I(0). On the contrary, found that time series data of Japan and Malaysia 
have stationary at first difference or have integration of order d as I(1). Afterwards, 
constructed appropriate models both ARIMA and GARCH models by considering 
models which the least both AIC and SC. Then, compared results of forecast tourism 
demand of Thailand by considering Mean Absolute Present Error (MAPE). The 
results revealed that ARIMA models of Malaysia, Japan and Singapore have less 
MAPE than GARCH models, concluded that ARIMA models have more accurate 
forecast than GARCH models. On the contrary, GARCH models of China and India 
have less MAPE than ARIMA models, concluded that GARCH models have more 
accurate forecast than ARIMA models. However, the results of forecasting both 
ARIMA and GARCH models were same direction which Thailand tourism demand of 
all countries have trend of increase growth rate in positive direction and Thailand 
tourism demand of China tourist has trend to be the first in the future. 
  
Forecasting by ARIMA and GARCH models which use only observation value and 
missing value in the past and were not considered the external factors such as crisis in 
economy, social, political and natural disaster. These factors were effect to tourist 
demand, then it has  limitation for movement behavior explanation of tourist amount. 
Therefore, other models such as EGARCH TGARCH should be choose for 
comparison result of forecasting and construction the most appropriate models in the 
next research. Therefore, in the future research should select other models such as 
EGARCH TGARCH for comparison result of forecasting and to get the most 
appropriate models.  
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Abstract 
 
This paper is motivated by the fact that there are about 1.5 million disabled persons in 
Thailand in 2011.  A year later 234,390 of them died; many of whom the deaths were 
premature. Major causes of their deaths could be traced back to deprived socio-
economic conditions. At present registered disabled persons are entitled to monthly 
payment of 500 Baht (17 USD) and access to low cost medical services. It is 
inevitable that a new initiative is needed to promote a better quality of their lives. 
Access to tertiary education is one of the viable options. Disabled persons are usually 
credit constrained; access to sufficient student loans is, therefore, a pre-requisite to 
access to tertiary education. Using a unique health literacy data set of Thai persons 
with disabilities, this paper examines how different student loan sizes affect returns to 
tertiary education.  Propensity Score Matching is used to estimate differences in log of 
earnings between a disabled person with tertiary degree holders and a disabled person 
with basic education qualification. Subsequent exercise on the effects of different loan 
sizes is conducted using the Thai Student Loans Fund (SLF) arrangement. The 
exercise reveals that rates of returns do not vary significantly with loan sizes. These 
findings suggest that promoting greater access to tertiary education for disabled 
persons will be beneficial to both individuals as well as the society at large. 
Supplementary in-depth interviews highlight the importance post-graduation 
placements services. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Based on National Office for Empowerment of Persons with Disability (NOEPD), in 
2011 there are about 1.5 million disabled persons in Thailand. A year later, 234,390 of 
them died. Many of them died prematurely due to lack of proper care and severe 
poverty. At the time of writing, disabled persons are entitled to a monthly allowance 
of 500 Baht (17 USD)1. By and large, disabled persons educational attainments rarely 
go beyond basic education. Their either are unemployed or only marginally attached 
to labor market, with their typical jobs being lottery sellers, basic handicraft makers or 
massagers (National Office for Empowerment of Persons with Disability, 2013). 
 
 
The above overview raises two interesting issues to be explored. The first relates to 
insufficiency of monthly allowance which precludes them from acquiring proper 
health care and nutritional food to sustain their health. Raising payment requires that 
additional public resources must be diverted from elsewhere. Such diversion often 
comes with opportunity costs. The second issue being low level of educational 
attainments. Researches in the field of education and labor market outcomes 
consistently find that more education allow individuals to be more productive; as a 
result, they will also enjoy higher earnings throughout their working lives 
(Psacaropoulos and Patrinos, 2004). The second issue also implies that education can 
be a powerful instrument to help disabled individuals who are able and willing to 
undertake such investment to achieve a better living standard. Being able to support 
themselves also help to free up public resources which can be made available to other 
disabled persons.  
 
 
Such initiative, however, has to be supported by hard empirical evidence on whether 
such investment will yield positive return. Another related empirical issue stem from 
the fact that many disabled persons are in poverty. They do not have sufficient 
resources to undertake such investment. In addition, without proper collateral, they 
are denied of access to commercial loans. One of the promising avenues for the 
disabled in Thailand is to undertake such investment by borrowing from a public 
student loans scheme called the Student Loans Fund (SLF). Again, the empirical 
question is whether borrowing from the SLF to cover their tuition fees and related 
expenditures is an economically sound decision. This paper attempts two address 
these two empirical issues. 
 
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 provides historical 
background and payment arrangement of the SLF. Section 3 lays out conceptual 
framework relating education to health outcome and potential earning. Research 
methodology will be discussed in section 4. Data and results are offered in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
 
                                                
1 The exchange rate is approximately 30 baht to 1 dollar. 
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2.  History of the SLF and Its Arrangement2 
 
 
The idea of making student loans available to the poor was formed in 1995 while the 
Democratic Party was leading the Thai government. The Student Loans Fund (SLF) 
was set up in 1996 while Chart Thai Party, was the leading party of the government. 
The main objective of the SLF is to foster access to upper secondary and higher 
education for students from low-income families.  It is believed that greater access 
will eventually reduce inequality education opportunities between the rich and the 
poor. Increased stock of graduates will also increase the country’s competitiveness, 
hence sustained economic growth in the long-run. To accomplish the above objective, 
the SLF provides the loans for upper secondary, vocational and undergraduate 
education to students whose family income does not exceed 200,000 baht per annum.  
Average public fund allocated to the scheme is around of 27,000 million baht per 
annum (Office of Student Loans Fund, 2007). 
 
 
Essentially, the SLF is a mortgage-type loan with a maximum repayment period of 15 
years. Annual repayment is an increasing proportion of the loan size, ranging from 1.5 
per cent in the first year of repayment to 13 per cent in the last repayment period. The 
nominal interest rate charged on the loan is one per cent. There are two types of grace 
period built into the SLF. The first interest rate grace period is before the interest rate 
begins to accrue two years after graduation or termination from the program enrolled.  
Therefore, for a four-year program, the interest rate grace period is six years. Second, 
there is also a two-year repayment grace period after graduation or termination from 
the program enrolled.  
 
 
The loans cover tuition fees as well as living expenses. The loan ceilings for tuition 
fees differ depending on the fields of study; the loan ceilings for tuition fees vary 
from 60,000 Baht per year for the social sciences and humanities to 150,000 Baht per 
year for selected science and medical programs. Loans for living allowances are 
limited to 26,400 Baht per year.3  Figure 2.1 illustrates a repayment pattern for a loan 
size of 200,000 Baht. 
 
 
  
                                                
2 This section is based on Chapman and Lounkaew (2009) and Chapman et al. (2010) 
3 See Office of Student Loans Fund (2007) for details. 
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Figure 2.1: SLF Repayments for the Debt of 200,000 Baht 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
 
 
To fix the idea, we will use the production of health to illustrate the points. Let’s 
assume that health can be measured in unit term with higher value of health 
corresponds to better health condition. Two inputs are used to produce health. The 
first being food intake per week; the second input is time spent on exercising per 
week. An increase in either input will increase health outputs. Figure 3.1 depicts the 
production function of health using time spent on exercising per week as an argument 
on the horizontal axis. The more time is spent on exercising, the better higher is the 
health outputs. However, the production function is concave to reflect the fact that 
improved health outcome gained from the first few hours spent on exercising are 
greater than the gain from, say the 22nd hour spent on exercising. 
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Figure 3.1: Health Production Function 
 
 
 
In the context of this example, if more schooling leads the productive efficiency, then 
these additional schooling shifts the production function upward; consequently, 
similar mix of input corresponds to higher output lying at the frontier of the new 
production function. This is shown in Figure 3.2. Prior to attaining more education, 4 
hours of exercising and 17 units of food per week produces 80 units of health outputs. 
More schooling shifts the production function upward. With the new production 
function, similar mix of inputs now produces 100 units of health outputs. 
 
 
Figure 3.3 demonstrates the situation in which more schooling leads to better 
allocative efficiency.  Prior to attaining more education, 3 hours of exercising and 20 
units of food were used to produce 80 units of health outputs. New insight gained 
from more education results in the new input mix of 4 hours of exercising and 17 
units of food; the new health output is 100 units. This is the maximum attainable level 
of output. 
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Figure 3.2: Illustrating Productive Efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Illustrating Allocative Efficiency 
 
 
 
An econometric model to test the productive efficiency involves the use of 
simultaneous equation to approximate the production function. The model predicts 
that, holding all other inputs constant, schooling coefficient is positive. Alternatively, 
the allocative efficiency model predicts that there is no direct effect of schooling on 
health output if all other inputs relevant to the production of health are included. It 
should be noted, however, that both approaches predict positive relationship between 
schooling and health outcome in the reduced form health equation (Grossman, 2006). 
 
 
In the context of this study, positive contribution of schooling on health outcome 
enables a disabled individual to be more productive and be valued more highly in the 
labor market. In addition, better education empowers them to take better care of 
themselves; this also increases their health capital. To formalize this, let Z be level of 
human capital; H is the level of human capital. Then annual wage increase can be 
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accounted for by changes in human capital and changes in health capital as shown in 
equation (1): 
 
                                         ( )% % ( ) % ( )w t Z t H tα βΔ = Δ + Δ                                                     
(1) 
 
 
4. The Data and Methodology 
 
 
This section begins with discussion on basic information of the Thai health literacy 
data; the most recent and most comprehensive data set available for the study of this 
nature. Then empirical method - the Propensity Score Matching- used to estimate 
percentage differences in annual income will be elaborated. 
 
 
4.1 Data 
 
 
Data on persons with disability are scarce. In Thailand, the Thai Health System 
Research Institute (HSRI)’s health literacy4 data set is the most recent and most 
comprehensive data on persons with disability- blind, deaf and handicapped. The data, 
collected in early 2013, containing 1,600 samples of persons with disability nation-
wide. Key information contained that are relevant to this study are, types of disability, 
gender, age, educational attainment, total personal income, self-rated health condition 
and health literacy. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 provide an overview of the data. It can be seen 
that only about 15 percent of persons with disability surveyed have tertiary 
qualification. Weighted average of annual income of a tertiary degree holder is about 
2.3 times higher than those with basic education. 
 
 
  
                                                
4 According to the U.S.’s Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDCP), Health Literacy is the 
capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information and services to make appropriate 
health decisions (CDCP, 2013). 
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Figure 4.1: Distribution by Education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Weighted Average of Annual Incomes 
 
 
 
 
4.2  Empirical Method 
 
 
Typical approach to estimate returns to education relies on Mincerian earning 
function. Years of schooling is used as a one of the regressors to capture the effect of 
additional year of education on earning. It is a well-known fact in labor economic 
literature that schooling coefficient is contaminated by biasness introduced by 
omitting certain variables such as individual’s ability and attitude towards learning 
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(Griliches, 1977; Berger and Leigh, 1989; Card 2000). Attempts have been made to 
address these issues; yet none of them has been satisfactory. 
 
 
Another approach which allows us to address such bias is to frame the exercise in the 
context of treatment-control research design. In an ideal setting, we can randomly 
assign disability persons into treatment and control groups with treatment being 
having access to tertiary education. In such randomized control exercise, difference in 
average earning between is caused by such treatment. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to conduct such exercise. The second-best approach is to carry out quasi-experimental 
design which mimic as closely as possible characteristics of randomized control 
experiment. Propensity Score Matching (PSM) is one of such approach (Morgan and 
Winship, 2007; Brand and Xie, 2010). This approach is now discussed. 
 
 
In essence, PSM creates a statistical comparison group based on a propensity score- 
the probability to participate in a treatment. The probability estimate is based on 
observed characteristics of participants. Participants and nonparticipants are then 
matched by their propensity scores. The average treatment effect of the program can 
be estimated by differences in the mean values of outcomes between these two 
groups. It should be noted that, in practice, PSM is most useful when observed 
characteristics have sufficient influence on program participation decision. Sufficient 
characteristic information also helps to minimized biased inherent in the program 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002)  
 
In the context of this study, omitted variable biased is more pronounced because the 
design of the health literacy survey. Primary purpose of this survey was to collect data 
on health literacy without much attention paid to collecting socio-economic 
background information. Consequentially, Mincerian estimates will suffer from 
omitted variable biased, possibly in a greater degree than typical estimates using labor 
force survey data. The question is whether PSM would help to mitigate such bias? 
 
 
The answer to the above question is positive. The health literacy data contain some 
basic characteristics; in addition, the data also contain disability persons’ self-rated 
health status as well as health literacy score. Conceptually, health literacy helps to 
make appropriate health decisions. Persons who score higher in health literacy are 
more likely to be capable of looking after themselves. Unobserved characteristics that 
influence one’s decision to undertake tertiary education correlate with health literacy 
scores. By including health literacy scores into the estimate of propensity score will, 
therefore, increase accuracy in matching characteristically identical individuals in the 
two groups.  
 
 
To obtain returns to tertiary education – defined as percentage differences in annual 
income- between tertiary degree holders and those with basic education, log of annual 
incomes are used as dependent variable. Data on types of disability, gender, 
geographical location, age, educational attainment, total personal income, self-rated 
health condition and health literacy are independent variables included to estimate 
propensity score. Effect of student loans sizes on returns to education is estimated by 
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deducting annual payment required to service the loans from annual income of tertiary 
degree holders prior to commencing PSM exercise. Amounts to be deducted are based 
on repayment schedule of the SLF shown in Figure 2.1. Three loan sizes are used in 
the estimate: 200,000 baht, 300,000 baht, and 400,000 bath. We also restrict the 
estimate to include only those aged between 25 to 50. 
 
 
5. Results 
 
 
Result from PSM estimate of average treatment effect of having a tertiary degree is 
shown in Table 5.1. It can be seen that a person with disability with a tertiary enjoy 
about 29.5 percent higher of their annual income compared to a person without such 
qualification. The difference is statistically significant. This confirms the argument 
developed in section 3 that education, after controlling for health and other 
characteristics, determines one’s total human capital, hence one’s income. Table 5.2 
compares the result obtained from this study two previous findings by Lamichhane 
and Sawada (2013) and Mori and Yamagata (2009). It can be seen that the Thai 
estimate in this study is consistent with two previous findings; that is estimates of 
returns to tertiary education is in the order of 30 percent. 
 
 
The effects of student loan sizes on returns to tertiary education are calculated as 
described in section 4.2.  Results in Figure 5.1 show the effect of borrowing from the 
SLF to finance their education. Baseline estimate for the debt size 200,000 baht, 
which is a typical debt size for normal person borrowing from the SLF, reduces the 
return to 22; further increase in debt to 300,000 and 400,000 baht reduce the returns 
further to 18 and 14 percent respectively. Thus it can be concluded that, while higher 
loans size do affect returns to education for persons with disability, they can still 
enjoy considerable returns on such investment; investment in tertiary education is a 
worthy investment and will surely help to improve quality of lives of those who have 
successfully undertaken it. 
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Table 5.1: Propensity Score Matching Estimates 
 
Variable 
 
 
Mean value  
S.E. T-stat 
Tertiary 
education 
Basic 
education 
Difference 
 
Log of annual 
income 
 
9.240 
 
8.945 
 
0.295 
 
0.142 
 
 
2.09** 
 
** Statistically significant at 𝛼 = 0.05 
 
 
Table 5.2: Comparisons to Previous Studies 
 
Author (s) Country Returns to education 
 
 
Lamichhane and Sawada 
(2013) 
 
Nepal 
 
30.4%-33.2% 
 
Mori and Yamagata (2009) 
 
Philippines 
 
24.7%-30.1% 
 
This study 
 
Thailand 
 
29.5% 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Effects of Student Loans Sizes on Returns to Tertiary Education 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
 
This paper is motivated by the fact that there are about 1.5 million disabled persons in 
Thailand in 2011. A year later 234,390 of them died; many of whom the deaths were 
premature. Education seems to be one of the candidates that can help some of the able 
disability persons to come out of deprived situation. Such initiative, however, has to 
be supported by hard empirical fact of whether such investment will yield positive 
return. This paper addresses this question by providing estimates of returns to tertiary 
education for persons with disability.  
 
 
The Thai health literacy data is used to undertake this exercise. As dictated by nature 
of the data, PSM is used to estimate returns to education. It has been found that return 
to education for tertiary education is about 29.5 percent. When taking into account the 
fact that disabled persons have to rely on student loans to commence such endeavor, 
returns to education fall to around 14 to 22 percent depending on the loan sizes. The 
results confirm that tertiary education is a worthy investment and will surely help to 
improve quality of lives of those who have successfully undertaken it. 
 
 
There are two other critical challenges that must be addressed in conjunction with 
promoting access to tertiary education. The first stem from the fact that disabled 
graduates cannot compete with typical graduates in labor market; policies to promote 
hiring disabled graduates will greatly improve their success in labor market. The 
second challenge is perception toward persons with disability. They have long been 
stigmatized as having to constantly rely on public support. Such negative perception 
may hinder their progress in the workplace and social ladders. A new fact-based 
perception that disabled persons are valuable members of our society must be 
promoted. By addressing these two challenges appropriately, education will be the 
key to ensure that they to contribute productively to the society 
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Abstract 
 
Political business cycle (PBC) is one of the most discussed theories in political economy 
filed. PBC refers to the phenomenon that incumbent uses fiscal or monetary policies to create 
economic boom before election so that periodic fluctuations are induced according to election 
calendars. Among many economic variables suggested by previous literature to examine PBC, 
government expenditure is one of the easily manipulated fiscal tools by incumbent before 
elections in order to remain in office. This paper use panel data from 1992 to 2010 to examine 
the effect of presidential and legislative elections on central government departmental 
expenditure in Taiwan. Moreover, we also collect related economic and political variables in 
the models. Four models with eight regression are used and compared.  
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between election and economic performance has been discussed and 
examined by scholars since 1940s. Although Kalecki (1943) coined the term “political 
business cycle”, Nordhaus (1975) is the one who uses economic model to examine the 
linkage between elections and macroeconomic performance. It is believed that among 
different political events which might have impact on markets, political elections are 
particularly important (Pantzalis et al., 2000: 1576). Tufte (1978: 65) pointed out the 
importance of election on nation’s economics as follows:  
When you think economics, think elections; 
When you think elections, think economics. 
In the democratic regimes, because incumbents under the pressure of re-election, they 
tend to create economic boom or promise offering benefit to specific groups before 
election in order to remain in power. For instance, in the 2012 Taiwanese presidential 
election, the two main competitive parties, Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic 
Progressive Party (DPP) raced to offer a better subsidy to farmers in order to win the 
farmer’s votes. KMT proposed to add 316 NTD to farmer’s original subsidy in the 
first place. However, because DPP proposed to add 1,000 NTD instead of 316 NTD in 
their political campaign, KMT finally decided to raise subsidy to farmers as 1,000 
NTD per person and also raise other subsidies to minorities. These benefit 
adjustments cost government about 20 billion NTD (United Daily News, November 
18, 2011). The phenomenon that incumbents use fiscal or monetary policies to boost 
economy or promise some benefits to specific groups during an election so that a 
periodic fluctuation is created according to elections is called political business cycle 
(PBC).   
There are mainly two approaches of PBC: opportunistic and partisan models. 
Opportunistic model assumes that there is imperfect information about an 
incumbent’s competence and expansionary policy before election is taken as an 
indicator of high competence by voters. On the other hand, a partisan model assumes 
the driven force of economic fluctuations caused by elections is the different 
ideologies between parties. A left-wing party is more averse to unemployment and 
less averse to inflation than a right-wing party. Although two theoretical models 
offered by scholars, most studies found evidence which support opportunistic models. 
The partisan PBC phenomenon was found in the United States, but not in many other 
countries (Drazen, 2001: 75-76). Therefore, the paper focuses on the examination of 
opportunistic PBC as well. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine if central elections induce opportunistic PBC 
in Taiwan. Among many economic variables suggested by previous literature to 
examine PBC, government expenditures is one of the easily manipulated fiscal tools 
by an incumbent before elections in order to remain in office. Therefore, this paper 
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examines the changes of Taiwanese central governmental expenditures to discuss the 
possible opportunistic PBC phenomenon in Taiwan.  
2. Literature Review 
There are two main theoretic models of political business cycle in the PBC literature: 
one is opportunistic approach, and the other is partisan approach. The main difference 
of these two approaches/models is the explanation of driving forces of a political 
business cycle. Leading by the works of Tufte (1975, 1978), Nordhaus (1975), McRae 
(1977), Rogoff and Sibert (1988), and Rogoff (1990), opportunistic approach argues 
that there is imperfect information about an incumbent’s competence, with 
expansionary policy before an election taken as an indicator of high competence. On 
the other hand, partisan approach, mainly suggested by Hibbs (1977) and Alesina 
(1987, 1988), presents a model of partisan policymakers in an environment similar to 
that of the Nordhaus (1975), but where these partisan differences were the key driving 
force for PBC (Drazen, 2001: 75-76).   
Drazen (2001: 76-77) reviewed the works for a quarter of a century (1975-2000) of 
PBC in his paper “the political business cycle after 25 years”. In the same vein, Shi 
and Svensson (2003) also provided their observations of development of political 
budget cycle from 1987 to 2002. These two articles provide a quick review of past 
theoretical and empirical researches of PBC. 
After reviewing the literature of PBC between 1975 to 2000, Drazen (2001) has 
several conclusions of the development of PBC: first, on the empirical side, there are 
a number of clear electoral effects on macroeconomic variables, but there is much less 
hard evidence found in the developed countries. Second, empirical data shows that 
there is significant disagreement about whether where is opportunistic manipulation 
that can be observed in the macroeconomic data but there is a clear partisan effect in 
the United States. Third, on the theoretical side, some key assumptions are criticized 
for implausibility, such as irrational behavior by the public and the reliance on 
monetary surprises as the driving force. In the conclusion, Drazen (2001) wrote:  
The survey was meant to convey a very clear message: monetary 
surprises are an unconvincing driving force for political cycles, either 
opportunistic or partisan (p113). 
Shi and Svensson (2003) directly shifted their focus from macroeconomic variables to 
fiscal policy manipulation of political budget cycle based on the same issue Drazen 
(2001) raised: government in fact has no real control on macroeconomic economic 
variables. Besides the argument of monetary and fiscal policies, Shi and Svensson 
(2003) suggest moral hazard approach to PBC. They followed Persson and Tabellinin 
(2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002) to revise the models of Rogoff (1990) who uses 
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adverse selection approach in examining PBC. The reason is that in contrast to 
adverse selection models which need to know the type of an incumbent, all types of 
the incumbent government will incur excessive pre-election budget deficit 
(independent of their competent level). In addition to moral hazard models, Shi and 
Svensson (2003) also outline two other developments of PBC at the time. One is that 
researchers use more sophisticated empirical methods to estimate PBC. The other is 
that studies has shifted from industrialized countries to all (including developing 
countries). They point out time series methods appropriate for dynamic panel data 
regressions have been adopted cross-countries studies in PBC.  
Besides the debates of policy instruments and quantitative methods used in PBC 
research, some scholars focus on some possible intermediate variables which might 
change the causal relationships between election and government fiscal variables. The 
degree of democracy and transparency are two variables which are tested in different 
empirical researches. The degree of democracy represents the cost of removing a 
policymaker from office. Gonzalez (1999a) finds that with a high enough cost of 
removing officeholders, incumbents will not be removed from and will follow their 
full-information optimal policy. Also, Gonzalez (1999b) considers the relation 
between the level of democracy and the strength of the political cycle in a sample of 
43 countries over the period 1950-1997 and finds that the cycle is strongest in 
countries with intermediate levels of democracy. Moreover, Brender and Drazen 
(2004) investigate 68 democratic countries between 1960 and 2001 and find political 
budget cycles in the deficits of new but not established democracies. As for 
transparency, the higher the degree of transparency means the smaller the amount of 
distortion away from the first best in the political budget cycle. Gonzalez (1999a) 
found that there is a positive correlation between the degree of transparency and 
political budget cycle, but only in the samples that the transparency measures are at 
intermediate levels.  
From the past literature, we have some observations: firstly, the indicators of political 
business cycle shifts from macroeconomic variables (for example, unemployment rate 
or inflation or GDP growth, etc.) to instruments which government has direct control 
on, such as government budget or expenditures. Secondly, a more sophiscated 
statistical methods and panel data type are employed by researchers in empirical 
researches. Thirdly, more and more scholars did cross-country comparison or examine 
developing countries rather than only target on developed countries. Finally, some 
intermediate variables such as the degree of democracy or transparency were 
introduced in the empirical model specifications.  
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3. Research Design 
3.1 3.1 Research Question  
The main purpose of this research is to find a possible cyclical pattern of presidential 
election in Taiwan. From the literature review, we know that macroeconomic 
variables performances (such as inflation or unemployment rate) normally has a time 
lag to be recognized by people as well as hardly manipulated by an incumbent; 
therefore, government expenditure is used by researchers lately to examine the 
existence of PBC. And because the elections we concerns are direct presidential 
elections, the nation-wide government expenditures, central government expenditures, 
become the target of examination in this research. Consequently, the research 
question is stated as:  
Does Taiwanese central government expenditure have a four-year cycle because of 
presidential elections? 
3.2 3.2 Model Specification, Data and Hypotheses 
In order to answer the research question, the authors collect central government 
expenditure from 1992 to 2010, covering four full election cycles, and use three 
different statistic models to examine and test the data set.  
The time span of the data set includes four Taiwanese presidential elections in 1996, 
2000, 2004 and 2008. In other words, there are four full election cycles in the data set. 
Table 1 lists the terms, name of winners, the winner’s parties, and voting date for 
these four elections.  
Table 1 Taiwanese presidential elections, term 9th to term 12th 
Term Winner Winner’s party* Voting date 
9 Lee Teng-hui KMT 1996-03-23 
10 Chen Shui-bian DPP 2000-03-18 
11 Chen Shui-bian DPP 2004-03-20 
12 Ma Ying-jeou KMT 2008-03-22 
Source: Central election commission, http://www.cec.gov.tw/ 
*: KMT: Kuomintang ; DPP: Democratic Progressive Party 
The dependent variable in the model is central government expenditures. The 
Taiwanese central government expenditures can be divided into the following eight 
departmental expenditures: general, education/sciences/culture, social benefit, 
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community development and environmental protection, retirement and condolence, 
debt, and others expenditure. We use this panel data which consists of 7 departments 
with 19 years to examine the possible cyclical patterns according to the four 
presidential elections in Taiwan.1 
There are four kinds of independent variables in the model: election variables, 
political variables, domestic economic variables and a global economic variable. The 
election variables are the main independent variables in the model. According to PBC 
theory, an incumbent usually tries to stimulate a nation’s economy before an election; 
therefore, we assume that central government expenditures would arise a year before 
election year to make people “feel good” before election. Moreover, an elected 
government has no incentive to stimulate economy after an election, so economy 
might slump after an election. Accordingly, in order to detect the timing of 
government expenditure variation, we put two kinds of election dummy variables in 
the model: one is elect which takes a value of 1 in the year of an election and 0 
otherwise; the other one is b_elect which takes a value of 1 in the year preceding an 
election and 0 otherwise.2 Therefore, the first two hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Taiwanese government expenditures rise in the year preceding a presidential 
election. 
H2: Taiwanese government expenditures fall in the year of a presidential 
election. 
The second set of independent variables is political variables. As stated above, the 
previous literature point out the importance of two intermediate variables in the 
political budget cycle: the degree of democracy and transparency, we include these 
two variables in the model. Although the first direct presidential election was held in 
1996 in Taiwan, most people consider the 2000 presidential election which has 
marked the fledgling democracy's first peaceful transfer of power, after over half a 
century's rule by the KMT party-state apparatus in Taiwan (Hung, 2011: 37). 
Therefore, the variable dem represents democracy phase, which takes a value of 1 
after the year of 2000 and 0 otherwise. Transparency represents the probability that 
voters learn the incumbent’s competence costless. Therefore, it means that the higher 
the degree of transparency, the smaller the amount of distortion away from the first 
best in the political budget cycle (Drazen, 2001: 98). We use corruption perception 
                                                
 
1 Some departmental expenditures can be divided into several sub-categories so that the final 
panel data consists 19 categories with 19 years. 
2 Taiwanese presidential election takes place on March of an election year so that authors  
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index announced annually from Transparency International (TI) to represent the 
degree of transparency in the model (denoted as trans in the model). Following the 
arguments of these two intermediate variables, the third and fourth hypotheses are:  
H3: Taiwanese government expenditure cycles are stronger in the years of “new 
democracy”.  
H4: Taiwanese government expenditure cycles are weaker when controlling the 
degree of transparency.  
Because KMT and DPP both hold the offices for two terms in these four presidential 
election cycles, we also add a party variable in the model to detect a possible impact 
of party in the government expenditure cycle. 
The other two sets of independent variables are served as control variables in the 
model. Following the models of previous literatures, we include inflation rate, GDP 
growth rate, unemployment rate, and GINI index as domestic economic control 
variables. Moreover, because Taiwan is an open economy and greatly affected by 
international or U.S. economy, we include Nasdaq Composite Index as a global 
economic control variable in the model. Table 2 summaries the variable type, code, 
explanations, and data sources. 
Table 2 Variables and Data Source 
Variable Type Variable 
Code 
Variable Explanation Data Source 
Dependent  gexpenditure Central government expenditure growth rate DGBAS 
Independent 
elect 
Election variable 1 
1 : the year of an election 
0 : otherwise 
Authors 
b_elect 
Election variable 2 
1 : the year preceding an election 
year  
0 : otherwise 
Authors 
Political control 
variable 
dem 
Democracy variable 
1 : 2000-2010 
0 : otherwise 
Authors 
trans  The degree of transparency (Corruption Perception Index) TI  
party 
Party variable 
1 : DPP 
0 : KMT 
Authors 
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Domestic 
economic control 
variables 
inflation Inflation rae DGBAS 
gdpg GDP growth rate DGBAS 
gini GINI index DGBAS 
Global economic 
control variable nasdaq 
U.S. NASDAQ index TEJ 
Source: Authors 
Notes: TI: Transparency International, DGBAS: The Directorate General of 
Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of Executive Yuan in Taiwan; 
TEJ: Taiwan Economic Journal database. 
There are four kinds of model specifications to examine political election cycles. 
Model 1 is base model which include election variables, domestic and global 
economic control variables. Model 2 adds the democracy variable to base model. 
Model 3adds the transparency variable to model 2. Finally, model 4, a complete 
model, adds a party variable to model 3. The models are listed as below: 
1. Model 1: Baseline model 
𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!"= 𝛼!" + 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔!" + 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖!" + 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞!"+ 𝜀!" 
2. Model 2: Baseline model + democracy 
𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!" = 𝛼!" + 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔!" + 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖!" + 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞!" +𝑑𝑒𝑚!" + 𝜀!" 
 
3. Model 3: Baseline model + democracy + transparency 
𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!" = 𝛼!" + 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔!" + 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖!" + 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞!" +𝑑𝑒𝑚!" + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠!" + 𝜀!" 
4. Model 4: Baseline model + democracy + transparency + party 𝑔𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒!" = 𝛼!" + 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" + 𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔!" + 𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖!" + 𝑛𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞!" +𝑑𝑒𝑚!" + 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠!" + 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦!" + 𝜀!" 
Panel data set helps to control for factors that vary across government departments but 
do not vary over time as well as to overcome omitted variables problems. However, 
we found that this dataset has cross-sectional correlation problem. In order to correct 
cross-sectional heteroskedastic in the estimations, we use generalized lease square 
(GLS) to estimate the coefficients in the models.  
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Central Government Expenditure—total and departmental growth 
Figure 1 graphs the fluctuations of growth rate of nine central governmental 
expenditures. The lines indicate the timing of presidential elections. Although we 
expect to see a rise before an election and a fall after an election if there is a political 
election cycle, the graphs are not really telling us much.  
 
Figure 1 Taiwanese Central Government Expenditure—total and departmental 
growth, 1992-2010 
Note: ESC: Education/Sciences/Culture; SB: Social Benefit; ED: Economic 
Devleopment; CDEPE: Community Development and Environmental 
Protection; RCE: Retirement and Condolence; OE: Others 
Expenditure. 
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4.2 Regression Models 
Table 3 presents some basic descriptive statistics of all variables in the regression 
models.  
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics* 
Variable Type  Variable Name Code Mean Median Max Min N 
Dependent variables 
Central 
Government 
Departmental 
Expenditure growth 
rat 
gexpiture 7.91 3.40 195.23 -67.58 361 
Independent 
variable 
Election  elect 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.00 361 
Year Before 
Election b_elect 
0.21 0.00 1.00 0.00 361 
Control 
Variables 
Political 
Democracy dem 0.58 1.00 1.00 0.00 361 
Transparency  trans 5.56 5.60 5.90 4.98 361 
Party party 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.00 361 
Domestic 
Economic 
Inflation inflation 1.51  1.43  4.10  -0.87  361 
GDP growth rate gdpg 4.79  5.51  10.72  -1.81  361 
Gini Index gini  33.26  33.85  35.00  31.60 361 
Global 
Economic NASDAQ nasdaq  7.59  11.56  61.83 -51.99 342 
Source: Authors 
＊：Both Gini Index and Nasdaq index are been scaled to between 0 and 100; 
moreover, Nasdaq index is transferred to yearly change rate. 
This study uses four different model specifications to examine political business 
cycles in Taiwanese central government expenditure. Table 4 summarizes the results 
of these four models with eight regression results. Each model has two regression 
results according to the different election variable (elect or b_elect).  
Firstly, the two election variables both are statistically significant in all eight 
regressions but with different signs. The dummy variable in an election year has a 
negative sign but the dummy variable in the year preceding an election has a positive 
sign in the regressions. The results indicate that Taiwanese central government 
expenditures increase the year preceding an election year, ceteris paribus. However, 
the central government expenditures have a statistically significant fall when an 
election is over. The results of the main independent variables are consistent with the 
argument of opportunistic PBC theory: a government has an incentive to increase 
government spending before an election, and when an election is over, a government 
tends to cut back its expenditures. Consequently, the results confirm the first two 
hypotheses: 
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Taiwanese government expenditures do rise in the year preceding a presidential 
election according to the data. 
Taiwanese government expenditures do fall in the year of a presidential election 
according to the data. 
Regressions 3 to 6 summarize the results of controlling democracy and transparency 
of baseline model. The coefficients of election variables in these regressions are 
consistent with the results of the baseline model in the first two regressions. Also, the 
coefficient of democracy variable is consistently significant positive in model 2, 3, 
and 4. However, although the transparency variable is significant in model 3, but 
when controlling party variable, the transparency variable turns to be not statistically 
significant in model 4 (regression 7 and 8).  
Table 4. Regression Results 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
constant 98.81 *** 108.47 *** 289.02 *** 206.18 *** 204.74 *** 167.00 *** 211.84 *** 203.89 *** 
elect -3.37 ***   -5.43 ***   -2.62 ***   -2.45 ***     b_elect   2.25 ***   1.34 *   5.02 ***    8.93 *** inflation 0.67 *** 0.25 ** 0.42  0.17  0.32 *** -0.17 ** 0.52 *** -0.05  gdpg -1.94 *** -1.91 *** -2.32 *** -2.11 *** -2.24 *** -2.19 *** -2.33 *** -2.42 *** 
gin -2.52 *** -2.83 *** -8.39 *** -5.87 *** -5.04 *** -3.79 *** -5.84 *** -5.85 *** 
nasdaq 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.07 *** 0.08 *** 0.11 *** 0.08 *** 0.07 *** 0.00  
dem     12.39 *** 6.98 *** 13.46 *** 10.65 *** 17.31 *** 20.03 *** 
trans         -5.50 *** -6.09 *** -1.63  -0.26  
party             -7.11 *** -11.60 *** 
N 342 342 342 342 304 304 304 304 
P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Source: Authors. 
Note: P-value<.01***, P-value<.05**, P-value<.1*。 
If we take the difference of two coefficients of election variables as an indicator of the 
strength of a PBC (the difference of an increase of expenditure growth before an 
election and a decrease of expenditure growth after an election), the strength of PBC 
increases with the political control variables adding in the baseline model. In the 
model 1, the difference is 5.62 (2.25 minus -3.37), in the model 2 is 6.77, in the model 
3 is 7.64, and in the model 4 is 11.38. Therefore, the results of model 2, 3 and 4 
support the hypothesis 3: Taiwanese government expenditures cycles are stronger in 
the years of “new democracy”. In other words, in a new democracy, an incumbent has 
a stronger motivation to manipulate government expenditures according to the timing 
of an election. Because of the insignificance of transparency in the model 4, we do not 
have enough evidence to support the hypothesis 4 in our dataset. To sum up, for the 
hypothesis 3 and 4, the test results are:  
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Taiwanese government expenditure cycles are significantly stronger in the years 
of “new democracy” according to the data. 
Taiwanese government expenditure cycles are not significantly weaker when 
controlling the degree of transparency according to the data. 
Finally, the party variable is statistically significant in the complete model. The 
negative and significant coefficient means that, comparing to the periods when KMT 
in the office, the government expenditure growth is negative when DPP in the office. 
But when controlling all political variables, the magnitude of PBC is stronger. 
5. Conclusions and Future Research Suggestions 
The main purpose of this study is to explore the fluctuations of central governmental 
expenditure in terms of presidential direct election in Taiwan. Four regressions 
models are used to examine the growth of central governmental expenditure panel 
data. Controlling for political variables, domestic economic variables, and global 
economic variables, the four models and eight regressions exhibit the same results: 
the election variables have statistically significant impacts on central government 
departmental expenditures. In other words, the opportunistic political business cycle 
shows in Taiwan after Taiwanese the first presidential direct election in 1996. 
Brender and Drazen (2005) find that the existence of a political business cycle in a 
large cross-section of countries; however, they find the result is driven by the 
experience of “new democracy”. The political deficit cycle is stronger in new and 
weaker democracies. Taiwanese presidential direct election started in 1996. 
Moreover, a real two party system has begun in 2000, just 13 years from now. 
Therefore, Taiwan is a new democracy, thus, the result that opportunistic PBC exists 
in Taiwanese central governmental expenditure is consistent with the conclusions 
found by Brender and Drazen (2005). Shi and Svensson (2006) use panel data to 
examine the relation between elections and fiscal policy. They suggest political 
budget cycles are significantly larger, and statistically more robust, in developing than 
in developed countries. Taiwan is in the developing country’s group and our results 
provide an evidence that the political business cycle is stronger when controlling the 
democracy variable; therefore, our results are consistent with the outcomes of Shi and 
Svensson’s research. 
One more interesting research result provided by the regressions is that party is a 
significant factor in the empirical model. In other words, different party has different 
expenditure growth rate in their regimes. This might suggest that partisan political 
business cycle might happen in Taiwan. This possible argument might need to be 
examined in the future. 
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Abstract 
 
Most developed countries have already turned towards a ‘second generation’ case management 
system, but it has only recently even been thought about in Bangladesh where it is greatly needed. 
There are 2.1 million cases pending in the Subordinate Courts of Bangladesh. During my five years’ 
experience as a judge in Bangladesh, I found some cases had lasted through three generations of the 
same family. The object of Case Management is to ensure fair, speedy and cost-effective case 
disposal, which is a pre-condition of ensuring ‘Justice;’ Success in application of case management 
in reducing case backlog has already been proved. Case management is involved from the 
commencement of the dispute in the court till it is finally resolved; it is acknowledged that not all 
cases are suited to a case management regime. The primary responsibility for the case management 
should be upon the judges, who have the necessary attributes and interest in case management, with 
the help of lawyers, court staff and parties to the case. An effective case management will identify 
the issues in dispute at an early stage, reduce the delay and expenses, limit the interlocutory 
dealings and also firm a date for final hearing within a reasonable time after the suit is first filed. In 
this paper, I will explain the urgent necessity and scope for case management for the civil trial 
courts of Bangladesh, and how it can be a successful method in reducing backlogs. 
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. INTRODUCTION 
To dispose a case within the scheduled time is one of the components to ensure justice. 
The judiciary is an institution accountable to society to administer justice and to 
organize itself to ensure the resolution of disputes in a way that is not only fair, just 
and in accordance with the law but also efficient, cost effective and with a high 
degree of professionalism and skill (Doherty, Doogue & Simpson 2013). 
Delay in court proceedings has been perceived as a problem for long time. Former 
Chief Justice Spigelman of the New South Wales Supreme clarified that though it is 
often said that justice delayed is justice denied, at the same time it is to be 
remembered that not all lapses of time can be called ‘delay’(2009, p 1). Spigelman 
identified the driving force for case management due to the existence of delays in the 
court system (2009, p 7). 
Case management is no longer a new concept for judges and court managers in the 
United States and some other countries. Steelman noted that judges and court 
managers must be realistic about the implications of case management in making the 
court proceedings speedy. He then explained that on the civil side, implementation by 
the court is the key concepts of case management and is strongly correlated with 
speedy case processing times and reducing delay (1997, p 90). 
In this paper, the author has used some empirical data collected (18 Sep- 20 Oct, 2013) 
for her thesis with due process. The entire data collection is yet to be completed. 
 
 CASE MANAGEMENT  
Background 
Case management first appeared from a brief review of American court reform efforts 
in the twentieth century (Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan, 2004). In the first half of the 
twentieth century, this reform movement was introduced by Roscoe Pound, William 
Howard Taft and Arthur Vanderbilt (Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan, 2004). Among 
them the father of the reform in America was Roscoe Pound, who delivered a speech 
‘The causes of popular dissatisfaction with the administration of justice’ to a 
convention of the American Bar Association in 1906 (Pound, 1906). Like other 
common law countries, Australia is also concerned about the fairness, and cost 
efficiency of the judicial system (Sackville 1997). According to Justice Venning, case 
management was introduced in the Australia in the late 1980s when Soloman and 
Somerlot published their seminal text, ‘Case Flow Management in the Trial Court: 
Now and in the Future’ in 1987 (2013, p 1). Delay in courts is a common problem. 
Generally backlog means ‘exceeding the time frame’. But that definition has been 
changed in recent times. According to Steelman the terms ‘backlog’ and ‘congestion’ 
were often used interchangeably with ‘delay’ to describe a court experiencing 
difficulty with its caseload (1997, p 78). The general consensus about the definition of 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
222
delay was eventually expressed by the American Bar Association’s National 
Conference of State Trial Judges in 1984 where ‘Delay is declared to be any elapsed 
time beyond that necessary to prepare and conclude a particular case’ (Steelman, 
1997).  
Definition of Case Management  
Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan identifies caseflow management as the absolute heart 
of court administration (2004, p xvii). The Australian Law Reform Commission 
(ALRC) defines case management by emphasising the control of the case movement 
process through the Court or Tribunal (ALRC, 1996). It further states that when the 
case management is performed by the judges it is called ‘judicial case management’ 
(ALRC, 1996; P M Lane, 1993, p 3). 
The Case Management Society of Australia (CMSA) has also defined case 
management as, ‘Case management is a collaborative process of assessment, planning, 
facilitation and advocacy for options and services to meet an individual’s holistic 
needs through communication and available resources to promote quality cost 
effective outcomes’. CMSA also termed it as a service delivery approach. According 
to the proposal of the CMSA, properly trained court staff, termed as case managers, 
can develop plans or strategies in collaboration with the client, reflecting their choices 
and preferences for the service arrangements, to make the clients understand that they 
are involved in all aspects of the planning and service arrangement in a dynamic way.  
Therefore, case management in legal terms refers to the schedule of proceedings 
involved in a matter. There are various stages in litigation, such as the filing of a 
claim, written statements (answers), the discovery process, (interrogatories, subpoena, 
depositions, etc.), and motions that occur before a trial is held or a decision is 
rendered. Each stage of the process has a scheduled timeframe in which it should be 
completed. When a claim is filed and a case is assigned to a court, the judge will often 
set forth a schedule according to the relevant Act for the submission or completion of 
the pleadings, court appearances, and other matters, which can be broadly termed as 
case management. 
Attributes of Case Management 
The greatest success of case management is it reduces backlogs and delay. The 
Honorable Sir Mason outlined some advantages of case management: for example, it 
saves time of disposition, it also ensures the hearing date and future course of the case; 
it also helps to identify issues at a very early stage (1997, p 195). 
The goals of case management also reflect the importance of case management. 
Solomon and Somerlot identify the goals of case management as: ‘Court management 
of case progress as part of an organized predictable system should assure (1987, p 5): 
• equal treatment of all litigants by the court; 
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• timely disposition consistent with the circumstances of the individual 
case; 
• improving of the quality of the litigation process; and  
• public confidence in the court as an institution’ 
Although courts may differ in their specific approaches to caseflow management, 
those approaches can generally be considered on the basis of certain techniques that 
all successful courts have in common (Steelman 1997; Solomon and Somerlot 1987). 
At the same time it is also true that there is no single model of a successful delay-
reduction or delay-prevention program. Different courts use different approaches and 
adapted program details suitable to local circumstances and have not sought a single 
miracle cure (Steelman 1997). 
 
HOW THE CIVIL TRIAL COURTS OPERATE IN BANGLADESH 
The Court system of Bangladesh has developed over many years, and it is a 
combination of Islamic concepts and the common law system; however the common 
law system generally prevails on all civil matters, but family matters. The court 
structure of Bangladesh is a little complex. The lower judiciary is separated into civil 
and criminal matters though the higher judiciary deals with both. 
A major portion of Bangladeshi law was enacted during the British colonial period. 
After the independence (26 March 1971) of Bangladesh, in 1972 an order named the 
Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing Laws) Order 1972 (Bangladesh) was passed and 
through this Order all Acts, Ordinances, Regulations, Rules and Orders or by-laws 
which were enforced immediately before 26th day of March, 1971 comprised the laws 
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (Bangladesh (Adaptation of Existing Laws) 
Order 1972 Bangladesh s 2).  
With a population of 163 million in a territory of only 1,43,998 sq km, Bangladesh is 
the eighth most populous country in the world (CIA). In this vast populated country 
2.4 million cases are pending (Faruque, 2013) of which 77% are land litigation 
(Barkat & Roy, 2004).   
Under the supervision of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh, there is a set of Subordinate Courts and Tribunals having civil, criminal 
or special jurisdiction. Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution concerns the 
establishment of subordinate courts of law and the respective laws determine their 
powers, functions and jurisdictions. The civil courts are governed mainly by the Code 
of Civil Procedure 1908 (Bangladesh), the Civil Rules and Order 1935 (Bangladesh), 
the Specific Relief Act 1877 (Bangladesh), the Evidence Act 1872 (Bangladesh) and 
other relevant acts. 
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Every Civil Court shall try all suits of civil nature if they are not explicitly barred by 
law. A ‘suit of a civil nature’ means any dispute arising out of a right to property or a 
right to an office. Suits of civil nature also includes family suit. It is also stated that 
every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it (Code 
of Civil Procedure 1908 Bangladesh s 15). Though the Code has not defined the word 
‘suit’, a suit is considered to be a civil proceeding filed in civil court by the aggrieved 
person, institution, legal entity or the State, whose civil right has been violated. 
 
The stages of a civil suit in the court of first instance are as below: 
 
 
Chart 4: The Stages of a Civil Suit in Bangladeshi civil trial court 
A. Submission of Plaint 
When a dispute arises regarding any matter of a civil nature, any party can file a suit 
through application, which is commonly known as ‘plaint’. This is the first stage of a 
civil suit. The person who submits the plaint is called plaintiff and the person against 
whom the plaintiff files the suit is called defendant. While there no restriction that the 
plaintiff or the defendant must appear through their lawyer, the general practice is 
they appear through their lawyer and their lawyer prepares their applications 
including plaint/written statement and other relevant papers on their behalf. Along 
with the plaint the plaintiff has to submit the court fees and the cost of serving 
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summons and he also needs to submit as many copies of the plaint as the number of 
the defendants (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Bangladesh Or. IV rule 1). The 
Sheristadar1 (court officer) of the court shall examine the plaint to ascertain whether 
the plaint has been presented in accordance with provisions of the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908 under Civil Rules and Order 1935 Vol-1 rule 55.  
  
B. Service of Summons 
By this process, the court officer on behalf of the court takes the responsibility to 
inform the defendant that a suit has been filed against him. The court notice is sent to 
the defendant along with the copy of the plaint so that he knows what allegation has 
been drawn against him and he can prepare accordingly (Code of Civil Procedure 
1908 s 27). Generally the time limit for issuing summons is five working days, but 
service of the summons on the defendant depends upon the satisfaction of the Judge 
that the summons was duly served on the defendant. The defendant or his authorised 
agent to whom the summons is so delivered must acknowledge the service on the 
original copy of summons. 
C. Submission of Written Statement 
When the defendant comes to know that a suit has been filed against him, and he 
knows what allegation has been drawn against him, then it becomes his duty to go to 
the court and submit his statement in writing, which is popularly known as 
submission of written statement. Usually the time limit for submission of the written 
statement is up to 30 working days after receipt of the summons (Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908 Or. VIII rule 1). However, the court can extend the time up to 60 
working days (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Or. VIII rule 1) applying its 
discretionary power. The empirical observation by the author is this discretionary 
power is exercised frequently. 
If the defendant does not appear or submit written statement in court within time, then 
the Court holds the case for ex parte hearing and after taking documentary and oral 
evidence from the plaintiff the Court pronounces ex-parte judgment (Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908 Or. VIII rule 1).  
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In civil procedure Alternative Dispute Resolution is generally termed as ‘mediation’. 
Initiative to mediate between the parties has become compulsory under Code of Civil 
Procedure (Amendment) Act 2012. If the parties agree to try for mediation then the 
Judge will appoint a mediator for them, and the whole procedure shall not exceed 107 
days in total (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 s 89 A). The Judge himself can be  the 
mediator. If a mediator is appointed other than the judge himself, then fees will be 
imposed upon the parties. If the mediation is successful, then the mediator will submit 
a report to the court (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 s 89 A). It is to be mentioned that 
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though the Judge as well as the parties are bound to take an initiative for mediation, 
they are not bound to resolve the issue through mediation. 
E. Framing of Issues 
If the mediation fails, then the case goes back to the original court. The next step is 
framing of Issues. In this stage, the Court tries to find out the issues on which the 
parties disagree (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Or. XIV rule 1). 
F. Steps for Discovery, Production and Inspection 
Within 10 days of framing of the issues, the judge shall make necessary order for the 
production of the documents which are necessary for the suit (Code of Civil 
Procedure 1908 s 30 and Or XI rule 1). At this stage, the plaintiff or the defendant by 
leave of the Court may deliver interrogatories in writing for the examination of the 
opposite parties (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Or XI rule 2). 
G. Settling date before Peremptory Hearing 
This stage is a transitional stage between the Peremptory Hearing stage and stage for 
discovery, production and inspection. It is a conventionally accepted stage though not 
specified in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. According to the Civil Rules and 
Order 1935, there must not be in total more than 5 cases in the hearing list in each 
working day and will not exceed 120 cases in total at a time in the Cause List2 of the 
Court. The Code of Civil Procedure 1908  is very clear and restrictive about the 
fixation of suits in the daily Cause List. So if the Court Diary3 is full (that means if 
already 120 cases are already listed for hearing at a time), then the newly prepared 
cases must wait in this stage until the number of the cases from the court diary is 
reduced to 70 (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Or. XVIII rule 20). The empirical 
experience of this writer finds that though there are restrictions not to list more than 5 
cases in each working day on an average 12 cases are listed. 
H. Peremptory Hearing 
Hearing of the suit means at this stage the judge would be taking evidence both oral 
and documentary to consider the questions relating to the determination of the suit. 
General rule is the plaintiff takes the dock first. It is the responsibility of the party to 
present witnesses on their behalf. The Court has full discretion on showing of 
sufficient cause to allow adjournment up to a maximum of six times for each party 
(Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Or. XVII Rule 1). Order XVII rule 1 states that the 
court shall award costs to the other side in case of adjournment beyond six times. 
I. Argument 
This is another stage which exists in practice, but there is no specific provision in the 
Code of Civil Procedure 1908 for this stage. But Order XVIII, Rule 2 (2) & (3) of the 
Code of Civil Procedure 1908  states that:  
‘The other party shall then state his case and produce his evidence (if any) and 
may then address the Court generally on the whole case. The other party 
beginning may then reply generally on the whole case.’ 
 
The Asian Conference on Politics, Economists & Law 2013 
Official Conference Proceedings 2013 Osaka, Japan
227
After completion of the production of evidence from both parties, the court fixes a 
date for hearing the summary of the case and lawyers of the both parties argue on 
their behalf according to the evidence as well as to the laws. 
J. Judgment 
The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pronounce judgment4 and on such 
judgment a decree shall follow (Code of Civil Procedure 1908 s 33). A Judgment 
must be based on the evidence on record and should be concise but must touch all the 
important questions raised by the parties with reference to the issues in the suit 
(Justice Haque, 2011). The Judgments are enforced according to the direction written 
in the judgment. If there is no such direction, then the plaintiff has to file a separate 
execution suit according to section 38 & Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure 
1908. 
If any party is aggrieved by the judgement then the party can appeal to the higher 
court according to part VII of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Besides, the 
aggrieved party can go to higher court for revision under section 115 of the Code 
against any order of the interlocutory order from the original court. Empirical research 
finds that the parties often use this option and go for revision and it delays the whole 
procedure.  
 
 INTRODUCING CASE MANAGEMENT IN BANGLADESHI CIVIL COURTS 
Most developed countries have already turned towards a ‘second generation’ of case 
management development (Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2008). Earlier they 
concentrated on speedy disposal but now they are moving for cost effective court 
systems. It is to be noted that the court system of Bangladesh is adversarial where the 
judges plays a silent role, but to introduce case management the judge must play an 
active role as the controller of the court. So questions may arise as to whether these 
two roles may conflict. Here I want to argue that the basic feature of the Australian 
courts is also adversarial system and they have successfully introduced case 
management empowering the judges where the judge will actively control the court 
procedure. From the Bangladesh perspective, it can also be said that we already have 
introduced the ADR mechanism in our court proceedings as a compulsory on 
September 2012 through s 89 A of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 
2012. Moreover, the Act has allowed the judge to cross examine the witnesses to find 
out the truth, which is just the opposite of the adversarial system (Evidence Act 1872  
s 165). But this provision has been adapted to the adversarial system. So from this 
discussion it can be inferred that making judges more active by adopting case 
management will not conflict with the adversary system in Bangladesh. Chief Justice 
Spigelman also agreed with this view. He states that there is no inconsistency between 
the expanded managerial role for the judiciary and the essential requirements of an 
adversary system (Spigelman, 2009). 
As part of the Case management, the following things can be introduced in the civil 
court proceedings of Bangladesh. 
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Early court intervention 
It is found from the national research of the USA that early court control is clearly 
correlated with shorter times in disposition of civil cases (Lomvardis, Geordt & 
Gallas, 1991). Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan differentiate between what early control 
means in practice and what it should be. In practice early control refers only to the 
commencement of a case, focusing on a monitoring process and in this process, the 
clerk records the initial filing of a case and enters the case into a system under which 
it will be reviewed at a fixed time to determine whether the next anticipated event has 
occurred in keeping with time standards for interim stages in the cases progress (2004, 
p 3). One Judge from the Barishal Sadar Court has stated to the author that the court 
proceedings of Bangladesh is lawyer dominated. If the lawyers do not cooperate with 
the court no one will be able to resolve a case in time no matter how cordial the court 
is.  From the perspective of Bangladesh, case management would limit the control of 
lawyers from the very beginning of the case and will ensure court’s control for speedy 
disposal.  
 
Differentiated case management 
Differentiated Case Management (DCM) method is accepted by most of the countries 
who have adopted case management. Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan justifies why the 
DCM is necessary by stating that in the absence of case differentiation, courts 
customarily apply the same procedures and timetables to all cases of a given type. 
Generally courts give attention to cases according to their filing time (2004, p 4).  
Bakke & Solomon also argue that this Differentiated Case Management is not 
restrictive rather it is more flexible and each court can have their own method 
according to the categories of the cases (1989, p 17). Steelman, Goerdt & McMillan 
also describes how the DCM method would operate, stating that the operation of 
differentiated case management program depends on early court cognizance of each 
case at the moment of filing (2004, p 5). 
In Bangladesh all the judges, lawyers, and even the court staffs who were interviewed 
(the number was 22 till 31 October 2013) in this empirical research agreed that the 
partition suit and title suit need the most time and should be treated separately, and to 
ensure their timely disposition they should be given special attention from the very 
beginning of the filing case. A Lawyer from Sylhet division who took part in the 
empirical research suggested that there should be separate court to deal this type of 
cases by experienced judges. He strongly argued for separate family court. Though 
the Civil Rules and Order 1935 (Bangladesh) has classified the civil suits into five 
different categories, but in practice the treatment for all cases is same. The 
Bangladeshi Court needs to ensure different treatment according to the nature of the 
suit. 
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Realistic schedules for completion of court events  
Professor Friesen observed that it is lawyers, not judges, who settle cases. Lawyers 
settle cases when they are prepared and lawyers prepare for significant and 
meaningful court events (1984, p 4). To make the court event meaningful and to occur 
as scheduled is an important way to ensure that lawyers and parties will be prepared 
to make those events meaningful in terms of progress toward appropriate outcomes. 
In the perspective of Bangladesh this process will ensure lawyers’ participation and 
will make them responsible. Empirical research shows that there is no alternative to 
take the control of the court proceedings away from the lawyers and vesting it in the 
judges to ensure speedier resolution. 
Limiting discovery and controlling Interlocutory disputes 
Interlocutory applications add to the duration and cost of litigation. There are a 
number of measures which can be utilised to limit interlocutory applications 
(Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2008). They fall into two broad categories: 
1. measures restricting interlocutory steps in a proceeding; and 
2. measures to reduce unnecessary interlocutory applications. 
Empirical research finds that judge from the Sylhet sadar court sharing her experience 
told that if you perused some records you will find, the cases which were intervened 
by the higher court were delayed in disposal. Interlocutory proceedings may also add 
to cost and delay when procedural decisions are the subject of appeals or applications 
for leave to appeal. Therefore, I would suggest on restriction of appeals on purely 
procedural decisions to save time.  
Trial management 
By managing trials effectively, judges can continue to do justice in individual cases 
while expanding the availability of the scarcest resources in the courts, judge time and 
courtroom space, for other matters (McConnell, 1991). Steelman, Goerdt & Mcmillan 
argue that as part of overall case management, trial management involves a set of 
steps, which include (2004 p 12; Zeliff 1989): 
• Preparation for trial 
• Scheduling to start trials on time and provision of adequate time for them 
• Management of jury selection 
• Maintenance of trial momentum, and 
• Establishment and enforcement of time limits. 
The empirical observation finds that the lengthiest process of the stages in the civil 
court proceedings is the trial stage. So proper management in this stage could ensure a 
firm and credible trial date and would ensure the timely disposition of cases. 
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Most of the courts in Australia have introduced subpoena where it is mandatory to 
collect and prepared for all documents before starting trial (Uniform Civil Procedure 
Rules (NSW) Part 33 rule 33.11). Empirical research shows that in Bangladesh the 
arrangement for documents take much time at the trial stage and often the trial 
procedure is stopped due to arrangement of the documents. It could be controlled 
through introducing subpoena procedure.  
Alternative Dispute Resolution 
In Bangladesh the ADR mechanism has failed to reach in its goal. Empirical research 
finds that lawyers and sometimes the party do not take initiative to resolve a case 
through mediation. The judge from the Khulna Sadar Court claimed that the lawyers 
do not want to resolve a case through mediation because this may reduce the number 
of pending cases in their hand and the parties of the suit consider winning rather 
prestigious matter. In fact the ADR is to ensure the win-win situation and the party 
must be encouraged. Proper training among the judges and mediators would be a 
good way to motivate the party as well as the lawyers to resolve a case through 
mediation. This method will end a case finally because no appeals from the mediated 
decision will be lie to the higher court. 
Proactive Judicial Case management 
One of the factors having an impact on the operation of the civil justice system is the 
apparent increase in the legal and factual complexity of many civil cases and the 
disproportionate impact on judicial resources of what has been described as ‘mega 
litigation’. The Victorian Law Reform Commission has also introduced and ensured 
proactive judicial management for complex litigation (2008, p 359). In the light of 
these difficulties Justice Sackville raised the question of what can be done to achieve 
more effective judicial control of mega-litigation. Many of his observations are 
equally relevant to judicial management of civil litigation generally. As Justice 
Sackville noted (2007, p 13):  
• There is ‘no easy solution’. 
• The aspiration of ‘just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues’ in dispute is 
easier to express than to achieve. 
• Modern technology may help but it is ‘wishful thinking’ to assume that modern 
information technology will solve the problem. 
• ‘Vigorous’ judicial management and control will help restrict the ambit of the 
litigation but will not prevent mega-litigation ‘imposing an unreasonable burden on 
the judicial system’. 
 
In Bangladesh all the participants of the empirical research agreed that partition suit 
can be termed as ‘mega litigation’. So proactive judicial case management for the 
partition suit can be a solution for speedy disposal. 
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Reform of Legislation 
To ensure the smooth functioning of a case management mechanism it must be 
incorporated within the substantive laws of the civil court proceedings through 
amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. In 2012 a good number of 
amendments were made to the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The main concern of 
those amendments was time binding and to limit the discretionary power of the court. 
But those amendments did not focus on court administration or case management. It 
will not be a matter of how we shorten the time; it is rather the matter how we execute 
law within its timeframe. As part of empirical research, 40 case records were perused 
to find out the real cause for delay and in those sample suits (40 cases) it was found 
that the average time, for disposal of the cases, was 1623 days, while the Act 
determined time to days to resolve at best 321 days. 
My empirical research shows that delay occurred due to service of summons, 
interlocutory matters, discovery at the later stage, and in times of trial. It is also found 
that the cases continuing more than years, were mostly delayed due to intervening 
interlocutory matters or to produce further documents. Without reforming legislation 
proper case management cannot be ensured. Experience from the other countries 
showed that the flexible case management method will be more useful, effective and 
can be monitored rather making it restricted. 
 
Introducing e-judiciary system 
In Bangladesh the whole judicial system is based on manual input which is time 
consuming. E- judiciary already introduced in many countries proved that there is no 
alternate to it. It ensures not only assessment, plan, execution & monitoring but also 
transparency at the same time. 
CONCLUSION 
Lord Woolf5 identified some defects of the civil justice system which are very much 
relevant to Bangladesh; for example: it is too expensive, very often the case costs 
often exceeds the value of the claim; too slow in bringing the cases to a conclusion 
and too unequal: there is a lack of equality between the powerful, wealthy litigation 
will cost and how long it will last induces the fear of the unknown; and it is in 
comprehensible to many litigants (Ministry of Justice UK). Above all, in the civil 
court of Bangladesh no one with clear overall responsibility for the administration of 
civil justice; the whole system is too adversarial as cases are run by the lawyers, not 
by the courts or the rules of the courts, which in turn are also too often ignored by the 
parties and not enforced by the court. Against this background the only solution 
appears to lie with ensuring appropriate case management. At the same time, case 
management would ensure a proper monitoring system for speedy disposal. It can be 
said that case management varies and Case management programs are now 
commonplace in trial courts throughout the world. Effective case management is part 
of what is considered optimal performance for a court in terms of service to the public. 
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This author argues for the judge’s role as case manager, because discretion lies at the 
heart of case management and only the judge can apply the discretionary power. The 
case management must ultimately be an activity that judges actually undertake on a 
day to day basis (Steelman, Geordt & McMillan, 2004). Proper case management in 
the civil trial court of Bangladesh would be able to ensure access to justice 
implementing Woolf’s principle of civil justice (Ministry of Justice UK).  
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1 Seristadar is the Office administrative officer. For each and every court there shall 
be a Seristadar who will be responsible for the administrative work of the Court. They 
are also appointed by the Government but not necessarily from a Law background. 
2 Cause list is the office registrar book to maintain the suit number and their date of 
hearing. A Daily Cause List in the prescribed form shall be posted in some 
conspicuous part of every court-house for the information of the parties, their 
advocates and the public. Cases and appeals shall be shown in the order in which they 
appear in the Diary (Rule 13 of CRO). 
3 A Diary in the prescribed form to be called the Diary of the Court of and shall be 
maintained by each Civil court in the manner prescribed by Rule 12 of CRO. 
4 Judgment means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or 
order, see, Civil Procedure Code 1908 (Bangladesh) s 2(9). 
5 The Lord Chancellor appointed Lord Woolf, one of the England’s most senior 
judges, to review existing rules and procedures, gather evidence and opinion from 
civil justice professionals and commentators, and identify effective ways to cut costs, 
reduce the complexity of the rules, and remove unnecessary distinctions of practice 
and procedure between the courts. Woolf’s interim report was published in 1995 and 
after consultation, the final report was published in June 1996. 
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Abstract 
 
The utilization study of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2011 by the Thailand development 
research institute (TDRI) revealed that the FTA helps with a variety of raw materials reduces the 
cost of production and increases its competitiveness in the global market. The FTA facilitates 
Thailand access to a larger market and as motivate for investment in both goods and services 
aboard. Overall, the impact of the FTA on trade is difficult to evaluate due to the influence of 
many factors involved. The analytical benefits of trade cannot determine conclusively for there 
are benefits to Thailand FTA much how. This study adopts an econometric model of the 
Generalized Method of Moment Estimators to Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) Analysis to estimate 
the substantial impact of the FTA on the economic factor and non – economic factor affecting the 
growth of Thailand’s economy. Scope of the study of FTA covers the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA), ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), and the Japan-Thailand 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), which Thai exports gained FTA benefits most of the 
top three. Empirical results of this study found most significant factors affect economic growth of 
Thailand were finding of output. In addition, may be able proxy to assess the role of the FTA in 
attracting investment inflow for contributing to Thailand economic development.  
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I.    Introduction 
 
Thailand's vision is to make Thailand to be the center of trade and investment in Asia 
in 2006. Government needs to strengthen economic base on the Dual Track Policy in 
developing countries, which is expanding exports to increase employments and 
incomes for entrepreneurs and farmers.  Thailand Development Research Institute 
(TDRI) revealed, according to the FTAs utilization study in 2011, Thai exports gained 
FTA tax benefits worth 118.20 billion bahts, or 3% of total export value, from 
bilateral trade agreement countries. That is higher than the 16.41 billion bahts 
recorded a year earlier. Exporters to ASEAN countries earned the highest privileges 
from the FTAs at 75.58 billion bahts. The import sector also benefited from FTAs at 
70.80 billion bahts in 2011up 11.64 billion bahts from 2010, or 2.7% of total import 
value. The FTA assists on a variety of raw materials, reduces the cost of production 
and increases its competitiveness in the global market. The FTA makes Thailand to a 
larger market and as motivation for investment in both goods and services from a 
board. Overall, the impact of the FTA on trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflow, which it is difficult to evaluate due to the impact of many factors involving. 
The overall analytical benefits of trade only one side cannot conclude conclusively 
that there are benefits to Thailand FTA much how. Because of the benefits of FTA in 
overall also needs to include trades in services sector and investment sector, which are 
measured in value can be difficult. This question is a novelty of this study; it will lead 
to analyze the impact of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on economic growth in 
Thailand. This study applies an econometric model of Panel Data Analysis on the 
generalized method of moments to Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) analysis to find the 
impact of the FTA to the economic growth of Thailand. The factors analyzed are 
economic factor and non – economic factor, which consist of economic potential, 
potential for investment, political stability and other variables to the economic growth 
of Thailand. The testing hypothesis of this study, that both trade and Quality of 
Institutions positively affect economic growth and Quality of Institutions has the 
largest effect on economic growth than trade (Linh Bun 2009). The study has covered 
1) ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), 2) ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 
(ACFTA), 3) Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), Thai 
exports has gained FTA benefits the most of the top three (Department of Trade 
Negotiation of Thailand). Expected results of this study may be able to find most 
significant factors that affect on economic growth of Thailand. In addition, it will lead 
to find the impact of the FTA on economic growth of Thailand and be able proximate 
assessing the role of FTA in attracting investment inflow for contribution to Thailand 
economic development.  
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
Until recently, many researchers have shown interest in the field of the FTA the effect 
on Thailand economic growth, and suggested many strategies to adjust international 
trade policies. These studies have carried out impact of economic and non – economic 
factor in economic growth and show the role of those factors used to contribute FTA 
between Thailand and partner country. Major findings and suggestions are as below. 
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A.   The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Economic and Non-Economic Factor 
Analysis 
Since the late 1970s, the ASEAN region has been one of the most attractive 
investment destinations in the developing world. ASEAN countries substantially 
liberalized their international trade and investment regimes by lowering trade barriers 
and lifting restrictions on foreign investment. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
foreign direct investment (FDI) plays an important role in the process of economic 
development in this region (Doktorgrades 2004). Which Japan and East Asian Newly 
Industrialized Countries (NICs) are the main sources of investments and their share of 
total foreign investment in this region has increased substantially (Athukorala and 
Menon 1996). The ASEAN countries found out the strategy for investment in the 
developing region, the FTA that is suitable to force developing in this region. Free 
Trade Area (FTA) is a group of countries that have agreed to eliminate tariffs, quotas 
and preferences on most goods and services between them. FTA is the second degrees 
of the preferential trading arrangement or economic integration consist of five forms: 
the preferential tariff arrangement, free trade area, customs union, common market, 
and economic union (Kuchiki and Tsuji 2008). Major FTA in effect in the Asia-
Pacific Region of AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA has effect in 1992, 2004, and 2007 
respectively. Since the establishment of AFTA in 1992, Thailand’s intra-trade with 
other ASEAN members has grown significantly (Leelawath 2010). Since Thailand 
became a net exporter in ASEAN market, and trade balance started to be positive. The 
net gains kept increasing until 1995. Although the tariff elimination schedule started 
from 2004 under ACFTA, the lowering of tariffs remained limited until 2008 except 
for agricultural products in the early harvest program (Shino 2012). The most gains 
from ASEAN-Japan FTA would derive from ASEAN tariff reductions, rather than 
market access, which will lead to higher price competitiveness, and increased exports 
and investment (Komolavanij et al. 2008). In terms of economic factors are all the 
units required in economic activities of production of goods and services with 
effective and efficient utilization of resources and fulfilling consumption demands in 
any market and national economy. Non - economic factors are social and political 
environments that may not directly affect the level of national incomes and outputs. 
Among regressors are variables relating to trades, trade policies, exchange rates, fiscal 
policies, political stability, social stability, rights, human capitals, macroeconomic 
policies and macroeconomic outcomes. Early studies tended to focus on trade policy 
and investment; studies associated with new growth theory typically including with  
initial real incomes and some measures of human capitals as well as an investment 
(Fische 1991). There are more foreign exchange markets than exchange rates. 
Understanding how  economies of different countries interplay and affect exchange 
rates is an important factor in determining, whether you would be successful in 
trading currencies or not. Inflations, interest rates, government debts and political 
stabilities, all influence how currencies will perform relatively to one another. 
B. Applying the Dynamic Panel Data (DPD) analysis  
 
Panel data offer a potential solution to the endogenous problem through to use of 
lagged values as instruments of endogenous variables (Lederman and Maloney 2003). 
Other article (e.g., Easterly et al. 1997; Levine et al. 2000; Bond et al. 2001) on 
economic growth attempting to deal with both unobserved country-specific effects 
and endogenous explanatory variables, a common finding as was regardless of 
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estimation technique, trade structure variables are important determinants of growth 
rates and hence probably should be in the conditioning set of growth regressions. 
Phillips and Sul (2003), argue that the homogeneity assumptions in dynamic panel 
models are convenient and commonly employed to take advantage of pooling in panel 
regression. However, these restrictions are sometimes, not well supported by the data 
and might produce misleading results and invalidate inference. Faruqee (2004) argue 
conduct advantage of dynamic panel data technical in fixed effect estimation 
overdirectly including these specific measures is controlling for omitted variable bias 
at the expense of isolating the individual contribution of distance on trade. The time 
effects intend to capture common time development with respect to bilateral trade 
across all trading partners in the panel. 
 
III. Empirical study 
Specific predictions of bilateral trade from the growth model in cross-country can be 
generated and further to compare, the effect of economic and non-economic factor of 
Thailand and trade partner on economic growth under the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA), ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), and Japan-
Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) of Thailand. 
A. The Growth model Approach  
 
The study begins with a basic specification that can nest much of the existing work on 
the empirical economic growth. Most of the previous work discussed above, and in 
fact, much of the growth literature until recently has been base on estimations of an 
equation similar to model (1) using cross sectional regression data that lack any time 
dimension, although the drawbacks are well know (Lederman and Maloney 2003). 
The growth model can be express as follows: 
 
(1)                              ititittiit uvXyy ++++= − ϕτγβ 1,ln  
 
Where ity  is the GDP per capita of country i in period t, itiy −,  is log income per capita 
at the beginning of the period; itX  is the variable of conditioning trade flow (export 
value), itτ is the particular economic variable of interest, iu  is an individual country 
fixed effect, tv  is a sample wide time effect. 
 
The new growth theory has also returned to some of the classic themes of the 
development literature, among them the roles of technology, international trade, 
human capital, economies of scale, and the possible need for a coordinated big 
investment push to break out of a low-income equilibrium (Fischer 1991). In term of 
economic variable of interest (Error! Bookmark not defined.), we would to find 
from ),( HAf=τ , where A is the level of technology, but also for example 
representing the quality of government management of the economy, or institutional 
factors; H are human capital, respectively. The quality of government manages of the 
economy was represented by the share of investment in GDP, public debt, and 
inflation rate. For the human capital representation in the labor force, the reason for 
uses those variables because of the countries of ASEAN has useful in human capital 
and natural resources field with views of need investor from aboard. As for variation 
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of conditioning trade flow, it consists of the bilaterally export value, the bilateral real 
exchange rate, an average tariff rate in importing, net inflow foreign direct 
investment, the number of the population, and effect of an FTA by a dummy variable. 
Generalized Method of Moment Estimators to Dynamic Panel Data Model was 
implement, which would be applied First-difference Generalized Method of Moment 
technical invent by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1998) and Arellano and Bond (1991) estimate 
the effect between variables. Such technique could eliminate country specific effect 
problem because of most countries have a different economic system. In terms of 
analyzing the impact of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on economic growth on 
Thailand, we devise two-group model, which consists of the model for analyzing 
economic and non economic factor of Thailand effect on the economic growth of 
Thailand under different FTA , the AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA. Specific model can 
be writing as follows: 
 
(2) +++++++++= − ititititijtijtitijttiti pdlfirpoptarerFDIortyy 216543211,1, expln ϕϕγγγγγγβ
          ijtijit AFTA εϕ ++sin3   
(3) +++++++++= − ititititijtijtitijttiti pdlfirpoptarerFDIortyy 216543211,1, expln ϕϕγγγγγγβ
         ijtijit ACFTA εϕ ++sin3         
(4) +++++++++= − ititititijtijtitijttiti pdlfirpoptarerFDIortyy 216543211,1, expln ϕϕγγγγγγβ
         ijtijit JTEPA εϕ ++sin3        
  
tijijijt vu ,+=ε , 0)(,0)(,0)( ,, === tijijtijij vuEvEuE  
 
Where the bilateral export value of product from country i to country j in year t and 
net flow foreign direct investment (current US$) in country i in year t are ijtortexp , 
and itFDI . The bilateral real exchange rate between i and j in year t is  erijt , an 
average tariff rate in importing country j on goods from country i in year t   represent 
in tarijt,  a n d  the number of population of country i in year t is itpop . The quality of 
government management of the economy, or institutional factors a r e  c a p t u r e d  
b y  t h e  t e r m  share of investment in GDP of country i in year t ( itsin ) ,  the public 
debt of country i in year t ( itpd ), inflation rate of country i in year t ( itir ), and labor 
force of country i in year t ( itlf ). For the rest of the article, we focus on the situation 
were AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA are effect on economic growth ( ijAFTA =1, 
ijACFTA =1, and ijJTEPA =1), which is realistic for the situation presented in the 
following section ( ijAFTA =0, ijACFTA =0, and ijJTEPA =0 would not effect on 
economic growth) 
 
The model for analyzing economic and non-economic factor of trade partner affects 
on the economic growth of Thailand under AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA can be 
writing as follows: 
 
(5) ++++++++= − jtitjtijtijtjtijttiti lfirpoptarerFDIortyy 16543211,1, expln ϕγγγγγγβ
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                     ijtijjt AFTA εϕ ++sin2   
(6)
 
++++++++= − jtitjtijtijtjtijttiti lfirpoptarerFDIortyy 16543211,1, expln ϕγγγγγγβ  
                     ijtijjt ACFTA εϕ ++sin2   
(7)        
++++++++= − jtitjtijtijtjtijttiti lfirpoptarerFDIortyy 16543211,1, expln ϕγγγγγγβ   
           ijtijjt JTEPA εϕ ++sin2       
  
  tijijijt vu ,+=ε , 0)(,0)(,0)( ,, === tijijtijij vuEvEuE  
 
These model has some factor similar in model 2,3, and 4 model and using similar 
notations in tiy , , 1, −tiy , ijtortexp , erijt , tarijt,  a n d itir ,  w h i c h  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  
the quality of government management of the economy, and  investment factor o f  
t r a d e  p a r t n e r .  T h e  f a c t o r  c h a n g e  a r e  share of investment in GDP of 
country j in year t ( jtsin ) ,  labor force of country j in year t ( jtlf ), net flow foreign 
direct investment (current US$) in country j in year t ( jiFDI ), and number of 
population of country j in year t ( jtpop ). In addition, focus on the situation were 
AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA are effect on economic growth ( ijAFTA =1, ijACFTA =1, 
and ijJTEPA =1), which is realistic for the situation presented in the following section 
( ijAFTA =0, ijACFTA =0, and ijJTEPA =0 would not effect on economic growth). Both 
model promote iu  is an individual country fixed effect, tv  is a sample wide time 
effect, and itε  is country and time specific effect. 
 
B. Dynamic panel data analysis (Generalized Method of Moments; GMM) 
 
The problems in empirical work are the country specific effects because most of 
countries are different in economic conditions and the dependent variable may have 
correlated with the error term. Thus, this study applied the Generalized Method of 
Moment Estimators to Dynamic Panel Data Model by First-difference Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) technique for resolving country’s specific effect problem. 
The Panel Data Methods is useful to reflect the dynamic variable changes of the data 
and identify the difference of data in each unit together. Although the consistency of 
the instrument variable (IV) coefficient estimates is not affect by the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, the standard IV estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent, 
preventing valid inference. The usual approached today when facing 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form is to use the GMM, introduced by Hansen 
(1982). GMM makes use of the orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient 
estimation in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form (Baum et al. 2003).  
In the context of GMM, the overidentifying restrictions may be test via the commonly 
employed Sargan test statistic or J test statistic of Hansen (1982). The J statistic is 
distributed as chi-square (χ2) with degrees of freedom equal to the number of over 
identifying restrictions L − K rather than the total number of moment conditions L 
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because, in effect, K degrees of freedom are used up in estimating the coefficients. J is 
the most common diagnostic utilized in GMM estimation to evaluate the suitability of 
the model. The null hypothesis for this test is that the instruments are valid in the 
sense that they not correlated with the errors in the first-difference equation. If the 
model cannot reject the null hypothesis implies that the instruments are satisfying the 
orthogonality conditions required for this implementation. 
 
C. The Expected Sign of Results 
 
The relationship between exports with GDP measuring is expects to be positive. A 
higher GDP in Thailand should be cause higher production capacity, which in turn 
transform into the ability of the Thailand economy to export more (supply side). On 
the other hand, a higher GDP for a trading partner country means a higher absorption 
capacity, i.e., the trading partner country is able to import more (demand side) 
(Jordaan and Kanda 2011). Zarzoso and Lehmann (2003) had argued that a negative 
relationship between exports and population is an indication of an absorption effect. 
The exchange rate, tariff rate, inflation rate and labor force all should have a negative 
effect on the observed variability of economic growth. For example, Schuh (1974) 
was the first to argue that the overvalued dollar caused the decline in agricultural 
exports due to their relative expense in other countries, so that the over valuation of 
the exchange rate had a large negative effect on agricultural exports. According to the 
study of Fischer (1993), using a regression analog of growth accounting, its present 
cross-sectional and panel regressions results had shown that growth was negatively 
associated with inflation, large budget deficits and distorted foreign exchange 
markets. Supplementary evidence suggests that the causation runs from 
macroeconomic policy to growth. The framework makes it possible to identify the 
channels of these effects: inflation alleviates growth by reducing investment and 
productivity growth; budget deficits also reduce both capital accumulation and 
productivity growth. Examination of exceptional cases shows that while low inflation 
and small deficits are not necessary for high growth even over long periods, high 
inflation is in consistent with sustained growth. Fischer (1991) base on the new 
growth theory to define the relationships between macroeconomic policies and 
growth, and the partial correlations between growth and inflation as well as growth 
and the budget deficit were examines. The results found that, the relationship between 
inflation rate and growth was negative and positive effect existed between investment 
and growth. The distance as expect to be negative related to the trade flow of exports, 
i.e. the longer the distance of foreign market, the higher the costs involved in trading 
and therefore a negative effect on trade flow. Thailand has strategies to join the Trade 
FTAs with several groups to reduce her tariff rates of major import and exports. The 
expected sign of FDI variable on economic growth ought to be positive. Not only this 
nexus should be co-integrate in the long-run (Adhikary 2011)	  but Thailand had also 
impact from the high competitiveness of Asian countries to reduce of tariff rate, 
which market share of the export market. The Thai government has to use many the 
external long–term debts for the development of infrastructures to support 
transportation agriculture products in each region of Thailand, such as double track 
railway. Hence, a higher level of Thailand's public debt could induce a negative effect 
on economic growth. 
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D. Data Sources  
The dataset in this study comprises 204 observations, which include 17 annual 
observations (1995-2011) for ASEAN countries, China country, and Japan country, 
which were countries of major trading partners. The product for analysis devise by 
major items utilizing FTAs in Thailand consist of the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement 
(AFTA), ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), and Japan-Thailand 
Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), which the information from the Ministry 
of Commerce, Thailand. The observed variable data between 1995 – 2011 
were sourced from World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (WDI) and 
the United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) statistics. 
The details as following: The GDP per capita data measure gross domestic product 
(1995 -2011) as sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI 
2005). The bilateral export data, labor force and the tariff rate data were the source of 
the UNCTAD’s statistics,	   the bilateral export data	   as	   a merchandise trade matrix - 
product groups, exports in thousands of dollars, annual, 1995-2012. The variable is 
measure as the weighted average tariff rate. Exchange rate data were source from 
WDI (2005). The exchange rate is measure as the period average exchange rate on 
number of local currency units that can be trade for one US dollar. The inflation rate 
was the source of the UNCTAD’S statistics. The net inflow foreign investment is 
obtains from OECD Statistics and Printed Issues of UNCTAD’s World Investment 
Report (WIR). The populations were sources from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI 2005). A dummy variable takes a value one when the 
two countries belong to the same Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and zero. The source 
of Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Data was from an intra bloc trade of world trade 
organization. Data shares of investment in GDP and public debt were sources from 
The World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database. The share of investment in 
GDP is measure as gross capital formation percentage of GDP. Public debt data is 
measured as external debt stock, public and publicly guaranteed (current US$). 
 
 
IV.    Results 
 
Empirical estimation results represent the effect of economic and non-economic 
variable on economic growth of Thailand are effective of Thailand variables and 
trading partner variable effect on economic growth. Which results would reflect the 
FTA’s effect of AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA on economic growth of Thailand and 
show the effect between Thai variable and trading partner variable in each unit with 
economic growth of Thailand.  
 
A. Analysis of effect Thailand variables to Thailand’s  economic growth  
 
Table 1 represents the results. The relationship between Thailand variable under 
AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA, we used the First-difference Generalized Method of 
Moment technique for resolve problem, analyzed a country specific effect problem. 
Results of Model 2 are in line with the expect sign literature, which variable of 
Thailand under the AFTA has a positive effect on economic growth consist of the net 
inflow foreign direct investment, share of investment in GDP, number of population, 
and effect of  AFTA. Included the public debt, bilateral exchange rate, tariff rat, and 
labor force has a negative effect on economic growth. However, the inflation has a 
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positive effect, which it is not in line with the expect sign literature.  Model 3 shows 
effect sign and significant effect of the variable of Thailand on economic growth 
under ACFTA. The bilateral export value, inflation rate and effect of ACFTA have a 
positive effect on economic growth. However, under the ACFTA, the net foreign 
direct investment, labor force, and share of investment in GDP has negative effect 
may cause of Thailand and China are competitor country for absorbing direct 
investment from aboard investor. According Brimble (2002) found the growing 
importance of creating or strategic assets influencing foreign investment location 
decisions (World Investment Report 1998). 
 
Table1. Impact of Thailand variables on Thailand’s economic growth 
Variable 
Economic of Thailand 
Free Trade Agreement 
AFTA (2) ACFTA(3) JTEPA(4) 
    
Initial income 3387.103*** 1170.277 *** 71929.11** 
The bilateral export value 4.25E-05 8.41E-05** 1.165873*** 
Net Foreign direct investment in 
Thailand 
7.20E-05*** -4.17E-05*** 0.059310** 
Share of investment (% of GDP) 75.23861*** - 65.7787*** 61918.54* 
Public debt of Thailand -1.29E-05*** -2.50E-05*** 2709.393 
Labor force of Thailand -0.254415*** 0.662602*** 237.9512** 
Tariff rate (Average rate weight) -64.53392*** 32.90929*** 61918.54 
Inflation rate of Thailand 80.28114*** 53.75509*** -67232.08 
Population of Thailand 0.024344*** -0.089391*** -313.7379* 
Bilateral exchange rate -0.000951*** 21937.56** 2709.393 
Effect of FTA 2027.517*** 33.74428*** 25235.87 
Observations 204 204 204 
J- statistics 
Instrument rank 
11.88 
13 
11.94 
12 
3.60 
12 
p value of Sargan statistic test (R- 
square) 
0.54 0.45 0.98 
The Generalized Method of Moment Estimators to Dynamic Panel Data Model by First-difference Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) with *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Estimations done by Eviews. 
 
It suggests that one of the main results of greater so-called “broader” impacts of FDI 
could be to strengthen the level of “created assets.” in the Thai business environment. 
In term of Model 4 found that under JTEPA, effect sign and significant effect of 
bilateral export value, net foreign direct investment, and labor force has positive effect 
on economic growth, which according to expect sign literature. Focus on the bilateral 
export value has positive effects on economic growth under ACFTA and JTEPA are 
significant. Support this effect by the study of Pholphirul (2009) found that the impact 
of tariff reduction under the AFTA schedule could be assesses through commodities 
and export demand function. Tariff reduction on each commodity should be reflect in 
changes in all commodity sectors, including prices of goods, production, price of 
labor and capital, etc. Effect of AFTA and ACFTA has a positive effect on economic 
growth significant, but the effect of JTEPA on economic growth not significantly. 
Thailand's economic stability and quality of government management would reflect to 
the share of investment in GDP, public debt, Inflation rate and labor force, which 
signs effect on economic growths, was difference under AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA 
significant. Under AFTA, Share of investment in GDP and inflation rate has positive 
effect on economic growth, whereas the public debt and labor force has negative 
effect on economic growth, which accorded to expect sign literature. In term of 
ACFTA found that share of investment in GDP and public debt has negative effect on 
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economic growth, wherewith labor force and inflation rate has positive effect on 
economic growth.  For under the JTEPA found that share of investment in GDP, 
public debt, and labor force has a positive effect on economic growth, which the 
inflation rate has negative effect on economic growth. The findings support from 
work of Anantarangsi (2011), found that China and Japan may prefer to use Thailand 
as a headquarter site rather than a production base because of the increasing 
competitiveness in terms of labor costs and availability of resources and technology in 
the CLMV countries, not to mention the overall business environments of Malaysia 
and Singapore. Thailand requires, therefore, a period of intensive reflection with a 
view to understanding the important factors that inspire enhanced FDI flows. Test 
efficient estimate of the model and the overidentifying restrictions would be test via 
the commonly employed Sargan test statistic or J test statistic found that p value of 
the Sargan test statistic (R- square) more than 0.4 all of model in this study. Which 
meaning was the model cannot rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the 
instruments are satisfying the orthogonality conditions required for this employment. 
 
B. Analysis of effect Trade partner variables to Thailand’s  economic growth  
 
For each trade partner variable, table 2 presents effect of trade partner variable on 
economic growth of Thailand, which includes the bilateral trade variable namely 
bilateral export value, bilateral exchange rate, and tariff rate. In particular variable of 
trade partner for analyze composite net inflow foreign direction investment, share of 
investment of GDP, labor force, and effect of AFTA, ACFTA, and JTEPA. For the 
ASEAN countries are trade partner under AFTA in model 5, found that the bilateral 
export value and share of investment in GDP of ASEAN has a positive effect 
significant at 5% and 10% level respectively. Most of trade partner variable has an 
effect on economic growth of Thailand are variable under ACFTA in model 6, 
wherewith has sign effect same direction with the variable under JTEPA in model 7.  
Results found that net inflow foreign direct investment and population of trade partner 
has a positive effect on economic growth. The share of investment in GDP and labor 
force of trade partner has a negative effect. Appears results able identify influent of 
net inflow foreign direct investment of China and Japan has benefit to Thailand. The 
coefficient of net foreign direct investment in Japan under JTEPA higher than China 
under ACFTA, It is mean that the  net inflow foreign direct investment in Japan 
increased affect to the economic growth of Thailand increase follow that. Most gains 
from ASEAN-Japan FTA would derive from ASEAN’s tariff reduction, rather than 
market access, which will lead to higher price competitive, and increase export and 
investment (Komolavanij 2008). 
 
Table2. Impact of trade partner variables on Thailand’s economic growth  
 
Variable 
Economic of trade partner 
Free Trade Agreement 
AFTA (5) ACFTA (6) JTEPA(7) 
    
Initial income -2940.482** 696.9423*** -5203.313 
The bilateral export value 0.000846** -1.87E-06 0.181068 
Net Foreign direct investment of 
trade partner 
-1.36E-07 4.40E-07*** 0.024365*** 
Share of investment (% of GDP) of 
trade partner 
297.4158* -41.24835*** -56406.45 
Labour force of trade partner -0.197442 -0.016853*** 356.9938 
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Tariff rate (Average rate weight) 195.4235 2.060245*** -213324.3** 
Population of trade partner 0.089013 0.054882*** 546.0977** 
Bilateral exchange rate -0.001838 16637.19*** -176845.5** 
Effect of FTA 942.3507 -198.3194*** -277801.6*** 
J-statistics  10.33 11.98 3.81 
Instrument rank 12 12 12 
p value of Sargan statistic test (R- 
square) 
0.59 0.44 0.98 
The Generalized Method of Moment Estimators to Dynamic Panel Data Model by First-difference Generalized 
Method of Moment (GMM) with *, **, ***: statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Estimations done by Eviews. 
 
Test efficient estimate of the model and the overidentifying restrictions would be 
tested Sargan test statistic or J test statistic found that p value of the Sargan test 
statistic (or square) more than 0.4 all models of analysis between trade partner 
variability and economic growth of Thailand. Which meaning was the model cannot 
rejection of the null hypothesis implies that the instruments are satisfying and the 
model suitable for this study. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Results of this study had to shown that the relationship between Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) of Thailand with trade partner effect on economic growth of 
Thailand, wherewith each of relationship was able to identify the situation of Thailand 
and the role of play in the market. The role of Thailand in ASEAN market, Thailand 
may be as a trader and as competitor in the same time. The result of dynamic panel 
data analysis, some variables of Thailand has a negative effect on economic growth 
such as labor force. Therefore, Thailand should devote there to developing human 
capital in all fields for take more advantage than competitor in the ASEAN market 
should, to support the efficient labor for foreign direct investment in Thailand from 
abroad. Trade between Thailand and China under ACFTA revealed found that many 
trade variables of China have a positive effect on economic growth of Thailand such 
as net inflow foreign direct investment and population of China. These results mean 
that if there is more progress of China's economic, it will contribute to increased 
economic growth of Thailand as well. In terms of trade between Japan and Thailand 
under JTEPA found that net inflow foreign direct investment and population of Japan 
has a positive effect on economic growth of Thailand, which the expected benefit 
from Japan of Thailand has same reason in China case. The other hand, the 
entrepreneurs of Thailand expected to make benefits on JTEPA effectively. It is a 
chance to sell agricultural such as banana, mango, mangosteen, pineapple, bell 
pepper, chicken, shrimp, seafood, flowers even more. The standards of product will 
improve by Thailand agriculture could connected with agricultural cooperatives in 
Japan can sell products directly to consumer. Quality of government management is a 
good level because of share of investment has a positive effect on economic growth 
under AFTA, and has a small negative effect between public debates on economic 
growth. The inflation rate has positive effect, which able interpreted Thai government 
has policy to increase minimum wage affect to cost of product increase and the 
employment value rise in short time. Therefore, this effect can reflect to the  
government policy has affect on economic growth of Thailand, as important effect for 
advice the role of Thailand to play in the each market, and as a data base for 
promoting a strategy of international trade policy for development suitable condition 
in next FTA of Thailand. 
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1. Introduction 
The welfare effects of price discrimination and technology licensing are two 
important issues concern economists and policy makers. These two issues are highly 
related in vertically related markets: the innovation and licensing of cost-reducing 
technology in the downstream market affect the way upstream firms set prices, and 
the pricing strategy of the upstream firms also has significant impacts on innovation 
and licensing of technology in the downstream industry. However, to our best 
knowledge, no existing study addresses the relationship between these two. This 
paper examines the welfare effect of price discrimination by constructing a vertically 
related industry model in which an upstream monopolist may perform price 
discrimination in input market and one of two downstream firms licenses its 
cost-reducing technology to the other. 
 
The study on the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in the final-good 
market is originated by Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933), and it is followed by 
Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), and Schwartz (1990). One of the best known 
wisdom of this literature is, with non-decreasing marginal cost, discriminatory pricing 
cannot generate higher social welfare than uniform pricing unless it at the same time 
generates more output. Katz (1983), recognizing that policies regarding price 
discrimination are far more relevant in input market than in output market, initiates 
and inspires studies on welfare effect of price discrimination in input market. 
DeGraba (1990), Yoshida (2000), and Inderst & Valletti (2009) are among the studies 
that follow Katz (1983). The studies on price discrimination in input markets find a 
result similar to those in output markets: price discrimination cannot enhance welfare 
unless it also increases output. Even though the impacts look similar, the economic 
forces behind the impacts are quite different: price discrimination in output markets 
tends to lower social welfare because it reallocates consumption from high-demand 
consumers to low-demand ones; while price discrimination in input markets tends to 
lower social welfare because it reallocates production from low-cost producers to 
high-cost ones.  
 
The licensing strategy of an inside innovator has been studied by Wang (1998), Wang 
and Yang (1999), Wang (2002), Kamien and Tauman (2002), Fosfuri and Roca 
(2004), Liao and Sen (2005), Sen and Tauman (2007), and Poddar and Sinha (2010). 
One of the main concerns of the literature is which licensing contract, royalty contract 
or fixed-fee one, brings higher profit to the innovator. Scenarios vary along different 
dimensions, including homogeneity of products, competition modes, innovation level, 
and so on, have been considered. The results regarding which contract is superior are 
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mixed. 
 
This paper compares social welfare of third-degree price discrimination with that of 
uniform pricing by studying a vertically related industry model in which an upstream 
monopolist may perform price discrimination in input market and one of two 
downstream firms licenses its cost-reducing technology to the other. We find if the 
technology is licensed by means of a royalty, the licenser has a higher ex ante cost 
than the licensee, and the cost reduced by the technology is greater than the initial cost 
difference, then, with no increase in output, the welfare under discriminatory pricing 
will be higher than that under uniform pricing. This result contrasts sharply with the 
well-known wisdom in the literature that an increase in total output is necessary for 
third-degree price discrimination to enhance social welfare. 
 
In the next section we set up the model. In section 3 we examine the welfare effect of 
price discrimination in the case of a royalty contract. In section 4 we study that in the 
case of a fixed-fee contract. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model 
Consider a market structure with a monopolist input supplier and two input buyers, 
firm 1 and firm 2, who use the input to produce a homogeneous final good. Firm 1 
and firm 2 are the only two producers in the final good market and they engage in 
quantity competition. Both firm 1 and firm 2 manufacture one unit of the final good 
by purchasing and processing one unit of the input. Let the purchasing price of the 
input be 1w and 2w for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively, and the processing cost 
be 1c and 2c . If the supplier is allowed to adopt discriminatory pricing, 
then 1w and 2w may be different. If the supplier is constrained to uniform pricing, 
then 1w and 2w must be of the same value, that is, www == 21 .  
 
Assume firm 1 acquires a new technology that lowers processing cost byε through 
previous investment in R&D. The technology can also lower firm 2’s processing cost 
byε , therefore firm 1 can patent this technology and license it to firm 2. Let the final 
good demand function be )( 21 qqap +−= , where 1q and 2q represent the output level 
of firm 1 and firm 2 respectively. 
 
The technology licensing can be either by means of a royalty or by means of a fixed 
fee. We assume the contract form to be exogenously determined and we study them 
separately in section 3 and section 4. If the technology is licensed by means of a 
royalty, a per-unit charge of r on output, the profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 will 
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be given respectively by 
21111211 )()( rqqwcqqqa
r ++−−−−= επ                             (1) 
22222212 )()( rqqwcqqqa
r −+−−−−= επ .                           (2) 
If the technology is licensed by means of a fixed fee, a lump-sum payment f , the 
profit function of firm 1 and firm 2 will be given respectively by 
fqwcqqqaf ++−−−−= 1111211 )()( επ                              (3) 
fqwcqqqaf −+−−−−= 2222212 )()( επ .                            (4) 
Without loss of generality, we assume the production cost of the input to be zero. We 
use 1x and 2x to denote the units of input demanded by firm 1 and firm 2, and 
consequently the supplier’s profit function is given by 
     2211 xwxws +=π .                                               (5) 
 
We model a three-stage game. At stage one, firm 1 determines the optimal royalty or 
fixed fee in the licensing contract. At stage two, the supplier sets input price to 
maximize its profit. If price discrimination is allowed, then the supplier can set 
1w and 2w individually; if price discrimination is not allowed, then the supplier can 
only choose one pricew for both firm 1 and firm 2. At the last stage, firm 1 and firm 2 
engage in Cournot competition. 
3. Welfare effect of price discrimination under royalty licensing 
In this section we assume the technology to be licensed by means of a royalty. We 
solve two three-stage games, one with third-degree price discrimination and the other 
with uniform pricing, separately, and then study the welfare effect of price 
discrimination by comparing the outcomes of the two games. For both games, we 
solve the final-good market equilibrium at first, we next study how the supplier sets 
input price, and in the end we consider how royalty is determined. 
3.1 Price Discrimination 
At the third stage, given r , 1w , and 2w , the Cournot equilibrium can be derived as 
3
)(2 2211
1
rwcwcaqrD +++++−= ε and
3
2)(2 1122
2
rwcwcaqrD −++++−= ε . 
Consequently, firm 1’s and firm 2’s derived demand are rDrD qx 11 = and
rDrD qx 22 = . The 
supplier’s profit function is thus given by 
2
1122
1
2211
3
2)(2
3
)(2 wrwcwcawrwcwcarDS
−++++−
+
+++++−
=
εε
π .   (6) 
At stage two, given r , the supplier chooses 1w and 2w to maximize (6). The solution of 
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the profit maximizing problem is
2
)( 1
1
ε−−
=
cawr and
2
)( 2
2
rcawr +−−= ε . 
Substituting them back to rDq1 and
rDq2 gives us 6
2 21
1
rccaqrD +++−= ε and 
6
22 12
2
rccaqrD −++−= ε . 
For the first stage, we substitute rDq1 and
rDq2 into (1) and get
rDrDrD rqq 2
2
11 )( +=π . Since 
firm 1 is the sole seller of the technology, it gets to choose r to maximize rD1π . It can 
be shown that the profit is maximized when ε=r  if a relevant condition is satisfied.1 
With ε=r , we have the following results: 
6
2 21
21
ε+−−
=+=
ccaqqQ rDrDrD                                        (7) 
2
)( 2rDrD QCS =
                                                      (8) 
rDrDrrDrDrD qqwcqp 211111 )( εεπ ++−−=                                     (9) 
rDrDrrDrDrD qqwcqp 222222 )( εεπ −+−−=                                    (10) 
rDrrDrrD
s qwqw 2211 +=π                                                  (11) 
rDrDrDrD
rD
rD
s
rDrDrDrD qcqcQpQCSSW 2211
2
21 )()(2
)(
εεπππ −−−−+=+++=
   (12) 
3.2 Uniform Pricing 
At the third stage, given r and w , the Cournot equilibrium is given 
by
3
2 21
1
rcwcaqrU +++−−= ε and
3
22 12
2
rcwcaqrU −++−−= ε . Consequently, 
firm 1’s and firm 2’s derived demand for the input are rUrU qx 11 = and
rUrU qx 22 = . The 
supplier’s profit function is therefore given by 
wrwccawxx rUrUrUS 3
222)( 2121
−+−−−
=+=
ε
π .                        (13) 
Given r , the supplier choosesw to maximize (13) at stage two. The solution of 
the profit maximizing problem is
4
22 21 rccawr −+−−= ε . Substituting it back 
                                                
1 The condition is 0)754( 211811 >−−+=∂
∂
=
ε
π
ε
cca
r r
rD
. 
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to rUq1 and
rUq2 gives us 12
52572 21
1
rccaqrU +++−= ε  and 
12
72572 12
2
rccaqrU −++−= ε .  
For the first stage, we substitute rUq1 and
rUq2 into (1) and get
rUrUrU rqq 2
2
11 )( +=π .  
Similar to the previous analysis, it can be shown that the profit is maximized 
when ε=r  if a relevant condition is satisfied.2 With ε=r , we have the following 
results: 
6
2 21
21
ε+−−
=+=
ccaqqQ rUrUrU                                      (14)  
2
)( 2rUrU QCS =                                                     (15) 
rUrUrUrUrU qqwcqp 21111 )( εεπ ++−−=                                   (16) 
rUrUrUrUrU qqwcqp 22222 )( εεπ −+−−=                                    (17) 
rUrrU
s Qw=π                                                        (18) 
rUrUrUrU
rU
rU
s
rUrUrUrU qcqcQpQCSSW 2211
2
21 )()(2
)(
εεπππ −−−−+=+++=   (19) 
3.3 Output and Welfare 
To examine the welfare effect of third-degree price discrimination, we compare the 
results from the previous two subsections. Firstly, we find that rUrD QQ = from (7) and 
(14). With this, we obtain the difference in social welfare between the two pricing 
strategies from (12) and (19): 
4
)]()[()()()()( 212122112211
ccccqcqcqcqc
SWSW
rUrUrDrD
rUrD
−−−
=−−−+−−−−=
−
ε
εεεε
   (20) 
From the above, we obtain Lemma 1: 
Lemma 1. (i) rDrU QQ = ; (ii) 
a) when 021 <− cc  or ε>− 21 cc , 
rUrD SWSW < , 
b) when 021 =− cc  or ε=−< 210 cc , 
rUrD SWSW = , 
c) when ε<−< 210 cc , 
rUrD SWSW > . 
From Lemma 1, we obtain the main result of this paper: 
                                                
2 The condition is 0)3717522( 217211 >−−−=∂
∂
=
ε
π
ε
cca
r r
rU
. 
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Proposition 1. The welfare under discriminatory pricing will be higher than that under 
uniform pricing without increasing output if the licenser has a higher ex ante 
processing cost than the licensee, the amount of the processing cost reduced by 
the technology is greater than the initial process cost difference, and the 
technology is licensed by a royalty contract. 
Proposition 1 contrasts sharply with the well-known wisdom in the literature that 
third degree price discrimination cannot generate higher social welfare than uniform 
pricing does unless it at the same time generates more output. The intuition behind 
Proposition 1 is as follows. First of all, rDrU QQ = , meaning that consumers get the 
same amount of output to consume under these two pricing strategies and thus the 
difference in welfare solely comes from the production side. Secondly, note that the 
condition ε<−< 210 cc  can be rearranged to be 2221 ccrcc =+−=+−<− εεεε , 
thus it means that firm 2 becomes the one with higher total processing cost (real 
processing cost plus royalty) than firm 1 after paying the royalty. Consequently, under 
discriminatory pricing, it will be charged a lower input price than firm 1 since it has a 
lower derived demand, and will produce more output than under uniform pricing. 
However, after adopting the licensed technology, firm 2 also becomes a more efficient 
producer than firm 1 because of a lower real processing cost, hence, the reallocation 
of production from firm 1 to firm 2 under discriminatory pricing rationalizes the 
industry output and improves welfare. 
4. Welfare effect of price discrimination under fixed-fee licensing 
In this section we assume the technology is licensed by means of a fixed fee. Like the 
previous section, we solve two three-stage games, one with third-degree price 
discrimination and the other with uniform pricing, separately, and then study the 
welfare effect of price discrimination by comparing the results of the two games. For 
both games, we solve the final-good market equilibrium at first, we next study how 
the supplier sets input price, and in the end we consider how fixed fee is determined. 
4.1 Price Discrimination 
At the third stage, given f , 1w , and 2w , the Cournot equilibrium is given 
by
3
)(2 2211
1
εε −++−+−
=
wcwcaq fD and 
3
)(2 1122
2
εε −++−+−
=
wcwcaq fD . 
Consequently, firm 1’s and firm 2’s derived demand are fDfD qx 11 = and
fDfD qx 22 = . The 
supplier’s profit function is thus given by 
2
1122
1
2211
3
2)(2
3
)(2 wrwcwcawwcwcafDS
−++−+−
+
−++−+−
=
εεε
π .   (21) 
At the second stage, given f , the supplier chooses 1w and 2w to maximize (21). The 
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solution of the profit maximizing problem is
2
)( 1
1
ε−−
=
caw f and
2
)( 2
2
ε−−
=
cawf . 
Substituting them back to fDq1 and
fDq2 gives us 6
2 21
1
ε++−
=
ccaq fD  and 
6
2 12
2
ε++−
=
ccaq fD . 
For the first stage, we substitute fDq1 and
fDq2 into (3) and (4) and 
get fq fDfD += 211 )(π and fq
fDfD −= 222 )(π . Since firm 1 is the sole seller of the 
technology, it gets to take away all licensing benefits from firm 2 through charging 
an f as high as possible. One can show that highest possible value of f is the 
difference between firm 2’s operation profit after licensing and the profit firm 2 gets if 
it does not adopt the technology. One can get
9
)2( 21 εccaf D +−=  . With Df , we 
have the following results: 
6
22 21
21
ε+−−
=+=
ccaqqQ fDfDfD                                      (22) 
2
)( 2fDfD QCS =                                                      (23) 
DfDffDfDfD fqwcqp ++−−= 11111 )( επ                                    (24) 
DfDffDfDfD fqwcqp −+−−= 22222 )( επ                                    (25) 
fDffDffD
s qwqw 2211 +=π                                                 (26) 
fDfDfDfD
fD
fD
s
fDfDfDfD
qcqcQpQ
CSSW
2211
2
21
)()(
2
)(         εε
πππ
−−−−+=
+++=
                        (27) 
 
4.2 Uniform Pricing 
At the third stage, given f and w , the Cournot equilibrium can be derived 
as
3
)(2 21
1
εε −++−+−
=
wcwcaq fU and
3
)(2 12
2
εε −++−+−
=
wcwcaq fU .  
Consequently, firm 1’s and firm 2’s derived demand for the input 
are fUfU qx 11 = and
fUfU qx 22 = . The supplier’s profit function is therefore given by 
wwccafUS 3
222 21 επ +−−−= .                                       (28) 
At stage 2, given Uf , the supplier choosesw to maximize (28). The solution of the 
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profit maximizing problem is
4
22 21 ε+−−= ccaw f . Substituting it back 
to fUq1 and
fUq2 gives us 12
2572 21
1
ε++−
=
ccaq fU and
12
2572 12
2
ε++−
=
ccaq fU .  
For the first stage, we substitute fUq1 and
fUq2 into (3) and (4) and 
get fq fUfU += 211 )(π and fq
fUfU −= 222 )(π . Similar to the previous analysis, it can be 
shown that f is the difference between firm 2’s operation profit after licensing and the 
profit firm 2 gets if it does not adopt the technology : )710144(
144
7
12 ε
ε
++−= ccaf U . 
With Uf , we have the following results: 
6
22 21 ε+−−= ccaQ fU                                               (29) 
2
)( 2fUfU QCS =                                                      (30) 
UfUffUfUfU fqwcqp ++−−= 1111 )( επ                                    (31) 
UfUffUfUfU fqwcqp −+−−= 2222 )( επ                                    (32) 
fUffU
s Qw=π                                                       (33) 
fUfUfUfU
fU
fU
s
fUfUfUfU
qcqcQpQ
CSSW
2211
2
21
)()(
2
)(         εε
πππ
−−−−+=
+++=
                        (34) 
4.3 Output and Welfare 
To examine the welfare effect of third degree price discrimination, we compare the 
results from the previous two subsections. Firstly, we find that fDfU QQ = from (22) 
and (29). With this, we obtain the difference in social welfare between the two pricing 
strategies from from (27) and (34) : 0
4
)( 221 ≤
−
−=−
ccSWSW fUfD . That is, under 
fixed-fee licensing, price discrimination cannot generate a higher welfare level than 
uniform pricing. Thus we have Proposition 2. 
Proposition 2. Under fixed-fee licensing, price discrimination cannot generate a 
higher welfare level than uniform pricing. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper compares social welfare of third-degree price discrimination with that of 
uniform pricing by studying a vertically related industry model in which an upstream 
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monopolist may perform price discrimination in input market and one of the two 
downstream firms licenses its cost-reducing technology to the other. We find if the 
technology is licensed by means of a royalty, the licenser has a higher cost than the 
licensee before adopting the technology, and the initial cost difference is smaller than 
the cost reduced by the technology, then, with not increase in output, the welfare 
under discriminatory pricing will be higher than that under uniform pricing. This 
result contrasts sharply with the well-known wisdom in the literature that an increase 
in total output is necessary for third-degree price discrimination to enhance social 
welfare 
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Abstract 
 
The indigenous societies in Taiwan had passed through the era which used to assert 
them as barbaric and uncivilized ‘the Others', and was officially de-colonized with 
political motivation and promulgation of certain legislations such as the Indigenous 
Fundamental Law, can still not formalize their customary laws which are prerequisite 
to their entitlement of community resources, such as the indigenous traditional 
knowledge and cultural expressions. 
In December 2007, a sui generis regime to the civil law IP regulations, the Indigenous 
Traditional Cultural Expression Protection Act (ITCEPA), is promulgated. ITCEPA is 
the very first law in Taiwan to substantiate diversified modes of indigenous cultural 
expressions such as songs, dances, weaves and dye, ceremony and even witchcraft as 
community resources entitled to the tribal unit. When certified and registered, the 
collective rights will be legalized retrospectively back to the time immemorial. Any 
established acquisition and exploitation of the resources by non-indigenous peoples 
will be revoked, no matter in which form (copyrights, or trade mark). 
Yet to implement ITCEPA, a tribal units based decision making process and 
management plan are needed, since the sui generis rights are entitled to the 
community only. But with the extended colonial rule and the consequent 
encroachment of Christian preachment and main stream political institutions over 
their community, primitive tribal leadership barely survived. This presentation will 
show how we as an expert group to the Act help 12 ethnic tribes on the Island to re-
establish and re-integrate their political organizations and the decision making 
process. 
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A. The indigenous community in Taiwan and the protection of their resources 
Taiwan is an inherent multi-ethnic nation-State since standing at the front role of the 
Monsoon. Yet it has never been a multiculturalism society before the amendment of 
Constitution in the year of 2000. Assimilating the indigenous peoples into mainstream 
society has always been a formidable policy of the Island’s rulers since colonial 
period. Japanese authority and the succeeding post-War KMT regime possessed the 
same strategy though with different means. Aside from the fierce suppression with 
arm forces, dominating majority also employed disciplines such as anthropology or 
museology to officially characterize the aboriginality as a symbol of 
under-civilization and consequent subordination. The context of aboriginality was 
therefore simplified as exotic outers and incompatible social behaviors carried by a 
group of marginal ‘the Others’ (Hu 2004; 2005). Therefore, compulsory assimilation 
is institutionalized. Police powers were then thrown into the sphere of education and 
sanitization to civilize these savage compatriots, and afterwards a planned migration 
and enclosure. The result is the dissolution of indigenous polity and, most important, 
their resources. 
The waking of indigenous rights in Taiwan is at about the time with the 
democratization movement in the 80’s. Through the process of liberation from KMT’s 
dictator rule, re-habitation of the oppressed sectors such as domestic petti-bourgeoisie 
on the Island formally encompassed that of the indigenous communities. One can see 
blocs of representatives were elected to the ridings and strived to congregate a new 
constitutional moment.   
In the year of 2000, an Amendment to the Constitution which symbolized an epoch of 
indigenous renaissance is inaugurated. Its Article 10(10) avows Taiwan as a 
multiculturalism nation-State: “the State affirms multiculturalism, and positively 
assures the development of language and culture of the indigenous peoples.” Then an 
innovative, ground-breaking Indigenous Fundamental Act was later adopted to 
substantiate the above Amendment in the year of 2005.1  
One can perceive the Fundamental Act as a semi-treaty based constitutional rewrite 
(Huang 2009). Pursuant to the act, the central government will be obliged to respect 
the will of indigenous peoples in terms of their status and future development while 
coordinating with the civil society, and eventually lead to an autonomous entity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The Indigenous Fundamental Act was promulgated on February 05, 2005, includes 35 articles. 
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(Article 4).2 The substantive aspects reflecting these prospects will be to regain 
control over their traditional knowledge and intellectual cultural creations.  
Under Article 133 and Article 204 of the Fundamental Act, the central government is 
commissioned to adopt laws to protect the indigenous entitlement of their land and 
natural resources, together with traditional bio-diversity knowledge and intellectual 
creations, and to promote their future development. Furthermore, while conducting 
research at the areas subject to indigenous title, the government or private party are 
obliged to consult indigenous peoples and obtain their consent or participation, and 
share with them benefits generated from land development, resource utilization, 
ecology conservation and academic researches derived from (Article 21(1))5. 
The above articles have provided themselves as a formal baseline for the exploitation 
of indigenous cultural heritage and nature resources though, specific and workable 
regulations are still in need to provide a due cause of actions either in transactions or 
in courts, which, however, proves to be a difficult task. According to the Fundamental 
Act, nominally, at least six laws covering different aspects are requisite to substantiate 
the admitted rights. Only half of them were enacted at the time. 
B. The ITICPA and its major features  
The traditional cultural creations of indigenous peoples, including their music, dance, 
songs, graphics and folk arts and other objective cultural expressions, had long been 
regarded as res nullius due to their incompatibleness with the necessary conditions for 
IPs protection (Lucas-Schloetter 2008: 383-393; UNESCO & WIPO 1985: par.3). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Indigenous Fundamental Act, Article 4:” The government shall guarantee the equal status and 
development of self-governance of indigenous peoples and implement indigenous peoples’ autonomy 
in accordance with the will of indigenous peoples. The relevant issues shall be stipulated by laws.” 
3 The Indigenous Fundamental Act, Article 13: “The government shall protect indigenous peoples’ 
traditional biological diversity knowledge and intellectual creations, and promote the development 
thereof. The related issues shall be provided for by the laws.” 
4 The Indigenous Fundamental Act, Article 20:” 
(1)The government recognizes indigenous peoples’ rights to land and natural resources. 
(2)The government shall establish an indigenous peoples’ land investigation and management 
committee to investigate and manage indigenous peoples’ land. The organization and other related 
matters of the committee shall be stipulated by law. 
(3)The restoration, acquisition, disposal, plan, management and utilization of the land and sea area 
owned or occupied by indigenous peoples or indigenous persons shall be regulated by laws.” 
5 The Indigenous Fundamental Act, Article 21(1):” The government or private party shall consult 
indigenous peoples and obtain their consent or participation, and share with indigenous peoples 
benefits generated from land development, resource utilization, ecology conservation and academic 
researches in indigenous people’s regions.” 
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Taking copyrightable expression for example, which need to fulfill the requirement of 
containing minimum creativity or originality (Farley 1997: 9-11; Gervais 2003). Yet 
most of the indigenous traditional cultural expressions are aiming to fully replicate the 
traditional elements inherited from generation to generations, even the sheer creativity 
could not, or in most of the case, is not allowed to be generated.  
The individual nature of private property is another hurdle to recognize indigenous 
IPs. Under Article 18 of the Copyright Act of Taiwan, “[t]he protection of moral 
rights of an author who has died or been extinguished shall be deemed to be the same 
as when the author was living or in existence and shall not be infringed upon by any 
person.” The author needs to be an individual to be endowed with moral rights. 
Authors as a group or community such as indigenous tribes cannot enjoy their moral 
right over traditional intellectual creations as a whole, yet for them the individual 
member is not allowed to claim the rights.  
The limited duration of civil law IPs also casts doubt on its applicability over the 
indigenous intellectual creations. Article 30 of the Copyright Act of Taiwan indicates 
that the IPs “[e] ndure for the life of the author and fifty years after the author's death. 
Where a work is first publicly released between the fortieth and fiftieth years after the 
author's death, the economic rights shall endure for a term of ten years beginning from 
the time of the first public release.” Since most of the indigenous traditional 
intellectual works have no traceable date of public release, or have to trace back to the 
time unmemorable, their duration of protection will instantly expire if applied. Not to 
mention as a common essence of current living, the indigenous traditional intellectual 
creations can never expire unless all of the peoples are extinguished. 
On the 7th day of December 2007, the Indigenous Traditional Intellectual Creations 
Protection Act (hereinafter as the ITICPA) made its way through the Legislative Yuan 
(the House of Congress) as an answer to the above Article 13 of Indigenous 
Fundamental Act. With ITICPA as a formal law of the State, the indigenous 
traditional intellectual creations are no longer left in the plight of no protection 
(Huang 2010). 
The traditional intellectual creations protected under ITICPA include the listing 
subject matters like traditional religious ceremony, music, dance, songs, sculptures, 
weave and dye, graphics, wardrobes, folk arts. An open-end, catch-all clause is also 
introduced to the Article so all other expression of cultural activities of the indigenous 
peoples can be protected once they are certified and registered (Article 3).  
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Not like that of the copy-right laws, to receive protections from the ITICPA, the 
creations need to be certified and registered through the administrative agency, i.e., 
the Indigenous Peoples Council of the Executive Yuan (Article 46, 57, 68). Once the 
certification process is completed, the indigenous peoples and tribes registered will be 
entitled to proclaim the exclusive right over the registered creations (Article 7), i.e., 
an unique form of community resources. The exclusive rights include the right to stop 
and prevent any false attribution, distorting, mutilating, modifying, or otherwise 
changing the content, form, or name of the work that damaging the author's reputation, 
and to litigate against any above activities that infringe the registered context (Article 
10).  
All the sui generis rights protected under the ITICPA shall take effect retrospectively, 
which means there will be no vested rights for the current civil law IPs which 
incorporate indigenous intellectual creations registered. Trademarks or 
copyright-protected works exploiting the sui generis rights without lawful licensing 
will be declared void notwithstanding its legality while admitted. This is a typical 
application of general theory of inter-temporal law, i.e., a necessary result of 
transformative justice (Huang 2010). Current practice adopted by the IPs Bureau of 
Ministry of Economy actually complies with the above reasoning. Consultation 
process will be a prerequisite before issuing any indigenous related trade-mark.  
The rights entitled to the indigenous peoples under ITICPA is not individual property 
but collective in nature (Huang 2010:24-26). Therefore, they are parallel to civil law 
IPs (copy-rights, patents and trade-marks). The latter may still be entitled to 
individual members of the tribe or ethnical unit registering the sui generis rights. Such 
a special character of the community resources is also evidenced by Article 22 of 
ITICPA: “The provision of ITICPA shall not affect the rights of the exclusive right 
owner of the intellectual creation and the third party derived from other laws. ” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 ITICPA, Article 4:”Intellectual creations shall be recognized by and registered with the competent 
authority so as to be protected by the Act. The criteria for recognizing intellectual creations mentioned 
in the previous paragraph shall be determined by the competent authority.” 
7 ITICPA, Article 5:”The competent authority shall recruit (assign) personnel of related institutions, 
specialists, scholars and aboriginal representatives to undertake the recognition of intellectual creations 
in addition to any matters stipulated in other regulations. At least 50% of these personnel shall be 
drawn from aboriginal representatives.” 
8 ITICPA, Article 6:”(1)The applicant for any intellectual creation shall provide a written application, 
a specification, necessary graphics, images and related documents or provide audio-visual creations in 
order to apply for registration with the competent authority. 
(2)The applicant mentioned in the previous paragraph is limited to aboriginal groups or tribes and a 
representative shall be elected to take care of all matters arising. The regulations of electing 
representatives shall be determined by the competent authority.” 
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The applicant of this sui generis right, according to ITICPA, will be limited to the 
(official) indigenous ethnic groups or tribes (Article 6(2)) 9, though which may 
eventually be found not as the proprietor or have to be co-entitled with other 
non-applicant ethnic groups or tribes, which is a decision made by the reviewing 
board. Experience learned from the mooting shows no surprises ever happened since 
which is a consensus-oriented community property.  
Provided under scrutiny no specific ethnic group or tribes is the due proprietor, then 
the right shall be registered to the indigenous peoples of Taiwan as a whole, and take 
effect immediately after the date of registration (Article 7(3)). I.e., no subject matter 
will be characterized as res nullius or public domain even if it cannot be found 
attached with any ethnic group or tribes, and the proprietors entitled will include the 
applicants, non-applicant indigenous ethnic groups or tribes, and the indigenous 
peoples of Taiwan as a whole. When pursuing the rights through courts, an official 
representative instead of individual member of the proprietor will have the exclusive 
locus standi.  
Given its nature as collective rights, the rights entitled under ITICPA can only be 
exercised, unless provided by laws or contracts otherwise, by the registered 
indigenous ethnic groups or tribes, or indigenous peoples as a whole exclusively. The 
rights include to exploit and usufruct the propriety rights, and moral rights to a due 
attribution (Article 14 (3)). An individual member of the proprietor, however, is free 
to exploit and usufruct the registered intellectual creations (Article 14 (4)), which 
makes the collective rights subject solely to the customary rules applied by the 
proprietor, and eventually legalize the community resources. One may therefore 
conclude that ITICPA is a leverage to prevent the false exploitation of indigenous 
traditional intellectual creations by the non-indigenous users. With the compulsory 
discourse10, the proprietors can assure that all the utilization will be conducted 
through authentic cultural discourses.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 According to the Taiwan indigenous ethic policy, only the indigenous peoples or tribes officially 
recognized by the government do have official status. Until now, there are many tribes still struggling 
for being recognized by the government. See Shih (2011); Jolan Shieh (2011). 
10 According to Article 1 of ITICPA, the legislative purpose of the Act is: “In order to protect the 
traditional intellectual creations of indigenous peoples, and to promote the cultural development of 
indigenous peoples, this Act is set forth according to Article 13 of the Indigenous Fundamental Act.” 
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C. The implementation of ITICPA- A Mooting Program 
Though have substantiated the sui generis rights recognized by the Indigenous 
Fundamental Act, the ITICPA per se can only provide the minimum and most general 
conditions to the processing and certification of them. Since there are 14 indigenous 
ethnic groups officially recognized in Taiwan, the abundance of their cultural 
diversity and ethnic significance make it barely possible to regulate them respectively. 
Yet while implementing the rights, these general regulations need to be transformed 
into some workable models. Noting this technical requirements, four articles of 
ITICPA authorize its administrative agency to promulgate bylaws, which covers the 
process of electing the representative of the applicant and proprietor to be (bylaws 
No.1), the procedure for the certification, registration and revocation of the sui 
generis rights (bylaws No.3), the standard of certification (bylaws No.2) and the 
management of fund generated from licensing (bylaws No.4) (Huang 2010).    
Taking the aforementioned open-end catch-all clause covering “all other expression of 
cultural activities of the indigenous peoples” in Article 3 of ITICPA as an example, 
there is no rigid definition over the indigenous traditional intellectual creations in any 
article of ITICAP. The certification committee needs a guideline to follow before it 
can admit any right and entitle it to the legitimate proprietor, such as for how long 
shall the intellectual creation exists and be possessed by the applicant, and with what 
conditions shall it be recognized and certified. 
As a group right, the applicant of certification and its proprietor will be limited to the 
(official) indigenous ethnic groups or tribes. Yet before the ethnic groups or tribes can 
be recognized as legal persons, a nature person representative of the applicant or 
proprietor is needed to file application and litigation. Then who shall be eligible and 
through which process to be elected as the representative? The bylaw is supposed to 
provide an answer. 
Currently the second and refined drafts of the four bylaws are completed and withheld 
by the Indigenous Peoples Council for further review. The following are the brief 
introduction of its drafting principles. 
On the process of electing the representative of the applicant and proprietor to be, the 
draft bylaw chooses not to provide respective conditions for each indigenous ethnic 
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groups or tribe of which the governing structure of polity may be highly different, 
instead leaving it to be regulated by the customary laws the polity regularly applies. 
The only compulsory restriction is the representative must be the member of the 
applicant, so to prevent the intervention from outsiders such as IPs brokers (bylaws 
No.1).  
As to the definition of the protected intellectual creations, the draft defines the 
indigenous peoples as a group of people who identify themselves as an organized 
single polity with inner coherence. The shared common languages and customs which 
form an indivisible foundation to such coherence could be traced back to 
unmemorable but lineal timeframe. Therefore, any rights entitled to the polity as a 
whole is of the nature of continuity. The right protected under ITICPA then must be 
an existing right blended with such a significance carried by the applicant. Though its 
context is allowed to evolve along with the technical development provided the above 
indigenous significance is not extinguished (bylaws No.2). With the definition, 
subjects used to be conceived as public domain could be protected under ITICPA, 
such as the linguistic structure and grammar, names of certain indigenous ethnic 
groups or tribes, and common symbols which possess the above characters.          
D. The authentication of cultural representation: lessons learned from the 
moot application  
To accelerate the preparation period psychologically, the Indigenous Peoples Council 
has launched a semi-experimental program as the “Demonstrative Application 
Program on the Exclusive Rights of Indigenous Traditional Intellectual Creations” 
since 2012, so to further assure (to itself and other Authorities) the feasibility and 
practicability of the draft bylaws and the overall infrastructure which may in the near 
future undertake the true operation of ITICPA.11  
The demonstrative program allows 14 local indigenous NGOs to voluntarily represent 
indigenous ethnic groups, tribes or sub-sections within their jurisdiction to undergo a 
moot application procedure. The chosen NGOs represent 12 official indigenous ethnic 
groups. They will undertake the responsibility, under traditional customary law or 
current legal procedure, to re-assemble the tribal congress or assembly and obtain 
their consensus over the issues such as choosing the traditional intellectual creations 
recognized as the most representative yet severely-threatened or exploited ones. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The author was the Chief Investigator of this semi-experimental program. See the program website 
in: http://ctm-indigenous.vm.nthu.edu.tw/. 
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meantime, a historical and cultural review over the origin and preservation of the 
targets, namely the history, exploitation taboos, and cultural implication of the 
expressions, together with field investigation such as procurement of oral evidence 
from the elders, will all be conducted by the NGOs. At the final stage, the 14 NGOs 
will follow the application procedures under bylaws No.3 to file for certification and 
registration with the gathered references. Since it is a moot application procedure, the 
sui generis rights will not be entitled with any tribes, yet the applications and the 
registered propriety under the moot program will be officially acknowledged by the 
Indigenous Peoples Council retrospectively once the bylaws are approved.  
Throughout the program, certain authenticity issues never been conceived either by 
mainstream anthropologists or regulation drafters are revealed. Taking the ITICPA 
itself as an example, the Act provides that only the (official) indigenous ethnic groups 
and tribes can be the legitimate applicants and proprietors to be. However, the moot 
practice proves that to certain indigenous polity, this is not a true statement. Among 
the moot application team one NGO from the official Paiwanian indigenous ethnic 
group vowed to represent not the official ethnic group or tribe as a whole, but their 
own noble-caste family (the Pakedjavai Family). Since the 12 glass beads (the 
Muljimuljidan, the Luseqnaqadaw, the Kurakurau, etc.), traditional home and the 
sacred songs they applied for protection belong solely to the noble family and the 
tribal head due to this unique Paiwanian caste system which is largely followed by the 
ethnic group nowadays. Only the entitled caste families can legitimately utilize 
(including, if necessary, licensing out) those creations.      
Similar situation could be found with another moot team from Tsao ethnic group in 
Chia Yi County. The applicant applied for protection over their famous tribal worship 
rituals Mayasvi and Miyapo. Both rituals are popularly known and documented by the 
anthropologists as enjoined by all of the tribal members. Yet through the consensus 
assembly, it is decided that only the two major tribes (Hosa) possess the legitimacy to 
their narrations and representations, including interpreting the meanings, taboos and 
due process of the ritual. Therefore, if certified, the objects will be entitled to the 
tribes only, not the whole official tribe.  
Notwithstanding the impact of the ITICPA over the reconstruction of indigenous 
cultural integrity and even the prospect of political autonomy through the above moot 
applications, or eventually if the Indigenous Peoples Council will continue to 
subsidize such a sui generis rights management, the process allows, first time in 
history, the indigenous peoples to actively participate as a subject with the 
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establishment of a practical set of authentic cultural representation, which is a core to 
the community resources. In the meantime, the collection and construction of the 
history, taboos, and cultural implication of the target expressions motivated by the 
indigenous polities themselves also help to pave ways for a more equal and balanced 
discourse between the indigenous peoples and non-indigenous community.  
E. The authentication of indigenousness in research and archive disciplines – a 
necessary consequence of legalizing the community resources 
Before the introduction of ITICPA, Copyrights Law of Taiwan and its bylaws are the 
only applicable regime proved certain legal difficulties to the archive program. To 
prevent itself from the risks of infringement of rights, the program tends to archive 
objects whose copyrights protection have expired or have fallen into public domain 
before any due diligence could be completed. Many indigenous related objects were 
among these preferable targets since the dates of their creation are time unmemorable, 
or the proprietor is unknown.  
However, the above strategy is forced to change after the adoption of ITICPA. 
According to its Article 3, the protected indigenous intellectual creations are very 
comprehensive, which include the traditional religious ceremonies, music, dance, 
songs, sculptures, weaving, patterns, clothing, folk crafts or any other expression of 
the cultural achievements of indigenous peoples. Fulfillment of the authentication and 
registration process under Article 4 with the competent authority are the conditions to 
vindicate the rights. The official ethnic groups, tribes, the sub-section of them, e.g., 
family groups as mentioned above, and the whole indigenous people then will become 
the proprietor of the moral right, which includes the right to publicly release the work, 
to be nominated, and to prohibit others from distorting, mutilating, modifying, or 
otherwise changing the content, form, or name of the work12. Property rights are also 
granted to exclusively use and profit from the registered objects13. The above rights 
are neither transferrable not subject to any pledge or taking and will be protected for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 ITICPA, Article 10(2):”The owner of an exclusive right to use intellectual creations enjoys the 
following moral rights of intellectual creations: 
 1. the moral right to publicly release the work. 
 2. the moral right to indicate the name of the exclusive user. 
 3. the moral right to prohibit others from distorting, mutilating, modifying, or otherwise changing the 
content, form, or name of the work, thereby violating the author's reputation.” 
13 ITICPA, Article 10 (3):”The owner of the exclusive right to use intellectual creations shall 
exclusively use and profit from the property rights of such intellectual creations on behalf of specific 
ethnic groups, tribes or the entire indigenous peoples, unless otherwise stipulated by law or agreement, 
and shall exercise the rights mentioned in the previous paragraph.” 
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goods. At the first glance most of the archived indigenous contents are candidates to 
the sui generis regime.  
The propriety under the ITICPA is collective in nature (Huang 2005:32-37), i.e., an 
inherent community resources. Proprietors are ethnic groups, tribes, family groups, or 
the whole indigenous people instead. Therefore, the legitimate means of procurement 
such as acquiring prior informed consents from their individual member who 
physically possess the objects, or through a sales transfer, will no longer validate the 
assessment. Authorization is needed from the registered legitimate proprietors if the 
archives would be publicly released, either through exhibition in museums or virtual 
libraries. There is no specific formality requirement for the necessary authorization, 
yet one can imagine a prior informed consent obtained through comprehensive and 
diligent discourse will be the bottom-line before any bylaws or model form is issued 
by the Authority.     
An instant example of the above turnover could be found in its business application. 
In the year of 2009, Glamorous female indigenous singer Chang Hui-mei (Amei) 
issued a new album titled ‘Amit’. The album tagged itself as a unique charm because 
it includes three songs derived and modified from traditional Puyumen rhythms. Even 
the ITICPA is yet implemented at the time, the record company still managed to seek 
for a semi-collective authorization from the council of the tribe in which the singer 
grew up. No information about the terms and conditions of the authorization though.        
The above incident evidences the noticeability of the intrinsic difference between 
copyrights and the sui generis rights under ITICPA. A prior consent to access is 
requisite not only from the individual possessor, but the community unit the former is 
belonged to. Certainly it is not very clear with which unit shall the archivers negotiate 
the consent, since the political institutions of these potential proprietors vary all the 
time due to current indigenous self-government policy.     
Workable data collections and user-friendly interface both symbol the versatility of an 
archive. A competent archiver needs to retain the ability to design a resilient metadata 
which incorporate both original context and historical lineage. However, when 
applying the said qualifications to the indigenous related archive one may encounter 
two major issues. The first one is that providing a publicly accessible interface is 
equal to publicly release the contents, which requires authorizations from the sui 
generis moral rights proprietors. The second is to categorize and make functional the 
archived indigenous contents could have touched the thin redline as “distorting, 
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mutilating, modifying, or otherwise changing the content, form, or name of the work, 
thereby violating the author's reputation (ITICPA, Article 10)”. A standard-clause 
notice to the website viewers containing key languages of the ITICPA, e.g., the moral 
and property rights are entitled exclusively with certain ethnic groups or tribes, and 
authorization is requisite in case of utilization, is designed as a dialogue box locating 
at the front page of the archive site so to substitute every individual licensing (Huang 
2011:60-64). Only when the viewer reads through and clicks the agreed bottom below 
can he or she access to the archive contents14. Viewers IPs will at the same time be 
located by the webmaster so to monitor any possible infringement.         
As to the relief for the second concern, the archivers are advised to consult with 
proprietors to be over the adequate ways of handling any cultural sensitive contents 
before constructing the metadata. If a taboo or restricted ritual or lyric is archived, a 
comprehensive discourse over the adequacy and formality of public release should be 
conducted beforehand (Huang 2011:66-68). The proprietor will have the right to 
request instant removal of any content from the site if they found the exhibition poses 
a threat to their cultural integration.  
As mentioned above, Social application of the archive contents is a planned and 
indivisible phase of the program. Licensing and transferal of the archive contents are 
always conceived as the necessary means to implement the application. However, 
under the ITICPA, the archiving institutions are not proprietors of the possessed 
indigenous archive contents since which are not transferable. Even if the transferred 
portion is only an edited copy or images which might still be part of the exclusive 
rights of the entitled ethnic groups or tribes. Currently archivers have started to 
prepare a revised version of model licensing clauses to cope with the challenge 
(Huang 2011:64-66). In the meantime, they are urged to actively consult with related 
ethnic groups, tribes and experts and to initiate a comprehensive discourse over the 
issues such as the public release, ways of nomination, mode of application and benefit 
sharing scheme. Though sometimes the tribes may not be the proprietor or a collective 
consensus is not obtainable through established mechanisms.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See the website of the Digital Music Archive Project for Taiwanese Indigenous People: 
http://archive.music.ntnu.edu.tw/abmusic/index.html. (Project investigator: Prof. Chien Shan-Hua, 
college of music, National Taiwan Normal University)  
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